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This PhD dissertation is a result of a three year study in the Graduate School 
in Lifelong Learning at Roskilde University. The research perspective of life-
long learning comprises learning through the whole life course in formal edu-
cation, everyday life, work life, family life, civil society, etc. Thus research in 
lifelong learning calls for an interdisciplinary approach to learning as a subjec-
tive activity in a social context. 
The Graduate School in Lifelong Learning was established in 1999 with 
support from the Danish Research Academy. Since the PhD-programme was 
established more than hundred students have achieved the PhD degree and 
presently around 60 students are enrolled. The Graduate School has an annu-
al enrolment of 10-15 new doctoral students. It is an international research 
training programme. Academic everyday life comprises frequent visits by in-
ternational guest professors and visits by foreign PhD students. Both stu-
dents and supervisors are engaged in international research networks. Also, 
the Graduate School is part of a national network developing and coordinat-
ing educational activities for PhD students. 
The Graduate School draws upon theoretical and methodological inspira-
tion from traditions within the arts and humanities as well as the social sci-
ences. Graduate School training addresses issues traditionally ignored by dis-
cipline-oriented research and professional knowledge. It particularly focuses 
on learning as the subjective mediation of objective, societal and cultural pro-
cesses. Research in Lifelong Learning encompasses a variety of subjects and is 
equally broad in the perspectives it takes. The topics of the PhD dissertations 
are often quite far from what is usually associated with pedagogy, but help to 
co-establish an emerging critical and historically located important area of re-
search. This often demands theoretical and methodological innovation. At 
the same time the programme aims to establish connections between existing 
traditions in pedagogical research and associated disciplines. Methodologically 
the graduate school concentrates on qualitative methods and interpretive 
methodology. Within a wide scope each project may choose and adapt quite 
different methods to the specific research problem. 
A PhD dissertation marks the end of an academic apprenticeship. It 
proves that the author has been “conducting an independent research project 
under supervision” as stated in the “Ministerial Order on the PhD Course of 
Study and on the PhD Degree”. It is the culmination of the process that is 
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published here. PhD dissertations are however also part of the development 
and forming of new areas of research. PhD dissertations are necessary in the 
continuous creation of new knowledge and reading this dissertation assures 
that this process is well taken care of. 
 
This thesis at hand presents an interesting, ethnographic study of interactions 
between professionals and patients in Danish psychiatric institutions. The 
main aim of the thesis is to explore the limitations and possibilities for user 
involvement in daily psychiatric practices in Danish Mental Health institu-
tions. The study was launched as part of the project “User-led Psychiatry” in 
Region Zealand with a particular interest in the “the interplay between lan-
guage, values and user involvement in a psychiatric context”. The thesis is 
based on an ethnographic field study of a closed inpatient ward and an outpa-
tient clinic in Region Zealand in Denmark in 2011. The study lasted three 
months and involved participant observation as well as 13 interviews with pa-
tients and 11 interviews with different professionals.  
The study employs a social constructivist approach to investigate how 
discourses unfold among professionals and patients in the daily psychiatric 
practices. From a Foucauldian perspective, the language used in mental health 
services is regarded as a type of identity work on patients situated in a broader 
institutional context. The interest is to study the relation between broader in-
stitutional discourses and the local reactions to them in the day-to-day inter-
actions. The results of the analysis are presented in three articles. 
The thesis deserves to be read by everyone with an interest in psychiatry 
and people with an interest in the idea of user-involvement. The thesis is 
well-structured and very well-written and it has significant academic impact.  
Theoretically it discusses the difficulties of working with the concept of 
“situated knowledge” (Donna Haraway). It discusses the risk of privileging 
the patients’ knowledge as the only “subjugated” knowledge. Ringer examines 
the difficulties of balancing a position that acknowledges the misery many pa-
tients experience on the one hand, and on the other hand one that does not 
deny the exercise of power in psychiatric treatment.  Ringer intends to move 
beyond a critical deconstruction of dominant discourses of mental health in 
order to explore how these are adopted and challenged in interactions. She 
uses positioning theory to have a focus on the experiencing, embodied sub-
ject, who is not reduced to a strategic, rational discourse-user. 
Methodologically the thesis contributes to the discussion of—and 
demonstrates— how the self-reflexive work of the researcher can be part of 





research question. Article one discusses the researcher’s positioning during 
the fieldwork as sources of data, and it demonstrates how the positioning 
processes were indicative of discursive norms in the field. It argues that the 
categories of “patient” and “professional” and the binary pair of “pathology” 
and normality” worked as structuring norms in the researchers interactions 
with patients and professionals. The problems associated with negotiating a 
position from which to reach both groups are seen as indicative of norms 
that separate professionals from patients, and as indicative of the powerful 
biomedical discourse of pathology. The article concludes that if patients are 
to adapt to the discursive norms of the field in order to be regarded as com-
petent, then the question of how to involve patients is very complicated. Fur-
thermore, if the professional are to adapt to the norms in order to be regard-
ed as “professional”, user involvement does not only depend on the profes-
sionals’ willingness to attend to the patients’ wishes.  
The results of the thesis can contribute to ongoing discussion in the field 
about the barriers for implementing user-involvement, which are not reduced 
to questions about the professionals’ willingness to listen to the patients. In 
article two (“Hell no, they´ll think you are mad as a hatter”) the discursive 
norms in the field are elaborated. Three distinctive institutional discourses are 
identified; the “instability” discourse, the discourse of the “really ill”, and the 
discourse of “lack of insight”. These discourses are derived both from inter-
actions between patients and professionals, and from interviews with patients, 
and thus have a particular focus on the embodied experiences of patients, 
which may become silenced in the meetings with the professionals. It is 
shown that for patients these norms bring to the foreground particular ways 
of visualizing mental illness, rendering other expressions of distress problem-
atic or inauthentic. Patients, who are not able to decode the discursive norms, 
and act according to them, risk having their views dismissed.  The paper con-
cludes that if user involvement is to be taken seriously, it would imply a re-
flexive attention to the discursive norms and their implications. Thus, the 
thesis provides detailed insight in particular norms of the field, which are 
generated by the intensive fieldwork. These norms work as part of the taken-
for-granted knowledge in the field and they are very difficult to reconcile with 
the political intention of increased user-involvement. 
In the third article, the identification of barriers and possibilities are elab-
orated, with a particular focus on incidents in which professionals try to in-
volve patients. The third article (“I would like to retain your compulsory 
treatment, is that alright with you?”) discusses the professionals’ navigation in 
the contradictory field of ethical ideals about equality and listening to the pa-
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tients, and technical discourses on expert knowledge. It demonstrates how 
involving the patients’ perspectives entails a complex balancing act of the 
professionals, which often involves a subtle re-negotiation of discursive 
norms, often in the form of “making exceptions”. It concludes that if user 
involvement initiatives are to extend beyond tokenism, mental health profes-
sionals need to be supported in their endeavors to involve patients by a sys-
tem which allows for complex definitions of mental distress and less rigid 
standards for quality and efficiency. Thereby, the thesis contributes to a criti-
cal discussion about the consequences of neoliberal regulation.  
Finally the thesis provides an important discussion of measures that must 
be undertaken if user-involvement is to be taken seriously. It concludes that if 
the democratic potential of user involvement is to unfold, the truth of psy-
chiatric knowledge has to be revisited and the psychiatric system has to em-
brace diverse definitions of mental distress. Also the patients must to be in-
volved in the planning and organization of psychiatric treatment, if user in-
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A major feature of the policy and practice of mental health care in recent 
decades has been to work towards a more active involvement of patients and 
their perspectives. This initiative is often called user involvement, and broadly 
defined it aims to place the patient, her wishes and needs in the center of at-
tention. However, despite the recognition of the importance of user involve-
ment among policymakers, patients and professionals (Anthony & Crawford, 
2000; Bowl, 1996), there is an increasing amount of research which calls into 
question the extent to which patients and their perspectives are actually being 
involved in the delivery and planning of mental health services (Bowl, 1996; 
S. M. Hodge, 2009; Pilgrim & Waldron, 1998; Roberts, 2010). 
 
Qualitative researchers have specifically suggested that psychiatric language, 
with its restrictive definitions of the patients’ identities and problems, may 
create barriers to involving patients’ perspectives (Borg, Karlsson, & Kim, 
2009; Roberts, 2010; Stickley, 2006). However, many of the discussions on 
psychiatric discourse and service user involvement have been theoretical. This 
thesis takes up the discussions on language in psychiatry and its implications 
for patients, but presents an empirical account of how discourses unfold 
among mental health professionals and patients in daily psychiatric practices. 
Specifically, I explore how discourses that are drawn on in two mental health 
institutions in Denmark create specific norms, definitions of patienthood and 
mental illness - with implications for the patients’ self-understandings and for 
their active involvement in the treatment.  
 
The thesis is based on an ethnographic study of a closed inpatient ward and 
an outpatient clinic carried out in Region Zealand in Denmark in 2011. The 
study lasted three months and involved participant observation as well as 13 
interviews with patients and 11 with professionals. Drawing on the work of 
Michel Foucault and psychological theory informed by his work, I explore the 
ways in which different discourses are drawn on, appropriated, adjusted and 
contested in meetings between patients and professionals. Particularly, I ex-





involvement, i.e. for involving patients and their perspectives in the treat-
ment.  
 
When approaching psychiatric research and practice, the researcher finds a 
contradictory and polarized field. As the medical anthropologist Lorna 
Rhodes (1995:4) has pointed out, there have traditionally been two very dif-
ferent ways of studying psychiatry. One way centers on the patients it treats – 
it focuses on defining their problems (framed in different ways: biological, 
psychodynamic, cognitive, systemic etc.), how they can be treated and how 
they affect the professionals who treat them. This is the underlying perspec-
tive in much of the literature produced by psychiatry itself, for example stud-
ies that aim at providing an evidence base for treatment by evaluating the ef-
ficacy of interventions. Such literature treats many of the problems in psychi-
atric institutions (e.g. the negativity professionals may feel toward patients) as 
elements which interfere with psychiatry’s basic function of helping and treat-
ing patients (ibid.). 
 
The other way of studying psychiatry, often considered irreconcilable with the 
first, views psychiatry as a place of social control, whose function is to nor-
malize deviance and preserve the social order (Rhodes, 1995:5). From this 
perspective, the role of the mental health services is to control and regulate 
people who do not “fit in” with the rest of society. It is this critical perspec-
tive on psychiatry that makes the mental health field a rather special field, 
quite unique in the context of medical specialties.  
 
Both perspectives have been valuable for my work in the thesis. The first per-
spective has encouraged me to remember the well-meaning intentions of psy-
chiatric professionals to help and provide care for people in need. It has also 
prompted me to not diminish the patients’ experiences of distress - and the 
human existential need for establishing caring and supportive relationships. 
The second perspective has been equally important; it has reminded me of 
the importance of the broader social and historical contexts which contribute 
to shaping the identities of those rendered psychiatric patients. It has helped 
me to situate the practices of mental health professionals and the experiences 
of the patients in a wider institutional and cultural landscape. 
 
However, the longer I have spent working on the thesis - writing, reading, 
doing interviews and observations in psychiatric settings - the more have I 
realized that both perspectives fall short of grasping the complexities and 
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contradictions that patients and professionals are faced with every day. There 
is not one psychiatry, but many psychiatries: a plethora of local understandings 
and tensions, varying not only from setting to setting, but from situation to 
situation, professional to professional and patient to patient. With this in 
mind, I aim to provide an account of psychiatric practice which is open to 
complexities and contradictions. Rather than reducing these to one single 
representation, I will approach the field from different angles – and strive to 
acknowledge some of the dilemmas so omnipresent in psychiatry.  
 
My assumption throughout the thesis is that psychiatric language, knowledge 
and practice are not neutral or “objective” reflections of reality, but constitute 
a particular set of knowledge, upheld and made influential by institutions like 
mental health facilities and psychiatric research. In recent years, psychiatric 
knowledge and practice have been subject to massive challenges and criti-
cisms - leading some to suggest that today’s psychiatry is experiencing a “cri-
sis of legitimacy” (cf. Bracken et al., 2012). While it is certainly the case that 
the current policy of user involvement in mental health services is also associ-
ated with other forces, I suggest that the wish to involve patients and to re-
form psychiatry must also be seen in the light of these indictments. The wish 
to involve patients and their perspectives in mental health care may be re-
garded as a way for psychiatry to accommodate to some of the arguments of 
its critics. Before I go on to describe the purpose and aims of this study in 
more detail, I will therefore outline some of the criticism and challenges to 
psychiatry that have been occurring in recent years. 
The crisis in psychiatry 
In 1997 the world-leading medical journal, The Lancet, published an editorial 
entitled “The Crisis in Psychiatry” (Editorial, 1997). In it, the authors argued 
that psychiatry was facing a crisis of previously unseen proportions; the tradi-
tional rigid disease and diagnosis models had little to offer to the ever-
increasing amount of people suffering from various forms of distress in an 
increasingly globalized world. The editorial argued that psychiatry was in des-
perate need to renew its treatment models and assumptions - and unless this 
were to happen the future of psychiatry appeared inescapably bleak. The edi-
torial triggered a series of responses from researchers and psychiatrists. Some 
lent support to the basic premises of the editorial (e.g. Venegas, 1997) while 





painted a too pessimistic picture (Jones & Craddock, 1997; Pincus, 1997). 
However, few could deny that in one way or another, psychiatric treatment 
models, research and diagnostic classifications seemed to rest on somewhat 
unsafe grounds.  
 
Some sixteen years later, in 2013, the notion that psychiatry is in trouble ap-
pears even more evident. The initial enthusiasm that accompanied technolog-
ical advancements in psychopharmacology and neurosciences in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s has proven deceptive. Some prominent psychiatric researchers 
even go as far as arguing that despite decades of economic investments and 
hard labor: 
 “… research into biological mechanisms of mental and behavioral responses 
has failed to deliver anything of value to clinical psychiatrists and is very un-
likely to do so in the future” (Kingdon & Young, 2007: 286).  
 
There is increasingly more evidence from treatment outcome studies that the 
effects of psychopharmacological interventions are unimpressive at best 
(Bracken et al., 2012; Kleinman, 2012; Moncrieff & Cohen, 2009; Moncrieff, 
2008; Whitaker, 2005). For instance, studies have indicated that the antide-
pressants Prozac and later SSRI’s - which were launched in the 1990’s as 
“smart drugs” that would fundamentally transform psychopharmacology - 
have little more effect than placebo (Barbui, Furukawa, & Cipriani, 2007; 
Kirsch et al., 2008; Kirsch, Moore, Scoboria, & Nicholls, 2002; Moncrieff & 
Kirsch, 2005). Further casting doubt on the legitimacy of western treatment 
models, a large-scale WHO-study conducted in the early 1990’s revealed that 
the long-term outcomes for patients with schizophrenia in high-income 
countries, despite these countries’ costly and technologically advanced mental 
health services, were significantly poorer than in developing countries 
(Jablensky et al., 1992; Jablensky & Sartorius, 2008).1  
                                                     
1 The study, which was a 15 year follow-up study, replicated and confirmed the find-
ings of earlier WHO studies conducted in 1969 and in 1978, but made use of a more 
stringent and standardized methodology. The reasons for why people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia are so much better off in developing countries remain speculative. 
Many have attributed this to cultural differences, suggesting that developing countries 
may have stronger social and family ties and less stigma associated with mental illness 
(Bentall, 2003; S Estroff, 1985; Jablensky & Sartorius, 2008). An alternative (and ra-
ther unsettling) interpretation has been put forward by the American science journal-
ist Robert Whitaker (2010), who noted an association between low levels of usage of 
antipsychotic medication in the developing countries in the study and their good rates 
for recovery. Whitaker suggests that the WHO studies provide evidence that in coun-
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The development of the new American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men-
tal Disorders, the DSM-5, which was published this spring (2013), started with 
a grand ambition to provide a “paradigm shift” based on the identification of 
biological markers of mental illness (Frances, 2009), but turned out to be a 
protracted and controversial affair – revealing the contested nature of psychi-
atric classifications. The psychiatrist Allen Frances, who chaired the taskforce 
of the previous diagnostic manual, the DSM-IV, has openly opposed the 
DSM-5, claiming that it medicalizes normality and may result in an “epidemic 
of false positives”, with excessive harmful treatments becoming ubiquitous 
(Frances, 2009:391, 2012). Other leading psychiatrists have called the DSM 
the “death of phenomenology”(Andreasen, 2007), arguing that the: “DSM 
has had a dehumanizing impact on the practice of psychiatry”(p. 111) and 
that the DSM “discourages clinicians from getting to know the patient as an 
individual person” (ibid.) They argue that the diagnostic tools have perhaps 
provided a reliable nomenclature for research, but an invalid and wrong one: 
the diagnoses do not reflect what they should. Still other psychiatric research-
ers, such as Kendell & Jablensky (2003), have argued that psychiatric diagno-
ses may potentially be clinically useful, but are not at all scientifically valid.  
 
Paralleling the internal struggles among psychiatric researchers, we witness a 
rapid expansion of service-user organizations, demanding changes and re-
forms in psychiatry. Some of these organizations take a political stance to-
wards the bedrock of psychiatry – the concept of mental illness - and estab-
lish alternative treatments and support groups that aim at making patients in-
dependent of psychiatric services. For example, the Hearing Voices 
Network/Intervoice, which is the largest international network for service users, 
aims to help people redefine their experiences of hearing voices in ways that 
do not reduce their status to that of the victimized mentally ill (Blackman, 
2001; Fee, 2000; Parker etal., 1995). Service user channels are becoming more 
political, globalized and collectivized and they are gradually more visible in 
the form of books, conferences and magazine articles (Crossley & Crossley, 
2001: 1477; Singla, in press).  
 
                                                                                                                         
tries where patients are not regularly maintained on antipsychotic medication, the ma-
jority recovers and does well within fifteen years. Thus, he argues, long-term usage of 
antipsychotic medication damages neurotransmitter function in the brain, which pre-





At the same time as we witness this “loss of faith” in many aspects of the 
project of psychiatry, the amount of people who are using or may potentially 
use psychiatric services are growing at a previously unanticipated rate. In 2001 
the World Health Organization published the report Mental Health: New under-
standing, new hope (WHO, 2001) to draw attention to the societal challenges 
posed by psychiatric disorders globally. The report estimated that more than 
24% of all people worldwide will suffer from a mental disorder at some point 
in their life; it reported that depression in 2020 will become one of the largest 
financial, social and human burdens in advanced societies. In the USA the 
percentage of the population said to be mentally ill has tripled since 1955, 
with one in four North Americans said to suffer some kind of mental disor-
der within a 12-month period (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). 
Denmark does not deviate from this general tendency. A report published by 
OECD in 2013 (OECD, 2013) estimated that every fifth person of working 
age in Denmark suffers from psychiatric problems - a number equivalent to 
the OECD average. The report estimated that psychiatric problems cost ap-
proximately 45 billion DKK yearly in lost productivity, health service expens-
es and social benefits. A report by Danske Regioner estimated that every second 
Danish family will at some point in their life be in touch with the mental 
health services (Danske Regioner, 2009: 1). According to the same report, the 
amount of patients treated in the mental health services in Denmark has dou-
bled between the years 1999 to 2009. Additionally, the report claims many 
people walk around with “undiagnosed” and “untreated” disorders – and it 
states as one of its goals for psychiatry to be accessible to everyone. While 
there are many potential explanations for why the number of people with a 
presumed mental illness is growing at such a rate, many researchers (e.g. 
Brinkmann, 2010; Rose, 2010) have pointed towards a general “psychiatriza-
tion” or pathologization of the social world - in which an increasing number 
of human conditions, sorrows and miseries are captured under the headings 
of an expanding bio-medical diagnostic system. Thus, they argue, the thresh-
old for when people may be defined or may define themselves as suitable for 
psychiatric treatment has been lowered considerably.  
 
While critical discussions on psychiatry are occurring on a global scale, in 
Denmark some of the developments are still modest in scope. However, here 
also we see some challenges to traditional psychiatry (cf. Singla, in press). 
Apart from The Hearing Voices Network, which nowadays has a branch in 
Denmark with self-help groups and political lobbying around the country, us-
er organizations such as LAP, Landsforening for Tidligere og Nuværende Psyk-
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iatribrugere established in 1999, have become more visible in their work for de-
cisive influence on the practices and delivery of mental health services 
(www.lap.dk). The Danish mental health services have also been in the firing 
line for scandals and heated media debates in recent years. Among other 
things, newspapers have exposed practices of heavy overmedication in hospi-
tals in the area of the capital city, greatly exceeding the guidelines of the Dan-
ish Health and Medicines Authority (Dam Nielsen, 2012; Drachmann, 2012), 
a range of sudden deaths among psychiatric patients due to overmedication 
(Schmidt, 2013b) and excessive use of coercion and methods of restraint 
(Schmidt, 2009, 2013a). This has sparked debates and controversies with, 
among others, the former Prime Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, writing a 
feature for the newspaper Politiken (Simonsen & Nyrup Rasmussen, 2012). 
In the feature he called for a thorough inspection of the “culture of psychia-
try”, claiming that contemporary psychiatry is characterized by coercion, 
overmedication and a lack of respect for human dignity. As a response to 
what he perceived to be development gone awry, the former prime minister 
established Det Sociale Netværk (The Social Network), a network consisting of 
user organizations and NGO’s aimed at promoting change and democratiza-
tion in psychiatry. 
  
In the meantime, and partly to accommodate the criticisms, psychiatric poli-
cy, practice and research have co-opted some of the terms of its critics and 
the service user movement. Terms such as “recovery”, “empowerment”, 
“partnership”, “participation”, “user-led services” and “service user involve-
ment” have become a key part of policy making in the mental health arena. 
Currently, especially the idea of service-user involvement is playing an in-
creasing part in the policy and practice of western psychiatry (Stickley, 2006). 
In Denmark, carer and user participation and involvement is a frequent 
theme in mental health planning and organization, and is now inscribed in 
legislative documents (Psykiatrien Region Sjælland, 2010a; Region Sjælland 
Psykiatri, 2010).  
 
Criticisms of psychiatry are not the only source of the increase of ideas of in-
volving patients in the treatment. The idea of user involvement also has roots 
in consumerist market forces that have shaped the public sector in general in 
recent decades. These are part of a neoliberal ideal of re-structuring the wel-
fare state, a trend sometimes called New Public Management. The movement 
has entailed the processes of an increased managerialism and the creation of 





value on consumer feedback and satisfaction to increase efficiency. In the 
mental health services, the development has involved a discursive shift of ac-
countability to “consumers”, which emphasizes free choice - while rarely 
questioning diagnostic accounts of mental illness (Speed, 2011). Hence, the 
true commitment of policymakers and practitioners to involving patients’ 
perspectives, and the extent to which service user involvement may actually 
be empowering for patients, has been questioned (Pilgrim, 2005; Roberts, 
2010; Stickley, 2006). Some (e.g. Speed, 2011) have suggested that rather than 
psychiatric patients or professionals, the key beneficiary of the consumerist 
trend has been, and continues to be, the state.  
 
These developments set the scene for this thesis. Psychiatry is expanding and 
an increasing amount of people are entering the range of psychiatry’s inter-
ventions. At the same time, there is growing attention, internally and external-
ly to psychiatry, to problematic aspects and traditions in psychiatric practice - 
as well as to an increasing commodification of mental health care. In the area 
of tension between these forces, it becomes relevant to take a closer look at 
psychiatric practice and the idea of user involvement. How is user involve-
ment practiced and understood in a psychiatric context? What is its relation 
to the assumptions which form the base of psychiatry? And what may be the 
barriers and possibilities for democratizing mental health care by involving 
patients in the planning and delivery of services? 
 
One of the regions in Denmark, which has taken the notion of user involve-
ment to heart, is Region Zealand. A few years ago, in 2009, the project “User-
led Psychiatry” (Brugerstyret Psykiatri) was launched in the region. The project 
involved a number of local workshops, theme-days and other dialogue-based 
and educational initiatives to promote working towards the active involve-
ment of patients. User-led Psychiatry took the initiative to launch a study on 
“the interplay between language, values and user involvement in a psychiatric 
context” (Psykiatrien Region Sjælland og Forskerskolen i Livslang Læring, 
2010). And so the idea of this PhD-study was born, which was developed in 
cooperation with the Department of Psychology and Educational Studies at 
Roskilde University. When I started working on the project, the terms lan-
guage and values in the original project announcement were developed into 
an inquiry into discourses, discursive norms and patient identities. In the next 
section, I discuss why it is relevant to study discourses, identities and user in-
volvement in the mental health services. 
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Why study discourse, identities and user in-
volvement?  
My interest in language in psychiatric practice is based on a Foucauldian per-
spective on discourses and subjectivity. From this perspective, the practices 
and language used in the mental health services may be regarded as a type of 
“identity work” on patients, aimed at shaping and changing the patients’ iden-
tities. For instance, giving a psychiatric diagnosis may be seen as an invitation 
for a person to enter a medicalized social category, and thus to work on his or 
her identity and shape it according to the understandings prevailing in the in-
stitution (Roberts, 2005). Other interventions, such as psychoeducation, in 
which patients are taught about their diagnosis, medication which alters the 
person’s thoughts and feelings, as well as psychotherapy, all aim at shaping 
and forming the patients’ “inner self”, or identity. Because the function of the 
mental health services’ is to work on patients’ identities in different ways, this 
opens up questions such as: what types of identities are being constructed 
within the mental health services? How are these identities constructed? - 
And what are the consequences of these constructions? 
 
I suggest that there is an intimate relationship between discourses, practices 
and service user involvement, in that different discourses drawn on in pa-
tient-professional meetings offer a range of identities to patients, which each 
implies specific possibilities of action for them. The question of whether pa-
tients are involved in the treatment therefore essentially becomes a question 
of how the particular psychiatric patient is defined – or who she or he is al-
lowed to “become” (Holen, 2011) in the specific contexts of psychiatry. Stat-
ed bluntly, there are significant differences in defining the patient as a victim 
of a brain disorder (traditional biomedical discourse) and defining the patient 
as a discerning consumer who chooses freely among service providers (con-
sumerist discourse) (Holen, 2011). My assumption, then, is that service user 
involvement should be studied by exploring the discourses that attempt to 
define who the patient is and what her problems are. 
 
The discourse analysts Linda Wood and Rolf Kroger (2000:101) have argued 
that a distinction between what they call “agent” and “patient” is fundamental 
in all discourse. An agent is someone who is seen to make choices, orient to 
rules and can be responsible for their actions. A patient, on the other hand is 
someone who is perceived to suffer the consequences of either external or 





all accounts of human action, both when talking about oneself and when talk-
ing about others. From a discursive viewpoint, this way of seeing people is 
not a claim about whether they actually are one or the other. However, nam-
ing and thinking of someone as an agent versus a patient inevitably has con-
sequences for that person. With this in mind, the wish to promote user in-
volvement in mental health care may be seen as a shift in mental health policy 
to attempt to position users of psychiatry more as agents than as patients. 
 
At the same time the notion of service user involvement is intimately tied to 
another discourse which has increasingly gained footing in the public sector 
since the 1980’s, namely the discourse of consumerism (Pilgrim, 2005). This 
discourse increasingly sees mental health care as delivering a service to a con-
sumer. Health care is seen as a commodity which should be standardized and 
schematized to ensure the most time and cost efficient services. In this con-
text, attempts to position patients as more actively involved are often trans-
lated to a position as free consumers on a market of mental health care 
(Pilgrim & Waldron, 1998). The definition of the patient as consumer con-
ceptualizes the patient as a whole person with needs and wishes beyond those 
from a diagnostic viewpoint (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2010). However, consumer-
ism is based on an assumption of voluntary partnerships, in which consumers 
can take or leave what is offered (Pilgrim, 2005). It has been noted that when 
applied to the mental health services, where involuntary detention and other 
practices of coercion are relatively commonplace, the consumerist logic fits 
rather poorly (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2010).  
 
In Denmark, the discourse of service user involvement is intertwined with 
structural changes in the public sector in general, particularly a neo-liberal 
motion towards efficiency, evidence-based practice and standardization. 
Thus, for instance, we read in the booklet on core values of the mental health 
services in Region Zealand: “There is no mismatch between evidence-based 
practice and [user involvement], as the point of departure is that the patient is 
offered evidence based treatment options that the person concerned can 
choose to accept with guidance from the provider staff” (Region Sjælland 
Psykiatri, 2010:10, my translation). The statement constructs the patient-
professional relationship as an equal give-and-take collaboration among part-
ners. However, it seems to forget that in the meeting between patients and 
psychiatry, there emerge specific power relations, issues of complex depend-
encies, struggles on definitions of mental health problems - and that a sub-
stantial amount of psychiatric patients are being treated involuntarily.  
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In this way, the concept of service user involvement seems double-sided. On 
the one hand it may be an orchestrated move towards increasingly placing re-
sponsibility on the patient (and hence towards cutting public expenses) - but 
on the other, it may potentially open up for increased patient participation 
and a questioning of powerful discourses in mental health practice. This dou-
ble potential has been noticed by others (e.g. Beresford, 2002) who note that 
user involvement may involve both a progressive and positive development 
as well as have a regressive potential. It has been suggested that, although the 
current model of user involvement is not straightforward, a more inclusive 
stance towards users’ views may potentially allow for reforms in the mental 
health system (Borg et al., 2009; Tait & Lester, 2005). In this sense, user in-
volvement may lead to the willingness to increasingly accept psychiatric pa-
tients’ statements, views and understandings as legitimate. However, as 
Stickley (2006) has pointed out, insofar as patients are expected to adopt the 
prevailing understandings of the institution while they are being involved, 
then service user involvement may only serve to perpetuate and reinforce the 
existing power relations.  
 
In the thesis, I am therefore particularly interested in user involvement as the 
possibility of allowing for the inclusion of patients’ perspectives, also when 
these diverge from the prevailing institutional understandings. Such an ap-
proach to service user involvement sees it as possibly opening up for a more 
inclusive stance, in which alternative subject positions and discourses are al-
lowed access to legitimate participation.  
Research questions 
Based on the discussions above, the research question of the thesis is as fol-
lows: 
How are identities as psychiatric patients constituted discursively in 
the contemporary mental health services? What are the implications for 
involving patients’ perspectives in the treatment? 
 
These questions are answered through three articles, each one of which fo-
cuses on a specific topic in relation to the research question, and explores a 






In the first article I approach the topic by applying a self-reflexive methodo-
logical frame. I analyze the methodological dilemmas I encountered during 
the fieldwork, as sources of data which provided clues on discourses and po-
sitions for patients. The sub-questions asked in the article are:  
• What processes of positioning became available for the researcher dur-
ing the fieldwork?  
• How can the researcher positioning processes be interpreted in terms of 
the discourses and norms that shape patient positioning?  
• What might be the implications of this for involving patients’ perspec-
tives in the treatment? 
 
The second article approaches the research question by exploring construc-
tions of mental distress that were present in the settings and their implica-
tions for patients. The sub-questions asked in the article are:  
• How are the various forms of distress that the patients experience de-
fined and understood in terms of mental illness?  
• Which discourses on mental illness are drawn on in meetings between 
patients and professionals?  
• What might be the implications of this for patients and for involving 
their perspectives in the treatment? 
 
While the previous two articles focus specifically on barriers for user in-
volvement, the third article is concerned with both constraints and possibili-
ties for involving patients in the treatment. The sub-questions asked in the 
article are: 
• What possibilities for involving patients’ perspectives are mapped out by 
the dominant discourses in mental health care?  
• When and how does it become possible for mental health professionals 
to involve patients’ perspectives? 
• What might be the implications for mental health practice?  
 
My approach to the research question and choice to explore it from different 
positions is based on an understanding of all knowledge as situated (Haraway, 
1988) (cf. Chapter 2). From the standpoint of situated knowledges, all 
knowledge is seen as “from somewhere”, from a certain partial perspective, 
and can never be free-floating or present a view “from above”. This requires 
the researcher to constantly be aware of her position and relationship to the 
researched. In the thesis this epistemological approach materializes itself in 
three “angles” that I have chosen to pursue in the articles. The first article 
approaches the research questions from the angle of the researcher and in-
quires about processes of researcher positioning. The second article on illness 
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discourses approaches the research question from the angle of patients – and 
asks about their experiences in the mental health services. The third article 
approaches the research question from the angle of mental health profession-
als – and looks at their practices and experiences (cf. Chapter 4).  
 
When I call these angles and not “perspectives”, the intention is to make ex-
plicit that these “angles” are my own constructs which developed during the 
reading of data; they do not as such represent directly the experiences of nei-
ther patients nor professionals. As long as the researcher conducts the analy-
sis, she will have the monopoly of interpretation. My aim with reading the 
material from different angles is to create a nuanced account that attempts to 
analyze psychiatric practice from different positions, rather than to rely on 
the first level of interpretation.  
 
My wish throughout the thesis is to develop a perspective on language, pa-
tient identities and service user involvement, which may encourage profes-
sionals and researchers to reflect on their practices and question taken for 
granted assumptions. In this way I will open up the exploration of the “very 
groundwork of psychiatry” (Barrett, 1996:13). This perspective leads to an 
inquiry into matters that may seem, to clinical psychiatry and perhaps to pro-
fessionals, hardly worth asking about, because they may appear to be so ordi-
nary, so natural, and self-evident (ibid.). Particularly, questions pertaining psy-
chiatric knowledge and involving patients’ perspectives work as a structuring 
thread throughout the three articles of the analysis. In each article I expand 
on and develop new understandings of the challenges and possibilities for in-
volving patients’ perspectives in mental health care. In the final discussion in 
the conclusion I recapitulate the main findings from the three articles and 
discuss how together they relate to my research questions.  
Personal motivation 
My personal interest in language and therapeutic practices stems from my ed-
ucation and therapeutic work as a psychologist. Throughout my education 
and work I have been attuned to the ability of language and communication 
in structuring human experiences and senses of self. My particular interest in 
psychiatric language, psychiatric categories and the experiences of psychiatric 
patients started when I was writing my Master’s thesis in psychology at Co-





diagnosed with borderline personality disorder on their experiences of partic-
ipating in a psychiatric day-center treatment. The thesis focused particularly 
on the patients’ experiences of integrative psychotherapy and was theoretical-
ly informed by phenomenological approaches - and so the thesis did not 
place much emphasis on language and its effects. However, in the interviews 
I noticed that our informants continuously made use of psychiatric vocabu-
lary in defining their experiences. Some defined themselves as “mentally ill”, 
others talked about themselves as “borderline”, “depressed” or “social pho-
bic”; yet others discussed their lacking skills in “mentalization”, “emotion 
regulation” and their “biological vulnerability for psychopathology”. All of 
these terms belonged to a psychiatric professional world, but seemed to have 
been appropriated and adopted by my informants in their processes of mak-
ing sense of themselves. Because the Master’s thesis did not specifically focus 
on discourses and psychiatric categories, at the time, we did not inquire into 
these terms more closely. However, the informants ways of describing them-
selves and their difficulties made me reflect on the question of language, iden-
tity and psychiatric knowledge. What happens to a person when she starts us-
ing psychiatric terminology about herself? Which assumptions about identity, 
mental health and the world are inherent in the psychiatric categories? And 
what if the psychiatric categories do not make sense?   
 
I have had a wish to explore these questions further ever since. When I there-
fore saw the announcement for a PhD position which focused on language 
and psychiatry, I quickly outlined a research proposal. And so I embarked on 
a process which would last three years and would lead me to question many 
of my earlier assumptions. It would also open my eyes to the complexity of 
psychiatric treatment and practice - and to the importance of reflexivity and 
critical inquiry.   
The background and process of the thesis  
The initiators of this PhD-study were the management of Region Zealand 
Psychiatry in Denmark. They wished to promote a patient-centered approach 
and improve the active involvement of patients in the treatment. They were 
interested in the ability of the language used in communication with patients 
to either restrict or promote involving patients in the treatment. Moreover, 
Region Zealand had been working with service user involvement long before 
my official employment. In March 2008, the move for a more active in-
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volvement of patients in their treatment was compiled in Region Zealand’s Plan 
for Psychiatry (Region Sjælland Psykiatri, 2010) which is the document outlining 
the general directions, aims and visions of the Region. In 2009, the Region 
launched the project “User-led Psychiatry” (Brugerstyret Psykiatri), with the 
aim of implementing the values outlined in the Plan for Psychiatry. The val-
ues in the Plan for Psychiatry were formulated broadly, but some of the main 
values were defined as: an interdisciplinary approach to mental illness incor-
porating biological, psychological and social approaches; evidence-based 
practice; “decisive influence” (p.9) of patients on the treatment; involvement 
of relatives and carers; a focus on inter-human relations; respect for the indi-
vidual, her or his resources and autonomy; standardized treatment with a fo-
cus on the individual; least possible coercion; and an integrated and coherent 
treatment (Region Sjælland Psykiatri, 2010; 9-10).  
 
The management forum in psychiatry became the steering group for the pro-
ject User-led Psychiatry. A so called Ambassador group was established; each 
district and facility appointed an “ambassador” who was to promote User-led 
Psychiatry. The ambassadors met one another at regular intervals to discuss 
the developments and how to proceed in order to implement User-led Psy-
chiatry. The ambassador group’s tasks were to create a dialogue about the 
values of psychiatry, to develop a tool to maintain the dialogue and to help 
local managements in planning and going through with local dialogue 
(Psykiatrien Region Sjælland, 2012). The ambassadors organized a large-scale 
theme day for all employees of the region on the values of the mental health 
services in September 2010, in which 300 professionals participated. The am-
bassador group also developed a board game called “the dilemma game”, 
consisting of cases and dilemmatic situations which were aimed at encourag-
ing collaborative reflexivity among professionals. Many districts additionally 
organized local workshop days during which the dilemma game was played 
and presentations and discussions on service user involvement took place. 
The developments of the project were finally described in a report which was 
published in 2012 (Psykiatrien Region Sjælland, 2012). After the three year 
project ended, a center for User-Led Psychiatry was established, with the task 
of developing the work outline for increased involvement of patients and car-
ers.  
 
Another related task of User-led Psychiatry was to initiate a study of “how 
values are expressed through language in practice” (Psykiatrien Region 





search collaboration between the mental health services of Region Zealand 
and the Department of Psychology and Educational Studies at Roskilde Uni-
versity. The co-operation between the two institutions was new and some-
what experimental. While the mental health services of Region Zealand and 
the Psychiatric Research Unit have primarily been engaged in traditional 
quantitative clinical research, the Department of Psychology and Educational 
Studies is primarily engaged in qualitative, critical social research.  
 
In September 2010 I was employed to carry out the study. I had not previ-
ously had any connection to Roskilde University, nor had I worked in the 
mental health services, but my background as a psychologist and my long 
standing interest in critical and discursive perspectives served to fulfill the 
perhaps somewhat different expectations of both organizations. My PhD 
scholarship was financed by the management and District East in Region 
Zealand and I was enrolled in the Research School of Lifelong Learning at 
Roskilde University. I received desk space both at Roskilde University and in 
the Psychiatric Research Unit in Region Zealand. A supervisor from each set-
ting was appointed, and I was greatly encouraged to find a way to bridge the 
differences between the two research traditions and make the study relevant 
and valuable for both organizations. 
 
About half a year into the study, an advisory group for the PhD study was 
established, consisting of members from the psychiatric board of directors in 
Region Zealand, as well as chief physicians and head nurses from the districts 
involved in the study. Other members were stakeholders who had been key 
people in the project User-led Psychiatry. Approximately every half year I 
held meetings with the advisory group during which I presented the new de-
velopments of the study and engaged in empirical and theoretical discussions. 
In the beginning of the PhD process I also attended the meetings of the am-
bassador group for User-led Psychiatry. 
 
As I started working on the thesis and immersed myself into the theoretical 
framework, the focus on “values” in the original project outline was changed 
to a poststructuralist inspired focus on discourses and discursive norms. This 
was done from a theoretical orientation which would allow me to reach fur-
ther into the empirical material and question taken for granted assumptions, 
rather than to just locate and list values. I also wished to de-individualize the 
assumptions and understandings that are drawn on in mental health care. 
With a focus on discourses and norms, institutional and cultural rationales 
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may be invoked as a mode of analysis, rather than people’s personal, individ-
ual beliefs. However, from the point of view of some of the study’s stake-
holders, this decision was not uncontroversial - and it required me to contin-
uously negotiate the terms of the study. At times it seemed there were some 
specific preconceptions and expectations of the study that had not been made 
explicit, which made it difficult to understand the specific demands.  
 
My co-operation with two research centers with different traditions has simi-
larly at times led to tensions. My formal employment status has placed me in 
between different epistemological and ontological fields with an expectation 
that I was to navigate between them. The stakeholders’ varied expectations to 
the study - as well as the fact that the study was strategically important and 
potentially politically charged - have encouraged me to attempt to locate a 
middle ground between the disciplines of psychiatry and social science. It has 
at times been a difficult and challenging process, but also one which has been 
stimulating and educational.  
 
When I bring these reflections into the thesis, this is not just to make explicit 
the processes that have led to the product in the reader’s hand. It is also to 
situate my perspectives and the discussions in the thesis in a wider social and 
historical context. The tensions I have experienced in bridging the fields of 
critical social science and psychiatry, both in the writing process, but also in 
my formal affiliation to two different research centers, are in no way particu-
lar to this study. The medical sociologists David Pilgrim and Anne Rogers 
(2005) have noted that prior to the 1970’s there was a prominent collabora-
tion between the social sciences and psychiatry, and sociologists were often 
active members of academic departments of psychiatry. However - partly be-
cause of psychiatry’s increasing reliance on bio-medical theories, and partly 
because of theoretical developments towards social constructionism in the 
social sciences - after the 1970’s the two disciplines drifted apart. Pilgrim and 
Rogers note that not only did the two disciplines become more distant, but 
mutual suspicion and contempt developed between the two. Psychiatrists 
blamed sociologists for the rise of the anti-psychiatric movement2, and soci-
ologists indicted psychiatry for a lack of critical reflection on the ideological 
nature of psychiatric theory and practice. Since then, the relationship between 
psychiatry and parts of the social sciences has been polarized and strained. 
                                                     
2 The anti-psychiatric movement was actually primarily headed by dissident psychia-
trists, but since they were partly inspired by sociological theories, sociology was at-






For me, this has meant, that throughout the study I have attempted to locate 
a research tradition that presents a critical psychological view, which strives to 
bridge psychiatric and social scientific approaches. This has been difficult, 
and there is hardly an extensive tradition for this in Denmark. However, I 
have found traces of it in recent developments towards a critical and theoreti-
cally informed psychiatry and clinical psychology (e.g. Cromby, Harper, & 
Reavey, 2013; Double, 2006; Rapley, Moncrieff, & Dillon, 2011). There is al-
so an increasing amount of articles in psychological, nursing and clinical jour-
nals which do invite critical and discursive perspectives (e.g. Avdi & 
Georgaca, 2007; Buus, 2005; Hamilton & Manias, 2006; Harper, 1995); albeit 
this is rarely the case in larger mainstream psychiatric journals. It is this bur-
geoning tradition of critical psychological and psychiatric research, inspired 
by discourse approaches, that the thesis inscribes itself into.   
The structure of the thesis 
I have structured the thesis into seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the 
thesis, its research questions and its background. It discusses the context of 
the contemporary mental health services in Denmark and on a global scale, 
with a focus on the controversies and contradictions surrounding the delivery 
of mental health care. Here I also explicate the terminology that is used 
throughout the thesis and I discuss the processes and the tensions that have 
led to the development of the thesis.  
 
In chapter two I review earlier studies on the experiences of psychiatric pa-
tients, professionals’ practices and studies on service user involvement, as 
well as specific important ethnographic studies on psychiatry. I pay particular 
attention to the studies’ strengths and limitations and discuss the contribu-
tions of this study to the field. 
 
Chapter three introduces my empirical field, psychiatry, in a present and his-
torical perspective. I look at the different traditions that have contributed to 
producing psychiatric knowledge, and how the position of the psychiatric pa-
tient has changed historically and contextually. I also describe the functions 
of the contemporary mental health services in Denmark and discuss how this 
thesis understands the institution.  
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Chapter four discusses the theoretical and methodological assumptions that 
the thesis rests on. I discuss the thesis’ epistemological and ontological per-
spectives, particularly the idea of situated knowledges. I also discuss more 
specifically the theories and concepts that I apply in the analysis, namely Fou-
cauldian perspectives on language, discourses and knowledge, as well as dis-
cursively informed psychological concepts of positioning and subjectivity.  
 
In chapter five I describe the settings of the fieldwork – one secured inpa-
tient ward as well as an outpatient clinic and my access to these. I also discuss 
the concrete methods of participant observation and interviews with patients 
and professionals. Finally, the analytical procedure and my ethical considera-
tions of the study are discussed.  
 
Chapter six contains the thesis’ analysis, which is divided into three articles, 
each of which approaches the topic of discourses, patient identities and user 
involvement from a different angle. The first article approaches the topic by 
exploring the processes of researcher positioning during the fieldwork. I ex-
amine the researcher positioning processes I became a part of and explore 
how these may be understood in terms of the discursive norms in the field. 
The second article centers the patients and approaches the topic by analyzing the 
discourses of mental illness that operated in the field, as well as their implica-
tions for patients. The third article centers the actions of the professionals and 
the possibilities and constraints for user involvement in their practices.  
 
Chapter seven concludes the study and discusses its implications for mental 
health care and research. It recapitulates the conclusions of the articles and 
discusses their implications for the wish to implement user involvement and 
for mental health care. The chapter also contains reflections on my research 
process and the strengths and weaknesses of the study.  
Terminology 
Before proceeding to discuss the relevant literature on patient experiences, 
professionals’ practices and service user involvement, it is important to expli-
cate the terminology that will be used throughout this thesis. While it is al-
ways relevant to provide clear definitions of terms in academic work, the 
terms used in mental health research may be particularly politicized, with dif-





(McGrath, 2012). This is perhaps due to the contested nature of mental 
health and illness in general (Rapley, Moncrieff & Dillon, 2011, McGrath, 
2012). In the section beneath, I will discuss the implications of the different 
available terms and I will make an argument for the chosen terminology. 
Mental distress 
There are a number of ways to define the experiences that have placed people 
in mental health care in the first place. Some of these are “mental illness”, 
“mental disability”, “mental disorder”, and “mental distress”. Each of the 
terms carries with it different political and social implications. “Mental disor-
der” or “mental disability” are used in juridical terms such as state and munic-
ipal services as an umbrella term for users of psychiatric services and neuro-
cognitive rehabilitation (McGrath, 2012). It may apply to people both under-
stood as mentally ill and those with brain damages. “Mental illness” is used in 
diagnostic contexts, such as those based on the diagnostic manuals DSM-5 or 
ICD-10. “Illness”, “disorder” and “disability”, are medicalized terms, and 
hence imply a bio-medical understanding of mental health problems, which 
has been widely contested (Bentall, 2003; Boyle, 1990; Cromby et al., 2013; 
McGrath, 2012; Parker et al., 1995; Pilgrim, 2005; Rapley et al., 2011). Fur-
thermore, many psychiatric patients do not think of themselves as ill and alt-
hough many have very distressing problems, they may not attribute these to 
an “illness” (Kinderman, Setzu, Lobban, & Salmon, 2006). Many patients 
therefore dismiss such illness labels or feel resentment towards them.  
 
At the same time some social constructionist accounts have been criticized 
for not taking into account the very real pain and suffering experienced by 
the people who seek psychiatric help (Blackman, 2007; Fee, 2000). For the 
purpose of the thesis, it seems to me that it is necessary to find a term that 
does acknowledge the suffering and misery often experienced by psychiatric 
patients, but at the same time one that does not limit their experiences to a 
diagnostic illness-framework. Following other researchers within a critical 
psychiatry tradition, I therefore use the term mental or emotional distress in the 
thesis, with the intent of trying to find a de-medicalized way of discussing ex-
periences of distress (McGrath, 2012; Speed, 2011). The terms “emotional 
distress” or “mental distress”, is a general term which recognizes the suffering 
often experienced by psychiatric patients, without adhering to a medical or 
diagnostic understanding. In the same way as a diagnosis tends to locate the 
problem in an individual disease process, the term mental distress is intended 
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to locate the problem in meaningful life events and in social discourses and 
narratives (McGrath, 2012). 
 
A difficulty with the use of the term “mental distress”, however, is that not all 
human experiences that are placed under the terms of symptoms of mental 
illness can be correctly described as distressful (McGrath, 2012). Studies have 
for example found that the majority of people who hear voices or have unu-
sual beliefs (delusions) are not distressed by these experiences – and often do 
not come into contact with the mental health services (Eaton, 1991; Tien, 
1991; Watkins, 1998). Moreover, not all psychiatric patients in this study 
spoke of their experiences as distressful - and some even used words such as 
“exciting”, “fun” or “epiphanies”, for experiences which in their medical rec-
ords were listed as hallucinations or other positive symptoms. The lack of 
suitable alternatives to describe the experiences of patients may reflect the 
cultural domination of the language of illness in defining unusual or distress-
ful experiences. As one of the patient’s in this study said about hearing voices: 
“…I have learnt more from [seeing it in my own way], than to just under-
stand it in the sober way: that it is an illness and that is the way it is. But I 
don’t know what damn else to call it, that’s the main issue. I don’t really have 
any words” 
 
These limitations aside, the term mental distress aims to be an alternative to a 
medical term of the patients’ experiences. My intention with using the term 
mental distress and with approaching psychiatry and the experiences of pa-
tients from this perspective is not to demonize mental health services or to 
undermine the fact that a number of psychiatric patients do seem to find a 
diagnostic illness-definition helpful (e.g. Hayne, 2003; Larsen, 2002). Rather, I 
wish to distance myself analytically from the prevailing understandings in the 
field and to point out that calling the patients’ experiences an “illness” is a 
metaphor - namely one way out of many possible for framing their lived ex-
periences.  
Patient as an identity category 
In the thesis I make use of the traditional term “patient” to refer to users of 
psychiatric services, even though the term is becoming increasingly outdated 
in research. In recent decades, a range of alternative terms to the classical 
term “patient” have developed. The terms “consumer” and “client” became 





was argued that the term’s managerialist tone insufficiently captured the us-
ers’ experiences of powerlessness and dependency on the system – and failed 
to acknowledge the significant number of people who were using the services 
against their will (McGrath, 2012; Sadler, 2005). The term “service user” has 
nowadays for the most part substituted the term “consumer” within qualita-
tive mental health research. This is also the case in some official Danish men-
tal health documents, where the term “user” (bruger) is used interchangeably 
with the term “patient” (e.g. Psykiatrien Region Sjælland, 2010a). However, it 
seems to me, at least in Danish3, that the term carries with it similar connota-
tions of voluntary choice as the term “consumer”. In this sense, it similarly 
does not seem to take into account the dependency and power differences 
between professionals and patients. In some other countries, like the UK, the 
term “survivor” is an alternative term used by service-user activists and some 
critical researchers (Speed, 2006). The term “survivor” may refer to both sur-
viving mental health difficulties, as well as surviving the psychiatric system - 
implying a degree of criticism and a contemporary anti-psychiatric discourse 
(Crossley & Crossley, 2001; Speed, 2006). The term is, however, still uncom-
mon in a Danish context.  
 
My employment of the term “patients” is not intended to inscribe the thesis 
in a medical tradition. In the thesis the term is regarded as a discursive cate-
gory that a person occupies when she enters the mental health services, re-
ceives a diagnosis and participates in the treatment. The term “patient” is the 
most widespread way of talking about service users in Denmark, both by pa-
tients themselves and by professionals – and hence it is the most frequent 
discursive category in the field. The term “patient” in the thesis thus becomes 
an analytical term: it is regarded as a subject position made meaningful 
through practice (Foucault, 1983). From this perspective, a patient is not 
something that a person “is”, but rather it refers to a way of constructing a 
person, similarly as identity categories such as “woman” or “immigrant”. It is 
a social, relational category that undergoes changes and is continuously nego-
tiated in a specific context (Holen, 2011). The term “patient” thus refers to 
the discursive construction of the person, as they are seen within the mental 
health system. When a person is rendered into a patient format she is at-
tributed certain characteristics, written up in a file and made into a “case his-
tory” (Barrett, 1996: 13). In this sense, psychiatric institutions may be regard-
                                                     
3 As one of the participants in this study pointed out, in Danish the term for user, 
bruger, is linguistically and semantically approximated to forbruger, consumer.  
 38 
ed as sites in which patient identities are created and managed. When I dis-
cuss the people in this study who receive psychiatric treatment, I will there-
fore use the term “patient”. When I discuss the results of other studies, how-
ever, I will apply the terminology used by the study in question. 
 
Although the term is approached as an analytical category, a difficulty with 
using the term “patient” may be that I risk reproducing the terminology – and 
hence the medicalized assumptions - that are present in the field. In this way, 
an objection may be that by using the term it may become difficult to dis-
tance myself from the prevailing understandings in the field. However, all 
terms at hand - patient, consumer, client and user - are terms used in the 
field, and so carry with them specific psychiatric/consumerist connotations. 
The only term which is fully independent of psychiatric terminology is the 
term “survivor”, but it implies that the person has taken a critical political 
stance towards psychiatry, which I cannot expect that all patients in the study 
identify with. This paradox of terminology is similar to studies that may wish 
to study the discursive constitution of identity categories such as “woman”, 
“man”, “black”, “white” or “immigrant”, but by studying these categories 
they cannot avoid reproducing the very same terminology. Rather than pro-
posing a solution to this paradox, this objection will serve as an inspiration 






Chapter 2: Research on psychi-
atric patients, professionals and 
user involvement 
This chapter discusses relevant studies on patients’ experiences, professionals’ 
practices and service user involvement. The area of the study lies in an inter-
section between different research traditions: psychiatry, sociology, anthro-
pology and psychology. It has therefore been relevant to locate literature 
from databases which focus on these areas respectably. I have searched the 
databases MEDLINE, PubMed, PsycINFO, CINAHL, JSTOR and Sociolog-
ical Abstracts for literature. At different stages in the research process I have 
conducted searches in these databases with the keywords: mental health / 
psychiatry AND discourse / narrative / communication / experience; and 
mental health / psychiatry AND user involvement / empowerment / partici-
pation – and I have selected the articles that I could identify as relevant for 
this study.  
 
The review is selective rather than comprehensive or systematic, in that I 
have selected the most relevant studies and studies that come close to the 
perspective I am applying here. The purpose of the review is thus not to ac-
count for the totality of the existing research on the area, but rather to give 
the reader a broad introduction to some of the ways that patients’ experienc-
es, mental health professionals’ practices, user involvement and psychiatric 
practice in general have been researched. In each article of the analysis in the 
thesis I additionally make a smaller, more specific review of studies which ad-
dress the particular topic of the article.  
 
To make the review more precise I have excluded the great amount of litera-
ture on health communication in non-mental health settings, e.g. physician-
patient communication in general hospitals. Because the mental health ser-
vices have undergone many structural changes (e.g. increasing de-
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institutionalization) and discursive shifts (e.g. the recent discourse of con-
sumerism and managerialism) in the last decades, I will concentrate on studies 
from the 1990’s onwards and mostly from the 2000’s. I have located 33 rele-
vant articles as well as some review studies, which will form the backbone of 
the discussion. To get a more local perspective I have additionally included 
some recent Danish monographs and some quality development studies on 
patient satisfaction conducted in Denmark. Finally, to acknowledge the 
broader research methodology that I draw on, psychiatric ethnography, in the 
last section of the review, I will also outline selected ethnographic “classics” 
conducted in mental health institutions from the 50’s onwards – some of 
which have been a great inspiration for this study.  
 
I have divided the review into four main sections. The first, Research on pa-
tients’ perspectives and experiences, discusses studies which often stem from psy-
chological research and concern “patient” or “client” perspectives on psycho-
therapy, psychiatric practices and relationships with professionals. The sec-
ond section, Research on mental health professionals’ perspectives and practices, 
discusses studies from the professional research literature, commonly found 
in nursing journals. The third section, Quality studies and research on user involve-
ment, discusses a motley collection of research on involving patients in psychi-
atric treatment. I discuss the recent practice of conducting consumer satisfac-
tion surveys in Denmark and I review some academic studies on user in-
volvement. The final section, Classical ethnographies of psychiatry, deals with 
major ethnographic monographs, which have shaped and informed contem-
porary research.  
Research on patients’ perspectives and experi-
ences 
The first group of studies we will examine are studies that focus on patients 
and their experiences of psychiatric treatment. These studies have traditional-
ly been placed quite low in the hierarchy of psychiatric evidence. Currently, 
what is considered the “golden standard” of psychiatric knowledge is the re-
search endeavor of evidence-based medicine, particularly randomized con-
trolled trials. Clinical research in the field of mental health has tended either 
to exclude the views of patients or to portray them as the passive objects of 
study (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2010). There is, however, a rising interest in qualita-





Relationship aspects of patient experiences: phenomenolog-
ical studies 
One widespread way of researching patient experience relies on broad phe-
nomenological4 or largely descriptive approaches, based on interviews with 
patients during or after their mental health treatment. This tradition is most 
prevalent in psychotherapeutic research, with a growing amount of studies on 
clients’ experiences of psychotherapy. Together with colleagues, I have previ-
ously conducted systematic reviews on studies on client perspectives on psy-
chotherapy (Ringer, Sjögren, & Toldam, 2010; Ringer, et al., 2013.). We re-
viewed 41 studies on individual and group therapy and found that altogether 
four main aspects in the psychotherapeutic process are valued by clients: a) 
the relationship with the therapist or with other clients in group therapy - in-
corporating an engaged, accepting and non-judgmental stance; b) the process 
of opening up and sharing difficulties and painful events; c) the clients’ re-
sponsibility and involvement by contributing actively in the therapy process; 
d) the possibility to gain new insights and skills, for example by exploring life 
history with the therapist or co-clients. Overall then, these studies seem to 
demonstrate that clients value the non-technical and relationship aspects of 
therapeutic interventions, rather than specific therapeutic techniques.5  
 
Although these studies may be useful for the practice of psychotherapy, they 
are restricted to one possible component of psychiatric treatment. Indeed, a 
large number of patients in mental health services do not even receive psy-
chotherapy (Bauer et al., 2012). Considerably less attention in research has 
been paid to how psychiatric patients experience mainstream psychiatric 
treatments (Denhov & Topor, 2012). However the studies that have been 
conducted tend to reflect the findings of psychotherapeutic studies, suggest-
ing that psychiatric patients are not preoccupied with the technical proficien-
cy of professionals. Instead, they seem to be much more concerned with the 
human and relationship features of their encounters with mental health pro-
                                                     
4 Here by phenomenological I mean approaches which largely inductively or atheo-
retically try to capture the essence of patients’ experiences. This may be done by a 
range of descriptive qualitative methodologies, such as thematic analysis, grounded 
theory, interpretative phenomenological analysis and so on.  
5 This point is also supported by clinical meta-studies on common factors of thera-
peutic change (e.g. Hubble, Duncan, & Miller, 1999). These meta-studies on effects 
of psychotherapy consistently show that specific technical factors of a given therapy 
method are much less significant for therapeutic change than so called “nonspecific 
factors”, most notably the relationship between client and therapist.  
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fessionals. Informality, trust, being listened to, being taken seriously, being 
treated with respect and kindness and a non-stigmatizing attitude are all men-
tioned by patients as valuable in psychiatric treatment (Denhov & Topor, 
2012; Gilburt, Rose, & Slade, 2008; Rogers & Pilgrim, 1993; Thibeault, 
Trudeau, D’Entremont, & Brown, 2010; Walsh & Boyle, 2009). Additionally, 
a study which focused on users’ experiences of sedation, seclusion and re-
straint (Mayers, Keet, Winkler, & Flisher, 2010) found that users perceived 
these to result from the lack of the aforementioned qualities.  
 
These studies on patient experiences are important in that they strive to give 
“voice” to an otherwise silenced group in research, and stress the importance 
of relationships in the provision of mental health care. However, there may 
be a tendency to reify the personal experiences of users; the users are con-
structed as feeling and experiencing individuals who are able to reflect on the 
interventions conducted by the professionals. In this way the patients’ own 
ability to act and navigate reflexively within the mental health services rarely 
receives attention. A notable exception is a recent study conducted by Topor 
& DiGirolamo (2010), based on focus groups interviews with 15 users diag-
nosed with schizophrenia. Topor and DiGirolamo found that their inform-
ants made active choices and developed rational strategies in order to manage 
their contact with the mental health services. The users explained how they 
adapted their stories of distress depending on how they perceived individual 
mental health professionals or other people they talked to. In this way they 
did not relate to e.g. psychiatrists as to a unified category of people, but rather 
as specific persons whom they were constantly assessing - trying to under-
stand what was expected in the interactions.  
 
Topor & DiGirolamo’s findings are interesting for this study, in that I simi-
larly am interested in how patients (and professionals) act and navigate in re-
lation to the mental health services. However, a more general remark which 
may be raised in relation to theirs and to phenomenological studies in general, 
is their limited attention to social context. Concentrating on the subjective 
experiences and reflections of patients, they rarely situate the patients’ experi-
ences in a broader cultural and institutional framework. In other words, the 
studies indeed place the subject, the patient, in the center of attention – but 






Ambivalence, contextualized strategies and the cultural rep-
ertoire 
We now turn to another tradition on researching patients’ experiences, which 
resists the tendency to decontextualize them. These studies are more in-
formed by theory and often explore how patients react to and deal with pow-
erful cultural and institutional imperatives (e.g. Johansson, 2011; Larsen, 
2004; McGrath, 2012; Speed, 2006; Tucker, 2009, 2010). In Denmark, John 
Aggergaard Larsen (Larsen, 2002; Larsen, 2004) conducted a person-centered 
existential, cultural phenomenological ethnography on 15 patients who were 
enrolled in OPUS6 teams. He found that institutional discourses, based on 
biomedical and cognitive-behavioral models, were both reflected and chal-
lenged in the accounts of service users - who were all engaged in innovative 
meaning-making activities. The users either dogmatically embraced the au-
thority of the explanatory model provided to them by professionals, or they 
acted as bricoleurs of various systems of explanation, including spiritual and ex-
istential systems. In this way, different explanations taken from the cultural 
repertoire were appropriated, rejected and adjusted in a continuous process of 
negotiation.  
 
Larsen found that his participants’ personal understandings of their psychotic 
experiences were vital to the process of recovery, as they afforded meaning to 
the confusing experiences of psychosis. Other studies have found that the 
process of meaning-making and identity construction can be vastly ambiva-
lent for patients, when their problems become categorized as a psychiatric 
diagnosis. For example, Ian Tucker (2009) interviewed people who had been 
diagnosed with schizophrenia in the UK to explore how they constructed 
their identities in light of the diagnosis. He found that a key feature of receiv-
ing the diagnosis was to see one’s identity as under threat from the many neg-
ative cultural stereotypes that persist regarding schizophrenia. The service us-
ers sometimes initially saw the diagnosis as positive in terms of providing a 
relief and explanation. However, after the initial relief there came a subject 
position with many undesirable cultural connotations. In this way, the diag-
nostic criteria continued to present challenges and threats to the maintenance 
of a positive identity. Thus, the service users continually had to make use of a 
range of discursive strategies to shield themselves from being placed in a neg-
ative identity.  
                                                     
6 OPUS teams are special Assertive Community Outreach teams in Denmark which 
are aimed at treating patients with first episode psychosis.  
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While a psychiatric diagnosis and the position of a “psychiatric patient” may 
be full of ambivalences, some studies have pointed to the legitimacy that such 
a position may also grant in specific contexts (Hayne, 2003; Johansson, 2011, 
2010). In a study conducted in Sweden on the meaning and identity of self-
harm, which combined data from 14 interviews with statements from internet 
message boards, Anna Johansson (2010) found that the action of self-harm 
became a way for patients to perform psychopathology in an “authentic way”. 
For the patients Johansson interviewed, cutting was a way to display recog-
nizable signs of disorder, a way for psychiatric patients to become “authentic” 
and visualize their need for care in order to access the mental health services. 
Being an “authentic” self-harmer demanded that the informants positioned 
their self-harm in a psychiatric discourse and juxtaposed it to youth culture 
and “wannabes”. The informants pointed to the importance of being able to 
demonstrate recognizable signs of disorder, to visualize a need for help.  
 
Johansson’s study is interesting for this study for a number of reasons. Simi-
larly to Topor & DiGirolami, Johansson observes that patients are required 
to “manage” their relationship to the mental health system and develop strat-
egies to navigate within it, but in contrast to them she relates this to institu-
tional expectations. She points to a psychiatric and cultural imperative of “au-
thenticity” and “visibility”. She thus indicates the existence of certain norms 
as to how psychiatric patients should act; a point which corresponds to the 
research interest of this study. However, Johansson focuses narrowly on self-
harm and relates her conclusions to the fact that self-harm is not a psychiatric 
diagnosis per se. In my study, which does not focus on a particular form of 
distress, it will be interesting to see if a similar process of persuasion about 
“authenticity” and visibility can be traced.   
 
In conclusion, the studies indicate that psychiatric patients generally seem 
more concerned with the human and relationship factors in treatment than 
the technical or medical proficiency of professionals. This justifies this study’s 
focus on interactions and relationship aspects between patients and profes-
sionals. However, many phenomenological studies on patient experiences fo-
cus narrowly on patients’ reflexive statements and overlook patients’ agency 
and their situatedness in an institutional context. The other tradition of theo-
retically informed studies opens up an exploration of how patients manage 
institutional and cultural assumptions. This perspective allows for the ques-





spective of the patients themselves (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2010). These studies 
indicate a strong ambivalence experienced by patients in the encounter with 
the mental health services. They note that patients engage in active meaning-
making processes and develop strategies in order to preserve a positive identi-
ty in light of institutional and cultural imperatives. These points will be ex-
plored further in this study. 
 
Most studies on patient perspectives rely on interviews with patients as the 
sole method of inquiry. As such, they limit their scope to the reflexive state-
ments of individuals made outside the context of everyday life (Larsen, 2004). 
Consequently, while the studies provide important insights into the experi-
ences of psychiatric patients, little insight is provided into the everyday pro-
cesses that shape how these experiences come about. Here, my study may 
contribute with a situated perspective that is close to practice. Throughout 
the analysis I will explore the themes of identity-negotiation, “authenticity” 
and patienthood in terms of situated interactions between patients and pro-
fessionals.  
Research on mental health professionals’ per-
spectives and practices 
Most qualitative studies on mental health professionals that I have been able 
to identify are from nursing journals, and they focus on nurse-patient interac-
tions. I will discuss these interchangeably with studies that focus on other 
professional groups. 
Workload, paperwork and the discrepancy between ideal 
and practice 
Much of the research on mental health professionals’ practices seem to be 
concerned with the discrepancies between ideals and practice. This is particu-
larly visible in studies on nursing, and may be because the normative ideal of 
the nursing discipline prescribes humanistic values, warmth and empathy 
(Hamilton & Manias, 2006). Many researchers therefore seem to ask: how is it 
that psychiatric practice does not fulfill the ideals we all wish for? How is it 
that patients are not treated as well as we would wish? 
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A common explanation for the discrepancy between ideal and practice is cit-
ed as overwork and paperwork. In a meta-review on 13 observational studies 
on inpatient treatment facilities, Sharac et al. (2010), for instance, found that 
at best 50 % of staff time was spent in contact with patients, and very little 
time on delivering therapeutic experiences. This was partly attributed to the 
professionals having to engage in administrative tasks. A prominent theme in 
many qualitative studies, workload and time pressure are often seen as inter-
fering with caring for and engaging with patients (Cleary, Edwards, & 
Meehan, 1999; Michelle Cleary, 2004; Donnison, Thompson, & Turpin, 2009; 
Hummelvoll & Severinsson, 2001). For instance, in an ethnographic study 
conducted in Norway, Hummelvoll & Severinsson (2001) found that work-
related stress resulted in a discrepancy between ideology and practice. Alt-
hough the nurses wished to apply humanistic and hermeneutic approaches 
which emphasized seeing “the whole patient”, time restraints and workload 
made them more inclined to apply psychiatric-medical models. Similarly, 
Cleary (2004) conducted an ethnographic study in an acute psychiatric unit in 
Australia in the context of mental health reforms. She found that the nurses 
experienced a stressful workload, with competing priorities and demands. 
Particularly, the nurses said that they had very little time to engage in “real 
nursing work” such as caring and being empathetic, because much of their 
time was spent on “non-nursing duties” such as washing up patient cups or 
buying cigarettes for them. As a consequence, the nurses were described as 
“stretched to the limit” and emotionally drained. Despite the circumstances, 
Cleary praises the nurses for “providing expert nursing practice” (p. 56) and 
for not resorting to practices that were “deliberately neglectful or abusive” (p. 
56).  
 
Although the points about stress and workload in these studies are important, 
there are a number of arguably problematic aspects in this research tradition. 
The studies tend to uncritically approach psychiatric work as a solely benefi-
cent practice which in essence only revolves around positive relationships and 
person-centeredness, disregarding that the relationship inevitably involves 
power. In this context, time restraints are seen as restricting an otherwise 
“free” space of warmth and empathy. Both Hummelvoll & Severinson and 
Cleary frame the work of nurses in the highly individualized and idealized 
terms of “caring”, “giving empathy”, and being “person centered”, whereas 
workload or biomedicine are framed as the villain. The researchers tend to 
adopt the language of their informants and their own account becomes en-





the field, the studies just tend to uncritically reproduce them. What is an un-
explored resource for analysis in these studies - the assumptions that are tak-
en for granted and how these are put to use, absorbed, contested and con-
doned - becomes the key focus of my study.  
Among expert discourses - biomedicine and managerialism 
A contrasting tradition of researching professionals’ practices does analyze 
professional assumptions and has a theoretically informed approach. Some of 
these studies have indicated that biomedical discourses, expert power and 
managerialism marginalize patient perspectives and work to uphold status 
quo in professionals’ practices (Hamilton, Manias, Maude, Marjoribanks, & 
Cook, 2004; Harper, 1994, 1999; Middleton & Uys, 2009; Stevens & Harper, 
2007). For example, in a number of interview studies with multi-disciplinary 
professionals, David Harper (1994, 1995; 1999) has demonstrated that pro-
fessionals use a range of discursive strategies which work to secure their pro-
fessional status as experts and portray service users as passive objects of brain 
abnormality. He argues that this understanding is inherent in the way mental 
distress is conceptualized generally in psychiatric practice, and thus is perpet-
ually produced and reproduced by professionals.  
 
Similarly, Bridget Hamilton et al. (2004) interviewed a nurse, a social worker 
and a psychiatrist regarding patient assessment in an inpatient setting. They 
found that the professionals were alert to the patients’ feelings, but tended to 
reframe these in the medical language of psychiatric symptoms and in a man-
agement discourse. The professionals constantly reframed the patients’ feel-
ings and desires into diagnostic categories, which essentially worked to re-
move the patients’ immediate concerns out of sight. In this way the perspec-
tive of patients were marginalized and blocked out. In Denmark, Nelli 
Sørensen (2006) studied nurses and nursing practices in a psychiatric hospital 
through a Foucauldian power analytic perspective. She found that the nurses 
offered patients a new understanding of themselves as subjects responsible 
for controlling and steering their illness, treatment and health. The practices 
offered the patients a new identity as medical or psychological subjects who 
become responsible for their own inclusion in society. The patients could re-
enter society with this new identity, constructed as free, but bound by a psy-
cho-medical power regime.  
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An increasing amount of studies document a tendency of the presence of a 
discourse of managerialism and consumerism in the language practices of 
mental health professionals (Buus, 2005; Hamilton et al., 2004; Hamilton & 
Manias, 2006; Plastow, 2010; Ware, Lachicotte, Kirschner, Cortes, & Good, 
2000). In a review of studies on nurses’ oral and written language in acute in-
patient settings, Hamilton & Manias (2006) documented the increasing emer-
gence of a managerialist discourse in nurses’ language, which was created to 
suit the demand of an increasingly commodified model of mental health ser-
vices. The discourses constructed patients and their progress as objects with 
inherent risk attached, which should be monitored and controlled as goods in 
a consumer society. In Denmark, Niels Buus (2005) conducted a study on 
communication among nurses at two mental health hospitals. Buus found 
that the nurses’ language was a mixture of everyday language and idiosyncrat-
ic technical words with special local connotations. This language was difficult 
to understand for an outsider and could work as a way to maintain hierarchal 
positions among the nurses. Furthermore, the language was constrained by an 
“institutional order of discourse” which contained a managerial discourse and 
a medical-psychiatric discourse. The medical-psychiatric discourse re-enacted 
the hierarchical difference between professional groups. The managerial dis-
course created visibility and control of the nurses, and forced them into the 
practice of documenting and writing their practices down.  
 
Summing up, the studies indicate that workload and time pressure are in-
creasing for mental health professionals in light of the contemporary empha-
sis on efficiency and production. This may contribute to a situation in which 
the professionals have limited resources to reflect on their practice. The work 
of mental health professionals seems to involve contradiction between the 
pressure to medicalize and standardize patients and humanistic ideals about 
“seeing the whole person”. This warrants a closer inspection of how profes-
sionals manage their day-to-day work in light of possible tensions, limited re-
sources and an increasing commodification of mental health work. In article 3 
I will explore the implications of standardization, ideas about professionalism 
and patient identities for the professionals when they attempt to involve pa-
tients’ perspectives. In this way I will relate the professionals’ practices to 





Quality studies and research on user involve-
ment 
Service user involvement has become a major political objective, and there 
are now surveys and questionnaires in Denmark which measure the satisfac-
tion of psychiatric patients with services and thus the extent to which political 
aims have been fulfilled. User satisfaction surveys and questionnaires are rela-
tively new in mental health, and have lagged behind other health care groups. 
This is likely associated with the traditional assumption in healthcare admin-
istration and research that the accounts of psychiatric patients lack credibility 
(Rogers & Pilgrim, 2010). However, in the last few years, studies on patient 
satisfaction with mental health care have been carried out in Denmark - and 
we start this section by discussing this type of studies.  
User satisfactions surveys and studies on patient attitudes to 
involvement 
A study on consumer feedback in outpatient treatment (district psychiatry) in 
Denmark in 2010 showed that 83 % of psychiatric patients declared that they 
had a general positive impression of their treatment, while 17 % declared that 
they had a less positive or negative view (Center for Kvalitetsudvikling, 2011). 
At psychiatric wards in Denmark the number of patients who said they had a 
positive impression of the hospitalization was 71 % and those with a less pos-
itive or negative impression were 29 % (Center for Kvalitetsudvikling, 2010). 
The same study showed that 79 % of patients declared themselves satisfied 
with the level of influence they had during the hospitalization and 21 % un-
satisfied. In 2012 the first LUP7 study of psychiatric patients and their rela-
tives was conducted, and it showed that between 90-95 % of psychiatric pa-
tients said their overall impression of the specific ward or clinic they were in 
was positive. 
 
                                                     
7 LUP (Landsdækkende undersøgelser af patientoplevelser ) is a national survey on 
hospitalized and non-hospitalized patients regarding their satisfaction with the health 
services. It is initiated by Danske Regioner, the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the 
Ministry of Health. It is a questionnaire with questions regarding patient and carer’s 
experiences of satisfaction, involvement, information and organization in the ser-
vices. It has been conducted every year in the general health services since 2000 and 
in 2012 it was carried out in the mental health services for the first time.  
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Consumer satisfaction studies have been criticized for a number of reasons. 
Pilgrim (2005:83) has noted that the functions of satisfaction surveys are not 
clearly defined and so they can be cherry picked and selectively attended to by 
managers. For this reason, consumer feedback questionnaires may function 
more as a de facto legitimization of political goals, rather than actually work-
ing as a background for improving services (Holen, 2011). It has also been 
noted that their format with restrictive, forced choice categories cannot ac-
count for the underlying reasons for the responses. In this regard, high de-
grees of patient satisfaction may actually just as well reflect the patients’ low 
expectations of services, rather than whether they are actually being involved 
(Holen, 2011). Social psychologists have long shown that notions of belief 
and attitude are complex and highly variable from situation to situation 
(Harper, 1995; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Ratings of satisfactions and attitude 
can therefore hardly account for the variations of experiences during psychi-
atric treatment.  
 
Some qualitative studies on user involvement have also been conducted. Re-
gion Zealand has conducted a qualitative report based on focus group inter-
views with three professional groups and one group of patients. The focus of 
the report was on the specific project “User-Led Psychiatry” and the inter-
views were especially concerned with how the professionals had experienced 
the project - and what they perceived as barriers and possibilities. The report 
found that both patients and professionals generally value the idea of service 
user involvement, but that professionals felt that there were limits to the ex-
tent of which the patients could decide in their treatment, “when they were 
very ill” (Psykiatrien Region Sjælland, 2012). A number of qualitative academ-
ic studies have additionally looked at patients’ perceptions of service user in-
volvement. In general, the studies report that psychiatric patients value ser-
vice user involvement and wish to be more involved in the planning and de-
livery of services (Bowl, 1996; Connor & Wilson, 2006; Petersen, 
Hounsgaard, Borg, & Nielsen, 2012; D. Rose, 2003). These studies addition-
ally suggest that patients experience the level of user involvement in mental 
health services as limited and insufficient.  
 
The discrepancy between the consumer satisfaction studies, which indicate 
that patients are satisfied with the level of involvement and services, and aca-
demic qualitative studies, which tend to show that many patients experience 
these as insufficient, is interesting. The inconsistency points to the great varia-





involvement. This indicates a need for more in depth and complex studies of 
the processes that occur in psychiatric settings and their implications for user 
involvement – which justifies this study’s focus on complexities and contra-
dictions. 
Professionals’ attitudes as the main obstacle for involve-
ment? 
Other studies have looked at professionals’ roles in user involvement. In 
Denmark, Petersen et al. (2012) conducted an ethnographic study on user in-
volvement in psychiatric rehabilitation. They found that user involvement 
was experienced by users as a struggle for self-determination and recognition. 
Similarly as the other studies on patients’ perceptions of involvement, the au-
thors report that the users valued being able to have influence and to have 
their goals respected; however they sometimes experienced that this was not 
recognized by the professionals, who were the “real authorities”. In Pe-
tersen’s et al.’s study, there is a tendency to explain obstacles to user involve-
ment in terms of the attitudes of professionals. When service user involve-
ment is found insufficient in the studied setting, the authors attribute this to 
“negative views among professionals regarding [the users’] capability to make 
choices and be involved in care planning” (p. 65), without exploring in any 
depth the possible sources of these views. In this regard, the authors seem to 
suggest that a higher level of service user involvement could be implemented 
if the professionals were just willing to change their negative attitudes.   
 
This tendency to attribute obstacles to user involvement to professionals’ lack 
of willingness to invite patients to participate seems to be echoed in interview 
studies that directly examine professionals’ views on involvement (e.g. 
Anthony & Crawford, 2000; Rutter et al., 2004; Summers, 2003). For exam-
ple, Summers (2003) interviewed 14 psychiatrists in the United Kingdom on 
their views on service user involvement and found that the informants could 
be divided into three categories: optimists, rationalists and skeptics. The “op-
timists” talked about users and professionals as having different but equally 
relevant perspectives which should be afforded the same status. For the “ra-
tionalist” group, endorsement of user involvement was limited to specific 
fields, with user involvement seen as potentially going “too far”. The “skep-
tics” viewed user involvement as unnecessary and said that users had little to 
contribute to the development of services.  
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What these studies seem to share appears to be an implicit reliance on an in-
dividualized definition of user involvement as depending solely, or mostly, on 
individuals’ reflexivity and motivation. Such a position appears to be some-
what simplistic and negates a consideration of the social context of mental 
health work – e.g. the tensions between contradictory discourses guiding psy-
chiatric work found by some of the studies in the previous section. If this is 
the case, then user involvement is about much more than individuals’ reflex-
ivity - and should rather be studied in terms of subtle processes that occur 
between professionals and patients in the context of institutional rationales.  
 
I have not been able to locate studies which look at such processes in terms 
of day-to-day work in the mental health services. However, in an observa-
tional study of a forum dedicated to user involvement, in which users were 
brought into dialog with officials, Hodge (2005) found that there were still 
subtle processes which reproduced and reinforced the power relations of the 
institution. It may be expected that officials who agree to participate in such a 
forum are largely positive to the idea of user involvement, and still, as Hodge 
shows, subtle processes of authority and undermining of patients’ accounts 
were reproduced. The users’ expressions of personal experience were only 
considered relevant in the forum when they could be incorporated instru-
mentally into dominant discourses; professional psychiatric assumptions 
functioned as normative boundaries, which deemed some experiences less 
legitimate. In this way, Hodge’s study seems to suggest that constraints to us-
er involvement cannot only be understood in terms of professionals’ atti-
tudes. This underlines the importance of studies that can address the daily 
practices of user involvement from a situated, contextual perspective. 
Classical ethnographies of psychiatry 
In the previous sections, I have mentioned some newer ethnographic studies; 
however the tradition of doing anthropological research in psychiatric institu-
tions is much older. Perhaps because of its hermetic and closed off environ-
ment, asylums have appealed to ethnographic scholars since the 1930’s, with 





Reforms and total institutions in the 1960’s 
One of the first major ethnographies was Caudill’s study (1958), during which 
he “went undercover” as a patient for two months. Caudill had a reformist 
agenda and identified several problems with the psychiatric hospital at the 
time, which he related to the hospital being a small static society, with limited 
ties to the world outside. The most influential work from the era remains that 
of Goffman’s (1961), whose essays on the social life of patients in “total insti-
tutions” were effectively a critique of state control. The total institution is ac-
cording to Goffman an institution in which the state seeks to control all as-
pects of the inmates’ life and eliminate external influences. A prominent char-
acteristic of the total institution is the gap between professionals and patients, 
who live in two separate social worlds, maintaining antagonism towards each 
other. Patients are subject to demoralizing practices which curb and limit the 
inmates’ sense of self, including role dispossession, and the loss of identity. 
Visits from others are highly restricted and contact to the outside world is 
kept at a minimum. 
 
Goffman wrote Asylums in an era when outpatient treatment was very unusu-
al and most patients were hospitalized for a prolonged amount of time. Con-
temporary ethnographers (Quirk, Lelliott, & Seale, 2006; Schepelern 
Johansen, 2005) have pointed to the differences between modern psychiatric 
wards and the institution described by Goffman. In an ethnography of three 
acute psychiatric wards in London, Quirk et al. (2006) for instance, have sug-
gested a redefinition of Goffman’s focus on the impermeable aspects of the 
total institution to the notion of the “permeable institution” of modern day 
psychiatric wards. Quirk et al. note that in contrast to Goffman’s total institu-
tions, today patients stay in touch with the outside world during their stay; 
and ward membership is temporary and changes rapidly (patients often have 
very short stays and staff turnover is high).  
Early processes of commodification and efficiency 
This state of flux and change in psychiatric wards has partly been related to 
the development towards efficiency and commodification that are becoming 
commonplace in psychiatric care. One ethnographic study of a ward in the 
USA from the 1990’s underlines the burgeoning processes of commodifica-
tion. In her ethnography entitled “Emptying Beds”, Lorna Rhodes (1995) stud-
ied the culture and practice of an acute psychiatric unit. She found that the 
overarching concern of the multidisciplinary team involved the discharge of 
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patients and how to manage the shortest possible stays for them. Rhodes il-
lustrates how the professionals used an array of variable and innovative strat-
egies to consider “options for disposition” (p. 40) in the most efficient and 
timesaving ways possible. For instance, the patients’ diagnoses were often 
given pragmatically rather than precisely, based on what would provide the 
best argument for referral to other facilities. In Rhodes ethnography, there is 
a tangible mechanistic and instrumental theme, reminiscent of the production 
rate in a factory (Hamilton & Manias, 2006). Rhodes points out how difficult 
it was for professionals to maintain an ethical practice in such circumstances, 
and I have used her insightful analyses as an inspiration particularly for the 
third article of the thesis. 
 
Rhodes focuses on the practices of the professionals and the pressure on 
them to “produce empty beds” to be available for new patients (p. 14). 
Hence, she is less concerned with a broader analysis of psychiatric knowledge 
and its effects. Two other major psychiatric ethnographies, conducted in a 
hospital and in community treatment respectably, have focused on how psy-
chiatric concepts of mental illness are put to use and produce effects for pa-
tients. These are Robert Barrett’s (1996) critical study of an Australian psychi-
atric hospital for patients diagnosed with schizophrenia, and Sue Estroff’s 
(1985) study of psychiatric clients in outpatient American Assertive Commu-
nity Treatment.  
Dialectics of deviance and the social production of psychiat-
ric knowledge 
In his seminal ethnography “The Psychiatric Team and the Social Definition of 
Schizophrenia”, Robert Barrett (1996) drew on the social phenomenology of 
Alfred Schultz and Foucault’s analyses of power and knowledge. In the team 
he studied there was a constant tension between practices that on the one 
hand constituted the patient as an object of internal or external forces with-
out a will of her own - and on the other, as an intentional and acting subject 
with volition. Barrett argues that in moving between these two conceptualiza-
tions of the illness and of the patient, the staff were able to effect transfor-
mations in the people they treated. Thus, the central objective of the treat-
ment was to constitute the patient first as an objectified “clinical case” and 
then to put her together as a transformed moral agent. Clinical decisions 
among the team were based on unquestioned common sense and taken for 





deemed legitimate and which were ruled out. These constructed schizophre-
nia as an anomalous cultural category, external to the basic categories of the 
social world and thus “unknowable” for normal people (299). As we will see, 
Barrett’s analyses on the production of psychiatric knowledge have been an 
inspiration for this study, and I will refer many of his findings throughout the 
thesis.  
 
Barrett focuses on the practices of professionals and does not at any length 
explore the patients’ own strategies of relating to the psychiatric categories 
and definitions. The patients are depicted more as people on whom the pro-
fessionals act in various ways. Another mental health ethnography, that of 
Sue Estroff’s, centers on the experiences of patients in relation to categories 
of deviance and mental illness. In her ethnography on clients of a community 
psychiatric treatment facility, entitled “Making it Crazy”, Estroff (1985) found 
that clients, staff and the community participated in the construction and 
perpetuation of a paradoxical and contradictory world. The clients’ principal 
distress was not due to “primary symptoms” such as hearing voices. Instead 
what troubled them the most were the fears, avoidance of others and their 
repugnance towards themselves that they developed as a result of being dif-
ferent from “normals” (p. 235). Estroff found that the clients’ exercise of 
“crazy” customarily granted them rewards that ultimately amplified their dif-
ference from the world of “normals”. For the clients, discharge and getting 
better often meant a loss of support and friends. Thus, Estroff argues, some 
of the clients may have chosen to “make it crazy” and actively pursued “being 
different” (p. 230). This was perpetuated by the negative evaluation of them 
that came with receiving a diagnosis that required a medical treatment. Es-
troff’s findings are interesting for this study in that they indicate that how 
mental distress is conceptualized has major implications for the positions that 
patients can take up and thus likely for user involvement. This warrants a 
closer exploration of psychiatric knowledge, definitions of illness and user in-
volvement. 
 
Barrett and Estroff approach the topic of constructions of mental illness 
from two different angles: focusing on the professionals and the patients re-
spectably. This may be related to their researcher positions during fieldwork. 
While Barrett, an anthropologist and psychiatrist himself, worked profession-
ally at the hospital he studied, Estroff approached the clients and largely had 
contact with them. Barrett (1996:xviii) notes that his position as a psychiatrist 
made it impossible to cross the “social chasm” and be accepted as a research-
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er by patients, however, neither Barrett nor Estroff  discuss at any depth the 
consequences of their position as researcher - and yet they appear to have 
been substantial. The topic of researcher positioning generally seems to be an 
unexplored resource for analysis in mental health ethnographies. This calls 
for a closer attention to the effects and processes of researcher positioning in 
psychiatric fieldwork, which will be pursued in this thesis in article 1.  
Concluding remarks 
Having discussed relevant studies on discourses, patient experiences, profes-
sionals’ practices and user involvement it is possible to outline some possible 
contributions of this study. As we have seen, many of the studies rest on un-
questioned assumptions about the nature of the patients’ problems and the 
beneficent function of the psychiatric system - assumptions uncritically bor-
rowed from psychiatric models. Thus, many studies do not inquire into psy-
chiatric categories, how these are practiced and put to use, and the effects 
they have for patients. In this study, the exploration of taken for granted as-
sumptions in psychiatry is one of the leading threads of the analysis.  In this 
sense, my focus is similar to that of Barrett’s. However, in contrast to his 
study, I will relate the question of illness discourses to user involvement, and 
I do not limit my attention to one diagnosis. Additionally, the focus in this 
thesis is broader than on the professionals’ practices.   
 
This leads us to a second possible contribution of this thesis: generally the 
studies seem mostly to address psychiatric practices from the angle of either 
patients or professionals, and thus center the experiences of one category of 
subjects. This allows many studies an in-depth exploration of one group of 
participants, but the position of the researcher and the experiences of the 
group that is not being centered are rarely given much attention. With my 
choice to approach the field from three different angles - that of researcher 
positioning, the positions of patients and the positions of professionals re-







Chapter 3: The madman, the 
asylum and psychiatry: present 
and past  
This purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the history of 
psychiatry and the present context of the mental health services. I will look at 
psychiatry as a societal institution, with particular focus on the patients’ situa-
tion and the way psychiatric patienthood has been understood in the past and 
present. I do not wish to discuss these issues in great detail; the chapter mere-
ly represents a very broad and basic outline, since the history of psychiatry is 
not the topic of the thesis. However because I am working from a situated 
perspective, I find it important to briefly outline the systems of thought and 
history of ideas that have dominated the development of the psychiatry we 
know today. I will particularly refer to the genealogical work of Foucault on 
the history of madness, and modern sociological accounts on subjectivity, 
psychology and biomedicine. 
 
The chapter serves two functions: firstly, it presents an introduction to the 
field that I am studying and secondly, it functions as an outline to my theoret-
ical understanding of institutions and the institution of psychiatry.  The chap-
ter will attempt to demonstrate how the concept of mental illness and psychi-
atry are not stable, ahistorical or constant entities, but are changeable and var-
ying. I will outline some of the main debates that have taken place, and still 
do, in psychiatric research and practice. I do not seek to resolve the debates. 
Rather the intention is to provide a background for some of the tensions 
which still characterize the mental health field today.  
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Psychiatry as an institution 
Institutions may be defined as complexes organized around a distinctive func-
tion, such as health care or education, which function as nodes of knots in 
ruling relations (Smith, 2002:43).  They are shaped by and construct forms of 
consciousness – knowledge, information, facts, legal rules etc. – that override 
individuals’ perspectives. From this perspective, inherent in the mental health 
services, as in any institution whose task is to help, treat or provide care for 
people with problems, there are specific self-stories and institutional ration-
ales that patients are anticipated to assume (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001). In 
other words, the mental health services comprise an institution which oper-
ates with specific institutional epistemologies (ibid.). In the encounter with 
the mental health professional, the patient's problems become categorized, 
diagnosed and conceptualized according to these institutional epistemologies. 
When a person enters the mental health services, she may not experience her-
self as distinctively ill, or even troubled or distressed (e.g. Kinderman et al., 
2006). An important function for the mental health services then becomes to 
work with the patients to define their problems in terms of an illness that re-
quires psychiatric interventions.  
 
In this light, psychiatry cannot be neutral - it cannot solely offer help based 
on the wishes and needs of the patients (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001). The in-
stitutional epistemologies in psychiatry are based on professional, cultural and 
historic notions of what it means to be a person, and what constitutes per-
sonality and mental illness (Barker & Stevenson, 2000). This implies that to 
understand the institution, the study cannot only examine the micro-
interactions between individual patients and professionals. It must also ex-
plore the broader discourses and positions that become available to patients 
within the institution of modern psychiatry. These are grounded in the histor-
ical and social context that the project of psychiatry emerged from, which we 
will now further explore. 
The birth of Psychiatry  
Michel Foucault, the French philosopher, wrote about the ideas and assump-
tions that have underpinned western civilization’s understandings of madness. 
Foucault traced the economic background of psychiatry to the massive un-
employment created by crises in the early capitalist societies in seventeenth 





bled and the mad were massively confined in big segregated institutions – an 
era Foucault calls “the great confinement”8 (Foucault, 2005). During this 
time, madness was not differentiated from other marginalized characters, and 
the main purpose of confinement was a general concern with order and re-
spectability within the city.  
 
Within the world of confinement, madness started to be conceptualized and 
individualized as lack of reason. Earlier in European history, the conceptuali-
zations of madness had been fragmented, but the madman was often por-
trayed as an animalistic figure: both beast-like and innocent at the same time - 
and often as someone with a specific wisdom, reason and knowledge  
(Foucault, 2001, p. 77). However during the great confinement, madness, 
along with other forms of deviance, came to be considered a self-imposed 
moral detour. In the institutions of the great confinement, the inmates were 
therefore treated with physical punishment and violent coercion.  
 
Towards the beginning of the nineteenth century, psychiatric discourses of 
insanity emerged as part of a reform movement, headed by reformists such as 
Philippe Pinel in France and William Tuke in the United Kingdom. Among 
the psychiatric reformists, the madman was no longer considered beast-like 
or passionate, but was seen as suffering from a disease which required treat-
ment. Thus, the reformists entered the confined institutions and separated 
the mad from the other inmates. The mad were placed in special institutions, 
previous leper colonies, which were devoted to the treatment of the insane. 
The project was finalized with the introduction of a medical person into the 
new asylums. With this, Foucault argues, a new relation between insanity and 
medical thought was born. The doctor became the ultimate representative of 
objectivity and rationality, offering salvation if the patients objectified and 
subordinated themselves to him. In this way, care over the mad became the 
domain of medical science - and a new technical-rational and objectifying un-
derstanding of madness emerged. At the same time, the old moral under-
standing of madness had not been erased. Thus, Foucault argues, these ori-
gins of psychiatry have resulted in two discourses of madness, which still in-
form contemporary psychiatry: a moral discourse of salvation through 
                                                     
8 This version of the history of psychiatry has been disputed by other historians of 
psychiatry (e.g. Porter, 2002; Shorter, 1997: 5). They point out that the era of the 
‘great confinement’ seems to have been largely limited to France and not as wide-
spread in other European countries. E.g. by 1826 in England only about five thou-
sand people were incarcerated, for the most part in the private sector (Shorter, 1997) 
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individual responsibility and a technical discourse of treatment through scien-
tific medicine (Barrett, 1996:16; Foucault, 1984:164).  
 
The reform movements of Pinel and Tuke are often depicted as a story of 
liberation and humane enlightenment, but for Foucault they represent the 
emergence of a new kind of power and surveillance over the mad. By a range 
of techniques, the overt physical punishments which had been carried out by 
persecutors in the institutions of the great confinement, became replaced with 
surveillance and internalized guilt, which were installed in the mad (Foucault, 
1991a: 151-152). With the emergence of psychiatric practice then, the power 
over the mad did not decrease, but just took on a different form. The old in-
stitutions had worked through a very visible power of representation, mani-
festation and corporeal punishment; with psychiatry the power became more 
efficient, “multiple, automatic and anonymous” (Foucault, 1991b:192). 
 
It is important to note that for Foucault, the developments in psychiatry do 
not only reflect discourses that were specific for the institution. Together 
with the birth of other institutions, such as the prison and the hospital, the 
birth of the asylum in the enlightenment era contributed to developing a par-
ticular modern relationship between subject and object, reason and unreason, 
rationality and irrationality. Through these developments, unreason became 
constituted as “the other” - as knowable only from the side of reason (Miller, 
1986). Thus, the birth of the asylums represents the victory of rationality and 
the ultimate separation of it from irrationality. Foucault (2006) argues that 
during the time of confinement, imprisonment and punishment, there had 
been a dialogue of struggle between reason and unreason. However, with the 
conceptualization of madness as mental illness, this dialogue was broken. The 
truth about madness becomes something that could only be understood with-
in the realm of reason, and so the mad person was deprived of the ability to 
say anything meaningful on her condition (Miller, 1986). The language of 
psychiatry thus became, and “a monologue by reason about madness” (Fou-
cault, 2006: xxviii, original emphasis).  
 
In his work on psychiatry, Foucault paints a broad picture of how psychiatric 
discourses became the main regime of defining the mad. He is less concerned 
with the challenges, struggles and conflicts which have surrounded psychiatry 
since its emergence. In the next section I briefly sketch out some of these 





Competing notions of mental illness: Psychiatry as a discur-
sive battlefield 
Psychiatry has been called the “the most contested field in medicine” 
(Hornstein, 2009:6, cited in Harper, 2011:53). Disputes about whether mental 
illnesses are brain diseases or alternatively not illnesses in any sense of the 
word, have been and are still constant in psychiatry. Although most of us as-
sociate criticisms of psychiatry with the anti-psychiatric movements of the 
1960’s and 1970’s, the medical specialty psychiatry has actually encountered 
skepticism and criticism from the very beginning of its emergence - quite un-
like other medical specialties (Miller, 1986; Møllerhøj, 2007). For instance, 
Møllerhøj (2007) has documented how Danish psychiatrists already in the 
nineteenth century complained in journals, textbooks and newspapers about 
the public and state authorities interfering and questioning psychiatric prac-
tice. These early criticisms stemmed from the public and relatives of patients, 
who questioned the ethical aspects of psychiatric methods and the discipline’s 
scientific status. Thus already in psychiatry’s early childhood, it was faced 
with the “problem of the public opinion” (Møllerhøj, 2007), which has 
haunted it ever since.  
 
However, also internally in psychiatric practice and research, there have been 
struggles concerning the function of psychiatry and the nature of mental ill-
ness from the beginning. Among the internal struggles in psychiatry, the de-
bate has traditionally consisted of two camps: on the one hand those who 
mainly believed mental illness stems from a biological deficit associated with 
hereditary factors (traditionally the “somatics”), and on the other those who 
believed that it emerges from social and psychological stressors (traditionally 
the “psychics”). The contrast between these paradigms is important in the 
context of the present day mental health services, as both arguments have 
consequences for how psychiatric patients and their distress are constructed, 
and the types of interventions that become possible.  
 
Within the biological paradigm, the most valid intervention is seen as medica-
tion. Since the difficulties of patients are seen as stemming from a chemical 
imbalance or other problems in the brain, the cure becomes to attempt to al-
ter brain chemistry. The socially oriented position on the other hand, advo-
cates psycho-social interventions, psychotherapy, social guidance and some-
times political change. These two paradigms may be seen as intimately con-
nected to the “moral” and “technical” discourse lying at the foundation of 
psychiatry, which I discussed in the previous section. As Barrett (1996:254) 
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has noted, the two paradigms epitomize different conceptions of who the 
psychiatric patient is. The biological-technical approach asserts that the per-
son with schizophrenia is categorically different from other people due to an 
inherent brain disorder, whose actions cannot be interpreted as meaningful 
besides in terms of their genetic makeup or brain functioning (Barrett, 1996: 
254). Psychosocial-moral approaches state that the person with schizophrenia 
is basically the same as other people and their behavior can be understood as 
reactions to their situation (Barrett, 1996). Different eras have seen the domi-
nance of different models of explanation. However, there is general consen-
sus that in the last many years with an expanding pharmaceutical industry, 
psychiatric research and practice have greatly found their inspiration in the 
medical or biological model (Moncrieff & Crawford, 2001).  
 
The current theoretical model which formally guides psychiatric practice and 
research, the bio-psycho-social model (Engel, 1980) developed in the 1970’s, 
is regarded by many as a type of compromise between the two paradigms, 
which ended a centuries long discussion on the aetiology of mental illness 
(Møhl & Simonsen, 2010). According to the bio-psycho-social hypothesis, 
mental illness arises from a combination of biological, social and psychologi-
cal factors – in that stressful life events are thought to work as “triggers” for 
pre-existing biological vulnerabilities. However, the extent to which the bio-
psycho-social approach actually does acknowledge a causal role for psycho-
social elements has been contested. The psychologist Mary Boyle (2011) has 
argued, that while the model seemingly does acknowledge a role for environ-
mental factors, the significance of these are actually negated. Boyle suggests 
that the implication of the model is that negative experiences are not in them-
selves harmful, but become so because of a biological vulnerability in the per-
son; thus, there is an assumption that “normal people” would be able to 
cope. In this way biological factors are held to be much more fundamental 
and prior. Similarly, Barrett (1996: 247) has noted that with the emergence of 
the bio-psycho-social model, psychiatric science could dominate antipsychia-
try and other psycho-social approaches by incorporating them into a bio-
psycho-social model which reaffirmed the primacy of biology – and so, he 
argues, it has secured biological reasoning as the dominant position in psychi-
atry. Barrett (1996: 245) observes that prior to the bio-psycho-social model, 
low social class, migration and social isolation had been attributed a causal 
role in schizophrenia, but with the introduction of the model, these factors 
went through a shift to become secondary aspects, or just factors influencing 






These critical voices notwithstanding, bio-psycho-social psychiatry has ex-
panded and gained in influence throughout the 20th century. The contempo-
rary significance of both psychological and biological models of mental dis-
tress may be understood in relation to social developments and modern defi-
nitions of subjectivity in western cultures. In order to make sense of these 
developments, I briefly discuss the work of modern sociologists with an em-
phasis on the work of Nikolas Rose.  
Proliferation of the psy disciplines and therapeutic cultures 
The medical sociologist Nikolas Rose (1996) notes that since the inter-war 
year, there has been a proliferation of sites for the practice of psychiatry. He 
argues that an increasing amount of social phenomena have come to be iden-
tified within the domain of what he calls the psy disciplines: psychology, psy-
chiatry, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis. The psy disciplines are “intellectual 
technologies” that serve to make “visible and intelligible certain features of 
persons, their conducts, and their relations with one another” (Rose, 
1996:10). With these developments there has been an increasing psychiatriza-
tion of new problems, a proliferation of the psychiatric population, as well as 
a multiplicity of techniques for normalization (Rose, 1986). Rose (1986) sug-
gests that the contemporary mental health system aims not only at eliminating 
mental illness, but to manage all aspects of life in order to produce and main-
tain mentally healthy citizens.  
 
Rose argues that psychological vocabularies have come to play a crucial role 
in the rationales and techniques of social government, such as in the army, 
medical establishments, among politicians and in schools (Rose, 1990). And 
so, people in general have started to understand themselves as psychological, 
and have begun to live out psychological models in their own talk and experi-
ences. The psy disciplines therefore function as a type of social regulation, 
but not one aimed at repressing people and controlling deviants. Instead, 
people are being regulated internally, by using the psychological models and 
by thinking about themselves as people who could always have better psycho-
logical capacities. In this way, people increasingly learn to govern their own 
subjectivities and self-monitor their mental health status.  
 
Rose’s account of the psy disciplines bears resemblance to the concept of 
“therapeutic culture” developed by Frank Furedi (2004). Furedi has argued 
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that western culture increasingly makes sense of social problems, marginaliza-
tion, inequality, racism and sexism through the individualized tone of thera-
peutic discourse. This has fostered a climate in which the internal world of 
the individual is the primary site in which social problems are sought to be 
resolved. The language of psychotherapy constructs a common sense under-
standing which regards people’s behavior and feelings as the outcome of in-
ternal causation: personal inadequacies, guilt or internal conflict. According to 
Furedi, this framing of the problems of everyday life makes people feel vul-
nerable, powerless and ill. In this way it imposes a new conformity through 
the management of people’s emotions.  
 
Both Rose and Furedi are mainly interested in the regulatory and surveillance 
aspects of the psy-disciplines and therapeutic culture. However, along with 
researchers such as McLeod & Wright (2009), it can be argued that this per-
spective may not pay sufficient attention to the situated ways in which thera-
peutic and psy rationales are negotiated contextually. McLeod & Wright argue 
that although psy-based practices may be a way to regulate subjectivity, in 
some contexts they can potentially open up transformative and productive 
possibilities for marginalized people. Thus, an account which only focuses on 
the negative and social regulatory aspects of therapeutic and psy models may 
ignore the sense of capacity that such models may also afford in some con-
texts. When I raise the reflection that psy and therapeutic cultures in the daily 
lives of marginalized groups may also have positive effects, the intention is 
not to dismiss the regulatory and powerful aspects of such discourses. Nei-
ther is it to disregard the importance of structural inequalities or to argue for 
a romanticized view of “personal change”. Rather, the point is only to high-
light that the effects of the psy disciplines are perhaps more contradictory and 
multi-facetted than their portrayal in some sociological accounts (McLeod & 
Wright, 2009). This underscores the importance of studying these processes 
from a situated, local perspective in relation to the everyday experiences of 
groups of people.  
Neurochemical selves in the 21st century 
In his later work, Rose has argued that in the last few decades, with the popu-
larization of psychopharmacology, brain imaging techniques and develop-
ments in genomics, people in western societies have increasingly come to un-
derstand their minds and selves in terms of their bodies and brains (Rose, 





derlying chemical imbalances in the brain. These conditions are increasingly 
thought to require interventions by drug treatment that may “re-balance the 
chemicals” (Rose, 2003). According to Rose (2003), Western societies are in-
creasingly becoming "psychopharmacological" societies. In such societies, the 
boundaries between normalization of pathology and the enhancement of ca-
pacities in general are becoming fuzzy. Human subjectivity can potentially be 
routinely re-shaped by psychiatric drugs. The task of the responsible and ac-
tive citizen then becomes to take control in the name of maximizing his or 
her potential, to engage in constant risk-management, to monitor the moods, 
emotion and cognition in a continuous process of self-scrutiny (Rose, 2007).  
 
Rose argues that this development has brought with it a fundamental shift in 
the relations between mental health and illness, and is linked to a transfor-
mation in our conceptualization of personhood. In as much as the previous 
conception of personhood was grounded on the ideas of the psy disciplines, 
in the 21st century we increasingly think of ourselves as somatic and neuro-
chemical individuals.  
 
For psychiatry, according to Rose, this has meant that from the 1990s on, 
there has been an important shift in psychiatric thought and practice. Alt-
hough there is little firm evidence which links mental illnesses to neurotrans-
mitter functioning in the brains of unmediated patients (Moncrieff, 2008), a 
new way of psychiatric thinking has taken shape. In this new paradigm, the 
explanations of mental illness must “pass through” the brain and its neuro-
chemistry to be legitimate (Rose, 2003). This does not mean that biography, 
trauma, social and environmental factors are ruled out, but rather that they 
are considered to have effects through their impact on the brain, again af-
fording biological explanations primacy. As Rose notes, some 25 years ago, 
such claims would have seemed bold. This shift has reshaped how both pro-
fessionals and lay people interpret, speak about and understand themselves 
and the world. Individuals who have never come near psychiatric hospital are 
beginning to speak about their moods as chemical imbalances, and act upon 
themselves in light of these understandings.  
 
After this brief overview of sociological accounts of the history of ideas of 
psychiatry, we now turn our attention to the historical developments in Dan-
ish psychiatry and its present situation. This is provided in order to situate 
this study in a more local and concrete context. 
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The mental health services in Denmark 
A brief history of Danish psychiatry 
Danish psychiatry has to a large extent developed historically parallel to its 
sister-institutions in other countries. The first psychiatric hospital in Denmark 
opened in 1816, as Sct. Hans hospital in Roskilde, and it was rebuilt and ex-
panded in 1860. In 1852, a first modern-type of psychiatric hospital was inau-
gurated in Risskov and by the end of the nineteenth century there were five 
more psychiatric hospitals in Denmark (Vaczy Kragh, 2010). From about 
1840, Danish physicians who worked with madness saw it as a physical and 
biological illness. Curiously, according to Møllerhøj (2005), the most im-
portant argument for the focus on biology and heredity in Denmark was reli-
gious and metaphysic: since the idea of a “sick soul” went against the 
protestant Christian teachings of the immortality of the divine soul, it had to 
be the body/brain, not the soul/mind that was somehow dysfunctional 
(Møllerhøj, 2008).  
 
The focus on mental illness as a physical disease became stronger towards the 
end of the century. Psychiatric practice and research in Denmark, headed by 
the physician Knud Pontoppidan (1853-1916) concentrated on identifying 
concrete, localizable damages to tissues or organs (Møllerhøj, 2008). This 
parallels the attempts in other countries to provide legitimacy and an air of 
science to the new project of psychiatry. At the same time, just as in other 
western countries, in 19th century Denmark, the most widespread form of 
psychiatric treatment became moral treatment, adopted from Tuke and Pinel 
- a treatment aimed at having a mental or spiritual influence on the patient 
(Shorter, 1997). Moral treatment was understood as a system of upbringing of 
the patients, which aimed at teaching the patient a sense of order and moder-
ation and thus to work on their inner mental life. Thus, although Danish psy-
chiatry had a strong commitment to biological and hereditary understandings, 
in practice it relied on moral understandings which were not addressed or ful-
ly acknowledged by the psychiatric establishment (Møllerhøj, 2008). This in-
consistency points again to the tension that, as we saw, lies at the very heart 
of psychiatry: the tension between a moral discourse of subjective salvation 
and a technical discourse of medical treatment.  
 
Although moral treatment was common in psychiatric hospitals, the biologi-





distress until the 1940’s when psychoanalysis gained greater influence in 
Denmark (Hansen, 2008). In the 30’s and 40’s Danish medical journals such 
as Ugeskrift for Læger and Hospitalstidende had vivid discussions about the legit-
imacy of psychoanalysis, psychology and pedagogics in psychiatry. In 1948 
the National Association for Mental Hygiene (Landsforeningen for Mentalhy-
giejne) was established, with the aim of spreading knowledge about mental 
disease as connected to the inner world of people - and as related to social, 
environmental and personal factors (Hansen, 2008). In this way, psychosocial 
understandings of mental distress gained greater footing in the world of Dan-
ish psychiatry after the Second World War. This paved the way for develop-
ments such as de-institutionalization and anti-psychiatry.  
De-institutionalization and anti-psychiatry 
As in most of the Western world, there was a large shift in the Danish institu-
tional practices and policy towards mental illness in the second half of the 
20th century: known as de-institutionalization. In Denmark this new way to 
structure mental health care, informed by community psychiatric approaches 
and involving a closing of the great asylums in favor of outpatient treatment, 
was called “district psychiatry”. The first time the term “district psychiatry” 
was used in an official Danish document was in 1965 (Lindhardt, 2001). Up 
until 1976 the mental health services functioned as large state hospitals with 
the number of inmates ranging from 500 to 2,000 (ibid.). In 1976 the total 
number of beds in psychiatric hospitals in Denmark was 12,700 (Lindhardt, 
2001). In the latest report on access to psychiatric services among adults, is-
sued in August 2012, the total number of beds in Denmark was 2,745 
(Rigsrevisionen, 2012). These developments have been accommodated by a 
physical and administrative placement of the psychiatric institutions in the 
somatic hospital system. 
 
Prior to, and parallel to de-institutionalization and the establishment of out-
patient “district psychiatry”, new critical perspectives on psychiatric practice 
had appeared in Denmark, as in many other countries. The criticism came 
from dissident psychiatrists, psychologists and service-user movements. In 
1960 the American psychoanalyst Thomas Szasz (1974) published The Myth of 
Mental Illness in which he argued that the idea that mental distress was an ill-
ness was a myth based on inconsistencies and misunderstandings detrimental 
to patients and society at large. The same year the British psychiatrist Roald 
D. Laing (1969) published the book The Divided Self and joined the psychiatrist 
David Cooper to head the anti-psychiatric movement. Previously the sociolo-
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gist Erving Goffman (1961) had published the work Asylums. In Denmark, 
much of the anti-psychiatric criticism was put forward by a combination of 
Marxist and Freudian theory, which emphasized the oppressive nature of in-
stitutions (Hansen, 2008).  
 
Today, while psychiatric wards still exist, their function is less one of lengthy 
“confinement” than of spaces for short-term stays with a goal to discharge 
quickly into the community. In 2011 the average stay at a psychiatric ward 
(excluding forensic patients) in Denmark only lasted 18.04 days (Deloitte, 
2012). At the same time, the number of outpatients has risen considerably. 
The result is that mental health professionals in wards now appear to rather 
manage the movements of a constantly changing groups of patients (Buus, 
2005). These developments have also been spurred by another reformist 
agenda, intimately entwined with the agenda of de-institutionalization, but al-
so associated with other reforms in the welfare state of late capitalist societies: 
namely that of neo-liberal ideologies.  
Neo-liberal critique and transformations in the welfare state 
The process of the closing of asylums and de-institutionalization has often 
been portrayed as a story of liberation which ended an era of abuse by dehu-
manizing “total institutions” and began the move to a more modern and hu-
mane treatment (McGrath, 2012). Nonetheless, it has been noted that de-
institutionalization, although assisted by activist movements, matched the 
aims of a wave of neo-liberal politics in the 1980’s (Hansen, 2008; McGrath, 
2012). In this way, de-institutionalization seemed to have had had both eco-
nomic and ideological roots.9 
 
In the 1980’s and 1990’s, in Denmark, there arose a project of modernization 
of the welfare state. It was built on a neo-liberal critique, which portrayed the 
welfare state as a pacifying colossus that made individuals dependent and 
weak (Hansen, 2008). Large scale state-implemented projects were expensive 
and were becoming increasingly less popular. Meanwhile the political climate 
                                                     
9 Some historians of psychiatry (e.g. Shorter, 1997) have attributed de-
institutionalization to the introduction of antipsychotic drugs - specifically the inven-
tion of chlorpromazine - claiming that the effects of the psychotropic drug made it 
possible for patients to live in normal community settings. However this version of 
events has been widely refuted, since it has been shown that an increased pattern of 
de-institutionalization began prior to the distribution of chlorpromazine  (cf. 





increasingly stressed individual’s responsibility and freedom of choice. The 
concrete strategies of the project of modernization were to decentralize the 
public sector, to expand the private sector and to create options of freedom 
of choice for citizens, who were increasingly construed as consumers (Han-
sen, 2008).  
 
In Denmark, these reforms in the public sector played a key role in the pro-
cesses of de-institutionalization of the mental health services and the rise of 
district psychiatry. With the neo-liberal reforms, citizens were expected to be-
come active and responsible agents who took responsibility for themselves 
and were involved in solving social problems (Hansen, 2008). The closing 
down of the asylums matched these ideologies: a large collective system was 
replaced with one which partly delegated responsibility for living, treatment, 
distress and recovery to the individual patient instead of the institution 
(McGrath, 2012). In this context, ideas from Marxist movements went hand 
in hand with the neo-liberal processes, as they both emphasized empower-
ment, agency and responsibility.  
 
So far we have looked at the historical processes, which have contributed to 
the formation of the psychiatric system that we know of today. We now turn 
to outline the present context: the contemporary organization and administra-
tive functions of the mental health services in Denmark.  
The functions and organization of the contemporary mental 
health services 
The mental health services in Denmark are placed under the general health 
services. The health services have the purpose of taking care of the popula-
tion’s health, as quoted in the Danish Health Act (Sundhedsloven, 
www.retsinformation.dk, my translation): 
§ 1. The purpose of the health services is to promote the population’s health 
and to prevent and treat disease, disorder and disability for the individual per-
son 
 
The health services in Denmark are divided into 5 regions, with 98 municipal-
ities. The mental health services are responsible for three areas: adult mental 
health services, child and youth mental health services and forensic mental 
health services. In all areas two models of treatment are provided: outpatient 
treatment in clinics or day centers and inpatient treatment at wards or psychi-
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atric hospitals. The idea is that psychiatric hospitals with inpatient treatment 
are for the acutely ill, while other patients receive psychiatric care via outpa-
tient treatment. Inpatient care is considered temporary and thus the wards are 
not places where the patients can live. However, some patients do stay for 
longer periods of time, and forensic patients sometimes stay in psychiatric 
hospitals for years. Many psychiatric institutions and centers have a mixture 
of forensic patients (i.e. who have been sentenced to treatment following a 
crime or felony) and non-forensic patients. There is, however, also a special 
psychiatric hospital (called Sikringsafdelingen) with specialized care for forensic 
patients (www.retsinformation.dk). 
 
Means of coercion and restraint are permitted in psychiatric treatment in 
Denmark, and the Act on Restraint in Psychiatry (Lov om anvendelse af tvang i 
psykiatrien, lovbekendtgørelse nr. 1111 af 1. november 2006) is more permissive to-
wards means of physical restraint than for instance in the United Kingdom. It 
authorizes the use of: containment, compulsory admission to psychiatric hos-
pitals, compulsory treatment, restrains such as belt-strapping and sills for the 
hand and foot as well as the use of physical power (www.retsinformation.dk). 
According to the law, means of restraint and coercion are only to be used af-
ter other means have been exhausted and if “the patient is insane or in a state 
that may be given equal status to it, and if it will be irresponsible not to con-
fine the person” (Chapter 3, Lov om anvendelse af tvang, www.retsinformation.dk, 
my translation). Approximately 6 % of all adult psychiatric patients were 
compulsory admitted to a psychiatric hospital in 2007 
(www.bedrepsykiatri.dk). 
 
The government has formulated the aim of the mental health services to be a 
user-centered and specialized “world class psychiatry” (Danske Regioner, 
2009a). To reach this aim, eight visions have been put forward: to increase 
the knowledge and comprehension of mental illness in the population; better 
prevention of mental illness; to treat everyone with a need for psychiatric 
care; to cure a larger number of people; to make the mental health services 
more accessible; to decrease the excess mortality among people with mental 
illness; to have the necessary technology and a well-functioning physical 
space; and to have enough qualified workforce and to make use of it in the 
best possible way. 
 
These are broad and general aims, which hardly stir much controversy. How-





larger sum of public spending is used on the physical health services than on 
the mental health services (Danske Regioner, 2009b). The mental health ser-
vices also suffer from a lack of trained workforce, especially psychiatrists. 
This has been attributed to medical students opting out of psychiatry as a 
specialty – likely due to its low status in comparison to other medical special-
ties and the public stigma associated with the discipline (Danske Regioner, 
2008). Some regions have attempted to fill the gaps by recruiting doctors 
from other European countries (Deloitte, 2012), however, there is still a lack 
of psychiatrists in most of the country’s regions. In 2008 approximately 15 % 
of all positions for psychiatrists in the adult mental health services and 30 % 
in child and youth mental health services were left vacant (Danske Regioner, 
2008).  
 
The general directions of health politics, such as health acts and other laws 
governing the mental health services, are passed by the state, while the re-
sponsibility for financing and structuring the content of the treatment and 
care lies with the Regions. Negotiations and contracts between the state and 
the regions are made every year, and these structure the financial possibilities 
and demands about productivity. However, the content of treatment is also 
co-governed by the state organ The Danish Health and Medicines Authority, 
(Sundhedsstyrelsen). Sundhedsstyrelsen supervises and accepts the Regions’ 
hospital plans and health plans and has influence on the overall organizational 
planning and the contents of hospitals.  
 
The regions are obliged to implement and make use of the quality system The 
Danish Quality Model (Den Danske Kvalitetsmodel - DDKM). In short, the 
DDKM is built on centrally defined standards for accreditation of good quali-
ty, which set guidelines for how the mental health services should function. A 
similar model has been functioning in the physical health services since 2005, 
and in the last years, the model has been revised and transformed to fit the 
mental health services. An external accreditation team surveys the progress 
with regular intervals and evaluates whether a specific ward or clinic lives up 
to the standards. If the standards are met, the specific facility becomes ac-
credited; if they are not, they can get an accreditation with remarks or be de-




Another new development to achieve the goals of cohesion and efficiency is 
the introduction of so-called “package procedures” (pakkeforløb).10 These are 
standards that set the exact procedure and amount of time to be spent on 
each individual patient as divided by diagnosis. For example, for unipolar de-
pression the standards are: 1 hour diagnostic assessment; 1 hour physical ex-
amination; 5 hours consultation on medication; 6 hours individual psycho-
therapy or 12 hours group therapy; 1,5 hour health guidance; 1,5 hour meet-
ing with relatives; 1 hour for coordinating the treatment with other 
authorities; 1 hour for closing the treatment (www.psykiatri-regionh.dk ). So 
far (in the summer 2013) nine packages have been implemented for nine di-
agnostic types:  anxiety and phobias, bipolar disorder, unipolar depression, 
periodic depression, eating disorders, personality disorders, post-traumatic 
stress and obsessive-compulsive disorder. The packages mean that a patient’s 
treatment is considered complete when the procedures and timeframe de-
scribed in the packages have been followed.  
 
Overall, the activity in the mental health services has increased significantly in 
the last years. From 2001 to 2011, the amount of adult psychiatric patients 
treated in the regional mental health services has risen by 25 %. In the same 
period of time the amount of child patients has increased by 165 % (Deloitte, 
2012). In 2011 the total number of adults in Denmark who were psychiatric 
patients was 94,336. The same year the amount of beds for inpatient treat-
ment was 2,323. This means that 4 out of 10 patients only receive outpatient 
treatment and have not been not hospitalized over a 10 year period (Deloitte, 
2012).  
Concluding remarks 
The chapter has indicated how psychiatry may be said to constitute a discur-
sive battleground in which different discourses and representations of pa-
tienthood have strived, and still strive for definitional rights. The different 
discourses which define patienthood and subjectivity are relevant for the the-
sis in the sense that all these ways of understanding mental illness and psychi-
atry’s function provide different ways to position patients. They may also 
provide different discursive norms that become available to patients and pro-
                                                     
10 This is similar to some models of Managed Mental Health Care, e.g. applied in the 





fessionals, and which may shape how they can act, think and relate to the 
mental health services. The psy disciplines position the patient as someone 
with a profound inner psychological space which needs to be monitored, 
counseled and transformed. The neuro-chemical discourse positions patients 
as repositories of chemical abnormalities that need to be fixed by medica-
tions. On the one hand the modern discourses of psy and biochemistry may 
be associated with the traditional discourses of “somatics” and “psychics” in 
psychiatry – and the historical tension between the moral and technical dis-
course. On the other hand, they may represent a peculiar late modern devel-
opment. The analysis will explore how some of these discourses take on local 
forms, and how simultaneously, other norms and discourses are developed in 
the practices of patients and professionals.  
 
At the same time as it provided a brief history of ideas of psychiatry, the 
chapter has aimed at making the reader more familiar with the context of the 
modern mental health services: their structure, recent reforms and challenges 
facing patients and professionals. We should now be better equipped for un-
derstanding the context for this study. In the next chapters I move closer to 
the study by discussing the theoretical and methodological perspectives that I 
employ.   
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Chapter 4: Theoretical and 
methodological perspectives 
My analyses find their theoretical inspiration in poststructural theories on dis-
courses, practice and subjectivity. Specifically, the theoretical tools have been 
developed from the work of Foucault and later discursive psychologists in-
spired by his work. Foucauldian perspectives have primarily been used in 
studies on “macro-level” analyses of political social processes of change and 
greater cultural movements – they are less common in psychology (Alvesson 
& Karreman, 2000; Willig, 1999:3). However, the analytical tools are also 
suited for studies on meso and micro-levels in contexts that are not tradition-
ally considered political, especially when a Foucauldian discourse perspective 
is combined with poststructural theories on subjectivity. Before I turn to dis-
cuss the thesis’ central theoretical concepts, however, I will briefly outline the 
main ontological and epistemological assumptions that the thesis rests on.  
The epistemology and ontology of the thesis 
Much research on mental health operates with what has been dubbed a “di-
rect” or (more condescendingly) a “naïve realist” perspective (Harper, 2004). 
“Direct realism” is a usually tacit assumption, inspired by the natural sciences, 
that there is a direct relationship between what is observed in the study, and 
the nature of reality in general, which is believed to be rule-bound and static. 
The psychiatric diagnostic manuals DSM-5 and the ICD-10, for example, are 
built on a belief that psychiatric symptoms are intrinsic qualities in patients 
that may be rightfully delineated through careful observations or rating scales 
performed by the clinician or researcher (ibid.). An important task for the re-
searcher who is working within a direct realist paradigm therefore becomes to 
attempt to eliminate her own influence to foreground reality, as it is crystal-






The “linguistic turn” that has been informed by post-modernism, poststruc-
turalism and social constructionism has questioned the ontological and epis-
temological stance of realism, arguing that that the social world (including the 
social world of research) is made up of discursive practices and is historically 
and socially contingent. Meaning is considered to be a social, situated phe-
nomenon produced in a specific cultural context (Järvinen, 2005). Among 
discursive researchers then, there is a tendency towards relativism and skepti-
cism towards many of the knowledge claims of realist-oriented research.  
 
The issue of relativism has been approached in a number of ways. Some so-
cial constructionists take the stance of radical relativism. According to a radi-
cal relativist perspective, all forms of knowledge claims are constructed, and 
no insider perspective may be privileged, as they may all be considered lan-
guage games implicated in power - not moves towards the truth (Haraway, 
1988). Within psychology perhaps the most radical claims for relativism have 
been put forward by Edwards, Ashmore, & Potter (1995), who have argued 
that the debate between relativism and realism itself can be dismissed and ap-
proached as rhetoric. In their article, Edwards, Ashmore & Potter attempt to 
deconstruct as rhetoric arguments that physical things (such as furniture and 
human catastrophes such as genocide) have a material reality that is not only 
language.  
 
Here, I agree with researchers like Ian Parker (1992, 2002), Carla Willig (2008) 
and Donna Haraway (1988) who point out that there are at least two prob-
lems inherent in such a radical relativist stance. First, a relativist perspective 
makes it difficult to maintain the project of social change in critical science. If 
no situation can be argued to be better than any other, movements for social 
and political change risk becoming groundless (Parker, 1992). A second risk 
concerns relativism on an epistemological level: the idea that no scientific ac-
count can be viewed as more valid or “objective” than others leaves little 
space for arguing for the validity or importance of any scientific study 
(Haraway, 1988). 
 
My thinking about ontology and epistemology has been much inspired by the 
work of the feminist poststructural researcher Donna Haraway (1988). Hara-
way calls for a reinstallation of the term “objectivity” in feminist research, 
which has been denied by radical social constructivists. She envisions a femi-
nist version of embodied objectivity: one which has a commitment to faithful 
accounts of the real world, while still maintaining that all knowledge claims 
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are historically and socially contingent. The solution, she suggests, is a con-
ceptualization of feminist objectivity as situated knowledges. By viewing all 
knowledge produced by science as situated, Haraway argues that no 
knowledge can be “from everywhere”, but is always created from specific po-
sitions. This way, research should never be seen as whole and total, but al-
ways as partial and stemming from certain positions. For Haraway, realist and 
relativist notions of knowledge and reality are equally problematic, as they are 
both guilty of the same sin: denying the importance of location, position and 
embodiment. She writes:  
“Relativism is the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of ob-
jectivity; both deny the stakes in location, embodiment, and partial perspec-
tive; both make it impossible to see well.” (Haraway, 1988: 584) 
 
In contrast, by thinking of all knowledges as situated, local and partial per-
spectives, Haraway argues, we may make knowledge claims that are valid in 
the sense of being faithful accounts of the world from a certain perspective.  
 
Following the idea of situated knowledges, this thesis is critical to the notion 
of an objective, universal truth, but accepts the possibility of specific local 
and social forms of truth, with a focus on everyday life and stories (Kvale, 
1997: 227). To work from a situated perspective means avoiding the tempta-
tion of having a neutral and objective vision “from above” (what Haraway 
(1988: 581) calls the “god trick of seeing everything from nowhere”). It also involves a 
constant sensitivity to the positioning of the researcher and the relationship 
between the researcher and the researched. Finally, working from a situated 
and partial perspective implies a moral, political and critical commitment to 
locating oneself within the positions of the “subjugated”, as this makes it 
more possible to acknowledge the critical and interpretive core of all 
knowledge (Haraway, 1988).  
 
However, working from a situated and partial perspective is not without its 
difficulties. In the case of psychiatry, in which multiple and often mutually 
exclusive and contradictory knowledges co-exist how may the researcher situ-
ate herself? Claiming a straightforward “patient perspective” I believe may be 
considered illusory. The assumption that the researcher is able to completely 
and fairly represent the experience of members of a marginalized group is de-
ceptive. A further difficulty presents itself when we ask: whose situated 
knowledge and perspective of “the subjugated” should be privileged? Is it on-





that only patients represent a subjugated knowledge I believe to be somewhat 
simplistic. As Lorna Rhodes (1995:8) has compellingly demonstrated, the lo-
cal knowledge of mental health professionals may also be said to constitute a 
subjugated knowledge - as it is highly contextual and fragmentary, and con-
trasts with the formal knowledge of diagnosis, administration and law.  
 
My understanding of the situatedness and partiality of knowledge is reflected 
in the structure of the analysis in which I consider three partial perspectives. 
The first article on researcher positioning is explicitly written from a re-
searcher perspective and the researcher functions as the main locus of action. 
The second article, on illness discourses, attempts to center the experiences 
of psychiatric patients; the patients function as the protagonists who develop 
strategies to conform to and sometimes challenge the norms and discourses 
in mental health care. The third article aims at centering the experiences of 
mental health professionals and the difficulties they experience when they try 
to involve patients in the treatment. 
 
The intent of pursuing three angles is not to say that I believe that it is ever 
possible for the researcher to actually place herself in a different person’s per-
spective. Instead, they present an approach to knowledge, which acknowledg-
es that all perspectives developed by the researcher are partial and interpreta-
tive. Additionally, the point of pursuing different angles is also to create a nu-
anced account that looks at different angles when approaching the topic of 
study. In this way I hope to produce results which do not reduce the com-
plexities of psychiatric practice to a question of locating “villains” and “he-
roes”. It is my wish to produce a thesis that is meaningful for the people it 
concerns, and in the best case, an inspiration for reflexivity and potential so-
cial changes.  
 
In terms of my own situated knowledge, many reflections throughout the 
PhD have concerned my moral, personal and political position in relation to 
the institution of psychiatry. This type of reflexivity is always necessary when 
conducting qualitative research, but in the case of this study it became para-
mount. This is especially so because, as mentioned, my concrete situatedness 
and formal employment status has placed me “in between” different episte-
mological and ontological fields. The placement of the PhD project as a co-
operation between on the one hand the psychiatric services of Region Zea-
land and the Psychiatric Research Unit (which for the most part is engaged in 
traditional quantitative clinical research) and on the other at the Department 
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of Psychology and Educational Studies (which for the most part is engaged 
with qualitative, critical social research) has created tensions regarding my po-
sitioning. The expectation that the study contributes to new research that is 
meaningful and useful for both sites has been a source of continuous reflec-
tions.  
 
The starting point of these reflections has been that it is important to make 
explicit the ontological and epistemological premises that have informed the 
research - both to myself as a researcher and to the broader audience. There 
are many different normative/political stances towards the mental health ser-
vices, ranging from largely enthusiastic about new developments within clini-
cal research and psychiatry - to various radical accounts aimed at abolishing 
the whole enterprise of psychiatry. I have strived to find a way to approach 
the functions of psychiatry from a critical and theoretically-informed, yet 
open position: one which on the one hand acknowledges the misery and dis-
tress experienced by many patients and their need for therapeutic care – but 
on the other a position which does not deny the power inherent in psychiatry 
in defining patients and the sometimes adverse and violent effects of psychi-
atric treatment. 
 
The work of Foucault - and his understanding of power, knowledge and dis-
courses as not simply oppressive, but also as productive - has helped me 
think about psychiatric practice as a site of production and “identity work”, in 
which discourses unfold and shape subjectivities. At the same time, I have 
strived to develop an approach which takes serious the participants’ differen-
tiated and diverse “perspectives” and their experiences not only as constitut-
ed by the institution of psychiatry, but also as lived experiences which can or 
sometimes cannot be made meaningful in the dominant discourses of psychi-
atry. In the following sections, I outline my main theoretical inspirations in 
closer detail: the work of Foucault and later psychologists inspired by his 
work. 
Central theoretical concepts 
This section is divided into two parts. I begin by outlining my perspectives on 
language, discourses and practice, which I relate to the institution of psychia-
try. Here I also discuss how discourses are implied in the production of 





forms of truth. In the second part of the section, I discuss my understanding 
of subjectivity and experience. I will suggest that if poststructuralist ap-
proaches wish to embrace the complexity of human experience, they need to 
move beyond a focus on discursive practices and a formulation of “selves” as 
merely contextual and constantly fleeting discursive formations. The second 
part therefore deals with the thesis’ understanding of subjectivity and person-
hood, specifically related to Rom Harré’s theories of positioning and subjec-
tivity. 
Foucauldian perspectives: Language, discourses and 
knowledge 
Language as a discursive practice 
From a discursive perspective, the language used in interactions is not simply 
a description of reality. Rather it has a function and an effect within an inter-
action, namely a performative aspect - and it draws on sets of wider under-
standings. Thus, instead of studying language and discourse as a route to dis-
covering some aspects of an underlying personality or a “true” underlying re-
ality, language and stories become the object of study themselves. An 
example from my fieldwork will serve to illustrate this point. The following 
situation took place during my first day of fieldwork at the ward:  
After the morning meeting I stay and chat for a while with a young woman 
who is staying at the ward, but whose name I haven’t yet caught. I ask about 
the rules at the ward and she explains them to me. I ask her if it’s difficult to 
understand me, since I have a Swedish accent. She says “a bit” and apologiz-
es if she seems unfocused. It’s because she’s psychotic, she says. And because 
she has so many diagnoses. She lists them: borderline, ADD, anxiety and de-
pression. I ask her what she thinks about the diagnoses. She says she thinks 
she lacks one: Tourette’s syndrome.  
P/O, p. 209 
My perspective on language means that with statements like the one above, 
my focus is not primarily on the participant’s “personality” or on her diagno-
ses per se. What becomes more interesting are the possibilities opened up and 
shut down for her, when she talks about herself this way (Speed, 2011: 125). 
For instance to call oneself “psychotic” as the participant above, opens up 
other possibilities of subjectivity and is different from calling oneself a “voice 
hearer” (ibid.). What is also of interest are the positions that the diagnoses 
make available - when they seem to be so present for the participant that she 
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lists them immediately. An additional point of inquiry would be the implica-
tions of the diagnostic identity categories for her - which leave her wanting 
yet another diagnosis.  
 
From this perspective, then, language practices such as speaking or writing, 
do not merely describe, but are involved in the production of subjects and 
objects. This implies that the way we talk about something is important, be-
cause people situate their experiences and understandings within a discursive 
context (Willig, 2011). This way, the language used in psychiatry and the in-
teractions between patients and professionals may have an impact on the pa-
tients’ understanding of who they are and the positions they can occupy in 
psychiatry. However, it is not only the content of verbal utterances that car-
ries with it discursive meaning. The tone of voice, body language and facial 
expressions may also be crucial for how a statement can be heard (e.g. 
Barrett, 1996:98ff). Similarly, a person’s position in an interaction will also 
shape how a specific statement may be understood. For instance, even if the 
exact same sentence is uttered by a professional and a patient, it is likely that 
these will be heard and interpreted differently - due to their varied positioning 
within the mental health services. 
 
When the thesis refers to language, therefore, it defines it as the discursive 
practices that happen on a day-to-day basis between patients and profession-
als, between different professionals, as well as between different patients. 
However language also may become naturalized, mixed with other practices, 
materiality and institutional rationales to create discourses. And when we 
speak, we are always drawing on specific discourses. As the poststructural so-
ciologist Stuart Hall (1997: 131) has noted: 
“Subjects may produce particular texts, but they are operating from within 
the limits of the episteme, the discursive formation, the regime of truth, of a 
particular period and culture”  
 
In this way, discursive practices, such as spoken and written language always 
emerge from a specific place. A person’s statements may thus not only be 
considered “private”, but a reflection of specific broader discourses that the 
person draws on. The discourses may also decide what counts as meaningful 
statements in a certain setting (Barad, 2003). In the next section I explain in 






Discourses and norms 
In theorizing discourses, institutions and norms I draw inspiration from the 
work of Foucault. From this perspective, discourses make available particular 
ways of ordering and making sense of the world, including ourselves, and 
what we experience as true and real. This is a broader definition than for ex-
ample that used in linguistics, where discourse refers to segments of speech 
or writing (Hamilton & Roper, 2006). As Parker (2002) noted, a Foucault-
inspired analysis of discourse is not primarily concerned with the specific 
rules and rhetorical conventions of mundane talk; rather, it explores “serious 
speech acts”, institutionalized talk or practices. Thus, its interest in language 
takes it beyond the immediate context within which language is used by spe-
cific speakers (Willig, 2008).  
 
Discourses may be regarded as wider systems of meaning that shape what can 
be thought, said, and done in specific situations. Thus, they may be defined as 
groups of signs and practices that systematically form the objects and subjects 
of which they speak (Foucault, 2004:54). In this way, discourses provide par-
ticular ways of ordering and making sense of the world, including ourselves.  
 
An example of an influential discourse is the biomedical discourse, which is 
powerful in mental health care. The biomedical discourse comprises ways of 
understanding bodies, patients, doctors and hospitals, as well as ways of act-
ing as a patient, doctor and nurse (Hamilton & Manias, 2006). As we have 
seen the biomedical discourse emerged towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, with the birth of enlightenment. For psychiatry, the biomedical dis-
course, which took hold of life in the asylums of that era, meant that madness 
for the first time became conceptualized as a mental illness, in line with other 
medical specialties. Madness became standardized, objectified and rendered 
the object of scientific study. Since the biomedical discourse of mental illness 
has a long history and has gradually become more taken for granted, for 
many people it will have become a naturalized, common-sense knowledge. 
Thus, few people would nowadays conceptualize the distress of psychiatric 
patients as something other than a mental illness - indicating the power of 
this discourse in defining these types of human experiences. However, the 
biomedical discourse is not the only discourse associated with psychiatric 
care. Several other discourses may be identified, e.g. a moral discourse of 
care, a social discourse concerning poverty, a psychological discourse (Rose, 
1996), and recently, a neo-liberal consumerist discourse. Due to its novelty (as 
mentioned, it emerged with market forces from the early 1980’s), the con-
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sumerist discourse may still be less taken for granted, and therefore more vis-
ible precisely as a discourse to professionals and researchers than e.g. the bio-
medical. 
 
Although discourses are relatively powerful, they are never all-embracing. 
Counter-discourses are always possible and do emerge eventually (Foucault, 
1980). An example of a counter-discourse in the psychiatric context is the as-
semblage of diverse practices which emerged in the 1960’s and 1970’s under 
the heading of “anti-psychiatry”. Additionally, psychiatric counter-discourses 
have lately found a revival in movements like critical psychiatry (e.g. Double, 
2006) and postpsychiatry (e.g. Bracken & Thomas, 2001) and in survivor 
movements like the Hearing Voices Network. Counter-discourses are less 
powerful or legitimate, and Foucault refers to them as subjugated discourses 
(Foucault, 1980).  
 
Discourses are historical and continuously emergent rather than constant. 
They gain their matter of fact quality since they are bound up with institu-
tions and institutional practices (Willig, 2008:113). In this sense, there is a dia-
lectic relationship between discourses, institutions and practice: discourses 
legitimate and reinforce institutional structures, but the structures also sup-
port and validate the discourses (ibid.).  
 
Discourses draw on and produce discursive norms that create and restrict 
possibilities of defining who patients and professionals are. In this sense, the 
term “norms” is not intended to be understood as rules which oppress or 
force people. Rather, they are understood as naturalized understandings 
which inform the person about legitimate ways of being and acting. The per-
son uses the norms to guide and regulate her actions. Through these interpre-
tational practices, local discourses may also come to life and assert themselves 
in the specific practices in which they exist. In this sense, generalized truths 
about psychiatric practices as well as local, specific truths and norms, which 
have emerged in specific contexts at specific wards and clinics, may co-exist. 
The norms become taken-for-granted ways of acting and thinking, and with 
them certain practices become legitimate ways of acting from within particu-
lar discourse while others do not.  
 
Since discourses make available certain norms and types of subjectivities (e.g. 
as mentally ill) they are implicated in the exercise of power. From a Foucauld-





ment may be seen as an exercise of power and discipline, a practice of the 
“medical gaze” that produces and reproduces deviance (Foucault, 1991c, 
2005). However, this does not mean that Foucault necessarily equates all 
forms of power; not all subject positions are repressive (Heller, 1996). Power 
is therefore not in itself evil, power is simply the ability to modify the actions 
of others. This is a point in which the work of Foucault is often misunder-
stood and requires some further discussion. 
Knowledge, power and freedom 
Foucault (1983) challenges the notion of a pre-existing subject who acts, 
thinks and experiences on her own. Instead, the subject for Foucault refers to 
discursive practices of power which shape human subjectivity. He writes: 
“There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by 
control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and 
makes subject to.” (Foucault, 1983: 212). 
 
In this sense, Foucault argues, power and knowledge create the subject. Ways 
of acting and the ideas used to attribute meaning to actions are perceived as 
emerging from power exchanges and language (Hamilton & Manias, 2006). 
Similarly, discourses gain their influence from relying on knowledge and 
power. The most powerful discourses are those that have won power-
struggles and have become supported by the establishment of new institu-
tions, education and research. The psychiatric discourse of mental illness, for 
instance, is in a stronger position than the anti-psychiatric, since it is a dis-
course which claims higher legitimacy as science. Scientific discourses are as-
cribed a higher degree of truthfulness – i.e. they will often count as unques-
tionable truths. As Parker (1992:8) has noted, discourses construct represen-
tations of the world which have a reality nearly as coercive as gravity. And 
like gravity “we know of the objects through their effects” (Parker, 1992: 8) 
 
However, Foucault strongly resisted the view that power is necessarily synon-
ymous with the exercise of domination. Instead, power for Foucault is a rela-
tion. In this sense, power in psychiatry cannot be explained as only being a 
“top down” process that goes down from the professionals to the patients, or 
even from the state or economy to the professionals. Instead, the profession-
als, patients, administrators and other actors and institutions are bound to-
gether in the same disciplinary space, and are all, to variable degrees, subjects 
of power (Rhodes, 1995:7). Moreover, power is not necessarily oppressive. 
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Rather, its foremost characteristic is that it is productive, in the sense that it 
produces subjects, discourses and truths. This point of Foucault’s has some-
times mistakenly been interpreted as meaning that all power is productive, 
and that repressive power does not exist (Miller, 1986). However, this is a not 
the point that Foucault seems to be making. In talking about power as pro-
ductive, Foucault was attempting to reconceptualize power, and its relation-
ships to lives of individuals, discursive practices and specific social categories 
such as the “mad” (Miller, 1986:40). In relation to such phenomena, power is 
seen as having a productive and constitutive function (in that it creates these 
categories), not simply one of repressing individual’s subjectivity (ibid.). In 
this sense, subjectivity is perceived to be constituted in and through the oper-
ations of power relations. Power is understood as a technology present in all 
social relations, which occur when a person acts upon the actions of others. 
Foucault writes: 
“When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of acting upon the ac-
tions of others, when one characterizes these actions as the government of 
men by other men – in the broadest sense of the term – one includes an im-
portant element: freedom. Power is exercised only over the free subject and 
only insofar as they are free” (Foucault, 1983:p. 221) 
 
Freedom, in this sense, is not the absence of power - but rather they are inter-
twined and linked. Foucault has been criticized for not being able to account 
for the kind of power that is detrimental and the kind of power that may be 
liberating. The critics of Foucault have argued that since the subject is pro-
duced by power, it is impossible to talk about aspects of liberation. In line 
with Heller (1996), however, I suggest that this may be a misreading of Fou-
cault. The criticism may only be considered valid insofar as the notion of 
freedom is equaled to the absence of power. For Foucault, liberation does not 
mean being free of power or being free of discourse. Instead liberation is 
possible when there are multiple discourses and counter-discourses available. 
From this perspective, positioning within some discourses can therefore al-
low for liberating subject positions.  
Perspectives on subjectivity: Discourses and positioning  
Discursive approaches on the study of “health”, “illness”, “mental illness” 
and psychiatric institutions have been successful in developing an under-
standing of the social, historical and cultural situatedness of these. However, 





beyond a critical deconstruction of the dominant discourses of mental health 
in order to explore how these are adopted, modified or challenged by the 
concerned individuals.  
 
The critical health psychologist Carla Willig (2000) has noted that in discur-
sive work on health and illness there has been little discussion of “exactly how 
discourse may be implicated in subjectivity and how experience may be medi-
ated by discourse” (p. 553, original emphasis). The discursive constructions 
of psychiatric patienthood, of narratives of mental illness and recovery pro-
vide a frame of reference for the ways in which we are able to experience 
ourselves, our identities and our bodies over time (Frank, 1995; Willig, 2000). 
This thesis is concerned with both aspects: the discourses and their implica-
tions for subjectivity, including how the discourses are appropriated, resisted, 
negotiated and disputed. Thus, the theoretical task becomes to theorize em-
bodied subjectivity while maintaining a commitment to a Foucauldian discur-
sive approach. In other words, the focus of the thesis goes from the availabil-
ity of discursive resources in the mental health services to how patients and 
professionals appropriate, resist and otherwise deal with them (Willig, 2000). 
 
The medical sociologist Nick Fox (1997) has drawn on Foucault’s later work 
to argue that Foucault was primarily concerned with how we become “desir-
ing subjects”, that is, how we express our bodies and desires within a subjec-
tivity capable of reflection. Towards the end of his life, Foucault himself 
acknowledged a need to shift focus from institutions and social processes to-
wards understandings of self-processes and self-formations. He writes: 
“I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am 
more and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others and 
in the technologies of individual domination, the history of how an individual 
acts upon himself, in the technology of the self” (Foucault, 1988, cited in 
Fox, 1997) 
 
This was pursued to a greater extent in his later work, but it did not develop 
to a full theorization of subjectivity. Foucault’s work, therefore, leaves ques-
tions unanswered regarding the relationship between individual agency and 
discourse. Hence, the majority of research working with a Foucauldian per-
spective has paid significant attention to discourses themselves as “macro-
processes”, rather than working with the relationship between discourse, 
practice and experience (Willig, 2000). Some versions of postmodernism have 
therefore been accused of “killing the subject” or of operating with an “emp-
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ty, grammatical “object” […] a fragmented, anonymous, dead self”(Crossley, 
2000, p. 41). In order to answer the research questions, the study must ex-
plore how available discourses and practices constitute subjectivity: how the 
individual is both constituted by the discourses and yet uniquely purposive 
and reflexive (Willig, 2000). This implies that the theoretical perspective must 
accommodate a move between discourses and institutions on the one hand 
and everyday life, sense-making and subjectivity on the other.  
 
As much as some Foucauldian perspectives avoid a focus on subjective expe-
rience and may have a tendency to underestimate the notion of personal 
agency (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006), there are other discursive traditions that do 
equip the person with much agency. These are often informed by linguistic 
and conversation analytic approaches. In contrast to Foucauldian approaches, 
which largely regard the subject as constituted by discourse, these approaches 
regard the person as an agentive “discourse user”. Before I move on to de-
scribe the perspective on subjectivity and discourse that is the main perspec-
tive in the thesis, positioning theory, I will briefly outline one of these theo-
ries. This short interlude is provided in order to explicate some of the 
strengths and limitations of other discursive approaches to subjectivity, and 
thus to make more explicit my choices and eliminations. Although there are 
many versions of the subject as “discourse-user”, we will look at the version 
of discursive psychology that has its roots in ethnomethodology and conver-
sation analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) - partly because it is one of the 
most influential discursive approaches within psychology, and partly because 
it was the theory that I originally considered employing as a main framework 
of the thesis, but largely moved away from.  
The problems with the person as “discourse user” 
Discursive psychology was developed towards the end of the 1980’s as a radi-
cal alternative to cognitive psychology. The traditional cognitive view assumes 
that people have a coherent core-self that can be identified within the inner 
world of the person. Language is seen as an externalization of underlying 
thoughts, attitudes and motivations. Jonathan Potter & Margaret Wetherell 
(1987) argued strongly against this notion of mental life and aimed to show 
that language is not a reflection of internal inner states, but performative of 
them (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006). They wished to demonstrate that what tradi-
tional psychology assumed to be psychological phenomena were actually so-





achieve certain ends. In relation to identity and selfhood, Potter & Wetherell 
argue that psychology must:  
“…displace attention from the self-as-entity and focus it on the methods of 
constructing the self. That is, the question becomes not what is the true na-
ture of the self, but how is the self talked about, how is it theorised in dis-
course?” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 102).  
 
With this follows that people’s talk is variable and dependent on the social 
interaction. How the “self” is expressed, for instance, depends on the specific 
setting and the function that the expression serves (Crossley, 2000). Discur-
sive psychology’s topic of study thus became the rhetorical strategies that 
people use to construct credible and believable versions of the world that 
serve particular social functions (Potter, 1996, p. 151).  
 
The great value of approaches such as discursive psychology is that they are 
sensitive to an analysis of what goes on in the very moment when people in-
teract. Discursive psychology has developed a range of conceptual linguistic 
tools to apply for the analysis of conversation and language in use, some of 
which will also be used in this thesis. However, with its attention to everyday 
interaction, it sometimes forgets to relate the discourses of everyday use to 
broader social, political, historical processes and issues of power (Parker, 
2002)11. In this study, in contrast, an understanding of the wider context in 
the constitutions of subjectivity, psychopathology, and selfhood are of key 
importance.  
 
Furthermore, and more important for the present discussion, although dis-
cursive psychology has much focus on the person’s agentic strategies and ac-
tive involvement in conversations, it still does not seem to sufficiently theo-
rize subjectivity: who the person that is using the rhetoric strategies is - and 
how it happens (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). The person appears as a stra-
tegic, functional and rational agent. The experiencing, emotional, embodied 
person still appears to be absent, and the notion that humans have a funda-
mental or internal “sense” of themselves as selves is downplayed (Crossley, 
2000). The result is sometimes a notion of selfhood in which “subjective ex-
                                                     
11 This argument may apply to some accounts of conversation analysis and discursive 
psychology, but not to others. Some accounts do mix discursive psychology with 
Foucauldian theory or other approaches that involve cultural and historical contexts. 
E.g. Wetherell (1998) has argued that the distinction between poststructuralism and 
conversation analysis is painted to sharply and advocates for a synthesis of the two.  
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perience... is made so context-dependent, so fluid and flexible, that there 
seems to be little beyond a personal psychology which is a moment-to-
moment situated experience” (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995:127, cited in 
Crossley, 2000).  
 
A brief example may clarify these points. In one of the interviews an inform-
ant told me that she had been sexually abused as a child by a male member of 
her extended family - and that the voices she heard belonged to her abuser.12 
How may such a statement be understood and analyzed without a notion of 
an experiencing subject? It would be somewhat problematic, I believe, to fo-
cus solely on the form of the statement as serving a function within an inter-
action; as e.g. an interactional tool used to persuade the interviewer of a spe-
cific version of reality. Instead her statements may rather be approached in 
relation to notions of embodied experiences and meaning-making: emerging 
thoughts, feelings and self-narratives as well as how these are tied to cultural 
discourses on gender, sexualized violence, victimization, family-relations, psy-
chopathology and so on.  
 
What emerges from this is that individuals are not simply “discourse users”. 
Discourses have effects, sometimes harmful, and the relationship of cultural 
categories to embodied experience needs to be analyzed with this in mind 
(Blackman, 2005). Thus, although discursive psychology provides important 
insights into language and rhetorical strategies used in interaction, the interest 
of this thesis lies in the intersection between discourses and practices on the 
one hand, and subjectivity on the other. Here, therefore  I draw inspiration 
from positioning theory.  
Positioning and selfhood  
A number of poststructural researchers have used the Foucauldian concept 
“subject position” in order to develop an account of subjectivity. With the 
concept of subject position people are seen to be continually constituted by 
processes of positioning in discourse. The work of Rom Harré (Davies & 
Harré, 1990; Harré & Gillett, 1994; Harré & van Langenhove, 1999) provide 
a useful framework for understanding subjectivity and interactions as discur-
sive - and is a key inspiration for theorizing subjectivity in the thesis.   
                                                     
12 Although rarely acknowledged in psychiatric textbooks, this is a common among 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia. Sexual abuse is one of the most frequent fac-
tors found to precede voice hearing and psychotic experiences (Ensink, 1992;  






Positioning theory (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & van Langenhove, 1999) 
was developed as an alternative to the traditional concept of “role” in social 
psychology. It regards humans as agents, active in their contribution to a larg-
er discourse, and as people who are applying meaning to what is said and to 
who he or she is (Harré & Gillett, 1994: 113). From this perspective, in any 
conversation, people position themselves, position others, or are being posi-
tioned by others in a process of identity negotiations. Positioning may be ei-
ther intentional and conscious or unintentional and tacit (Davies & Harré, 
1990). Positioning consists of a distribution of a set of rights, duties and obli-
gations, which have implications for what the person can do, say or think 
while being located in the position (Harré, 1998). For instance, in a meeting 
between a patient and psychiatric professional, the patient may position her-
self or be positioned by the professional as a victim of illness. The position of 
victim may imply the right of being cared for, of being met with empathy and 
compassion. It may also grant the person the right to deflect personal respon-
sibility for a difficult situation. At the same time, the position of victim may 
imply the duty of remaining passive rather than active, as well as avoiding a 
too energetic stance in changing the situation. In this sense, the positions im-
ply rights and duties and hence have social consequences and functions.  
 
Positioning always draws on wider discourses and norms, which are insepara-
ble from the context of the interaction. For instance, in the situation above, 
the position as a victim of illness may be tied to broader discourses on illness, 
“the sick-role” (Parsons, 1975), madness, hospital institutions and medical 
authority. The positions are further intimately connected to social power rela-
tions. This implies e.g. that the victim-position may much more easily be 
granted to the patient than to the professional in the interaction. However, 
regardless of a potential power asymmetry in the interaction, the conversation 
is a mutual engagement between two agents. A person may disagree with a 
positioning, challenge it or refuse it. The patient, perhaps having seen that the 
position of victim of mental illness involves a passivity she does not wish to 
embrace, may attempt to position herself as someone who is not suffering 
from illness. In that case a negotiation may occur, where a secondary posi-
tioning may or may not be agreed upon. Thus, people have the possibility of 
attempting to refuse, negotiate or modify positions, preserving personal agen-
cy. However, because the positions are tied to discourses and powerful insti-
tutions, they may be pervasive and breaking with them may lead to inertia.  
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Subjectivity as privatized discourse 
Although many subject positions which are taken up in discourse are tempo-
rary and transient, others are more permanent (e.g. woman or man, black or 
white). If a person is continually positioned in a specific way, she may learn to 
understand and orient her actions, thoughts and feelings towards the network 
of meanings inherent in the position. For instance, being continuously posi-
tioned as “manipulative” by psychiatric staff (as tends to be the case for 
women diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, see e.g. (Nehls, 1999; 
Ringer et al., 2010)), is likely to affect how a person views herself and her 
possibilities of participation in the mental health services. What initially origi-
nates from the social reality of language thus develops into an internal subjec-
tive orientation (Willig, 2000). In this sense, psychological phenomena can be 
seen as privatization of public discourse. This orientation towards psycholog-
ical phenomena and long-term narrative identities is what distinguishes posi-
tioning theory from the type of discursive psychology inspired by conversa-
tion analysis. Harré & Gillet (1994) suggest that through learning to use the 
words “I”, “me”, “mine”, the child learns to see itself as an experiencing 
agentic person. Thus, when we use the first person pronoun “I” we produce 
selfhood discursively for others - and at the same time we produce it discur-
sively for ourselves. This creates a sense of personal identity and a feeling of 
having an experiencing self.  
 
From this perspective, subjectivity is both distributed and personal - condi-
tioned by the social and institutional contexts that an individual participates in 
and by her ability to make sense of and reflexively engage in these contexts. 
Harré (1998) suggests that internalized discursive positioning constrains and 
opens up possibilities for what a person is able to do and feel, even when 
they are alone. In this sense, a patient who has been positioned and positions 
herself as a victim of mental illness for a prolonged time, may learn to attrib-
ute her personal sensations, thoughts and feelings to the illness, while contin-
uously viewing herself as unable to change them.  
 
Positioning theory has been criticized for leaving some questions regarding 
experience and subjectivity unanswered. For instance, it may be difficult to 
account for why some people continuously position themselves in ways that 
are negative or deteriorating to their identities (Willig, 2011). While this cri-
tique may be justified, I find that for my focus the theory entails great 
strengths. The combination of positioning theory and Foucauldian analysis 





landscapes and patient identities, which is the focus of the thesis. In this 
sense, the thesis foregrounds the institutional context and the experiences of 
subjects within it, rather than a theory of subjectivity.  
 
I will use the positioning concept as a way of exploring the interactions be-
tween patients and professionals in psychiatry and as a way of understanding 
how the patients may adopt, refute, modify or privatize the discourses that 
become available to them within the institution - as well as draw on other dis-
courses. Positioning theory holds that the person experiences a sense of con-
tinuity while at the same time developing temporary selves in conversation. 
This allows me to carefully speculate about how the temporary, discursive 
selves that arise in interaction may affect the person’s subjective experience 
and sense of self. At the same time, the positioning concept is sensitive to is-
sues of power, exclusion and inclusion in interactions. I therefore apply the 
concept of positioning not only as a way of studying the subject positions 
that become available to patients and professionals, but also as a way of un-
derstanding and situating myself as a researcher, which is discussed at length 
in the first article of the analysis (Ringer, 2013). 
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Chapter 5: Study design 
In this chapter I describe the design of the study and the process of produc-
tion of data. The chapter also contains reflections on the process of access, 
and of ethical considerations. The question of researcher positioning will not 
be discussed at length, as it is the topic of the first article of the analysis.  
The settings of the fieldwork 
My choice to study more than one psychiatric setting was motivated by a wish 
to allow for diversity and variation in the data. At the same time I did not 
wish to be scattered over too many places, since I wished to immerge in each 
setting for a longer period of time. For the purpose of variation 
(Polkinghorne, 2005), I therefore found two settings to be an appropriate 
choice.  
 
For my research interest, I wished to study settings that allowed for the de-
velopment of long-lasting relationships between patients and professionals. I 
therefore excluded psychiatric emergency services, where patients are either 
referred to another institution for long-term treatment or sent back home af-
ter a few hours. The choice landed on two settings: an outpatient clinic and 
an inpatient “locked” ward. My research motivation for selecting institutions 
that varied in their structure and organization was to strive for diversity (e.g. 
Denzin, 2006). I expected that everyday life, institutional cultures and the 
challenges facing the participants in an inpatient ward and outpatient clinic 
would vary significantly. Thus, if it was possible to point to similar patterns, 
understandings and discourses across the settings, despite their differences, 
this could strengthen the results. If, however, there would be significant varia-
tions in the patterns, these could contribute to an understanding of complexi-





Access to the settings 
Prior to the fieldwork, I had meetings with the two head nurses13 of the dis-
tricts that were involved in the study, during which tensions emerged regard-
ing where the fieldwork should take place. It was implied that one district was 
afraid that the project would be a comparison of how well the districts man-
age user involvement. This subtle tension reinforced the decision that the 
fieldwork should be done at two very different facilities, an outpatient clinic 
and a closed inpatient ward. This way, no comparison could be conducted, 
since the institutions functioned in very different ways. After a few meetings 
we settled on one specific ward and clinic which could be of interest. The 
head nurses contacted the charge nurses of the facilities and asked them if 
they wished to participate in the project. They both agreed. After having re-
ceived the immediate acceptance from the charge nurses  I held meetings 
with the rest of the staff at the ward and clinic, during which I presented the 
study, listened to their input and answered questions. I also provided written 
material about the study (Appendix 1).  
 
One of my initial ideas was to focus on patients diagnosed with borderline 
personality disorder. This wish was based on my prior knowledge of the field 
and of how patients with this diagnosis have traditionally been perceived in 
clinical practice: the diagnosis has often been given to female patients who 
become problematized or even disliked by professionals (Horn, Johnstone, & 
Brooke, 2007; Ringer et al., 2010). Given my interest in problematized pa-
tients and a long-held interest in gender, this patient group seemed to be of 
particular interest in the study. However, in the meetings with the head nurs-
es during which access was negotiated, it was explained that this would not be 
in the interest of the region, since Region Zealand wished for the study to fo-
cus broadly on all patients. I thus changed the focus to include all patients in 
the settings. And so the fieldwork was carried out in the spring and summer 
of 2011.  
                                                     
13 It is difficult to translate the Danish titles of professionals directly. Each district in 
Region Zealand has a head nurse who is responsible for all the psychiatric teams in 
the region. When I refer to these nurses who are in charge of a whole district and 
usually do not work directly with patients, I use the term “head nurse”. Every psychi-
atric team additionally has a nurse in charge who together with the chief physician, 
makes up the management of the team. When I refer to the nurses who are team 
leaders, I use the term “charge nurse”.  
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The outpatient clinic  
The outpatient clinic was placed in a medium-sized town in Denmark and 
occupied two floors in a three story building. The team consisted of 13 men-
tal health professionals who provided services to between 250-350 patients 
with different diagnoses. At the time of the study there were 280 patients 
with contact to the clinic, out of which 20 patients were forensic, i.e. received 
compulsory treatment after a sentence. At the time of the fieldwork the clinic 
had recently changed its focus – from being primarily considered a long-term 
treatment facility it had become a general facility with both long-term (previ-
ously called “chronic”) patients and more short-term patients.  
 
The permanent professional group consisted of a management – the psychia-
trist and the charge nurse as well as the team members: four nurses, two oc-
cupational therapists, two health care assistants14, one doctor with the func-
tion of general physician, a psychologist and a social worker. At the time of 
the fieldwork there were also three nursing students who passed through as 
well as a physician resident.  
 
Except from the doctors and the psychologist, all team members were gener-
alists; individual team members worked as case managers15 and had mixed 
caseloads including patients with a range of conditions. Apart from the func-
tion of case manager, the team also organized a range of group activities for 
patients, group psychoeducation16, education on healthy lifestyles, evenings 
for patients’ relatives and group therapy.  
 
The team was working hard on implementing the newest standards of care 
developed by the Danish Quality Model (DDKM) (cf. Chapter 3). One to 
two of the new instructions were brought up during each morning meeting; 
one of the team members would project the new instruction onto the wall for 
the team to see and read it out loud, followed by a discussion of how it could 
                                                     
14 Danish health care education is divided into a short education for health care assis-
tants (social- og sundhedsassistent and the former plejer), who train for less than two years, 
usually by a combination of short theoretical and lengthier practical courses, and a 
longer education for nurses, occupational therapists and physiotherapists which lasts 
approx. 3-3,5 years . 
15 The term ‘case manager’ has been translated from the Danish primær kontaktperson. 
Each patient was assigned a case manager who had regular meetings with her/him 
and who organized the treatment.  
16 Psychoeducation stands for patient education about their diagnoses, and could be 





be understood and/or implemented. Many of the professionals felt an in-
creasing pressure to perform as a result of the new standards and ideals of 
efficiency - and experienced feelings of pressure and stress. The standards re-
quired every team members to register the amount of face-to-face contact 
with patients every day. These were then summed up and the collective out-
put of the team was measured in accordance to the set standard for minimal 
patient contact. The standards did not include phone calls to patients, e-mail 
contact, meetings with relatives, or contact with the municipalities, which 
meant that these activities, often a necessary part of psychiatric work, were 
not accounted for. Furthermore, one meeting with a patient was registered as 
one service, regardless of how long the meeting lasted. The standards there-
fore encouraged the professionals to keep their meetings with the patients as 
short as possible - and to have many short meetings with a large number of 
patients. Some recent budget cuts had also resulted in the dismissal of one of 
the team’s colleagues who had worked in the team for 18 years. 
 
The treatment philosophy of the team was based on cognitive-behavioral ap-
proaches and most of the team members had received training in cognitive-
behavioral techniques. Apart from meeting with a case manager, patients 
were offered a range of group activities, e.g. psychoeducation, group therapy, 
groups for relatives and groups for promoting a healthy lifestyle. The patients 
had widely varying difficulties and many different diagnoses. The average 
length of treatment was approximately 6 months; however the forensic pa-
tients and the patients who were in treatment with Leponex (a strong antipsy-
chotic which demanded that patients had to be closely monitored and dis-
charged only by a psychiatrist) were in contact with the clinic longer. The pa-
tients were usually referred to the clinic after hospitalization or from their 
general practitioners, and they usually had meetings with their case managers 
once a week or once every second week. The meetings either took place at 
the clinic or in the patient’s house, although because of the pressure to keep 
the meetings shorter they increasingly took place in the rooms devoted to this 
purpose at the clinic.  
The inpatient ward 
The ward was also located in a medium sized town and it occupied one floor 
in a building surrounded by other wards. It was structured as a traditional 
ward; centrally by the entrance to the ward there was a staff room with large 
windows covering the walls, allowing the professionals to look out onto the 
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ward. There were 14 single bedrooms and some rooms reserved for activities 
such as watching television or playing table-tennis. The mental health team 
consisted of approximately 27 mental health professionals and a number of 
substitutes who worked in shifts around the clock, providing services to 14 
in-patients with varied diagnoses. Among the professionals, there were 23 
nurses and healthcare workers, a psychiatrist, a physician resident, an occupa-
tional therapist and a social worker. The ward also had an affiliated psycholo-
gist, but during the time of the study the psychologist was involved in other 
tasks, and so was rarely seen at the ward.  
 
The patient group was a mixture of forensic patients and non-forensic pa-
tients. Among the non-forensic patients some were at the ward voluntarily 
and others were receiving compulsory treatment. One patient had been at the 
ward for half a year, as he was awaiting a sentence, but otherwise the stays 
were usually shorter, lasting from a few days to 3-4 months. A large amount 
of the patients were “repeaters” or “revolving-door patients”, i.e. patients 
who were well known to the professionals and who had been hospitalized at 
the ward before.  
 
The ward had recently undergone a transformation from an open ward, with-
out the possibility to detain patients against their wish - to a “closed” ward 
with locked doors and other means of restraints, such as belt-strapping. 
There was a system of privileges which granted some patients the right to 
leave the ward, while some were not allowed to do so. The professionals kept 
track of the rights and restraints of individual patients by writing these down 
on a large whiteboard in the staff room.  
 
Many professionals described difficulties with the new structure of a secured 
unit, and complained of the lack of training in handling confrontational situa-
tions with patients. They explained that they had only received a quick course 
in handling conflicts, and wished for more training in handling patients who 
acted threateningly or violently. They wore a safety alarm, a small white arti-
fact with a button to press. If they sensed they were in danger, they could 
press the button, and so send a signal to call on colleagues from the sur-
rounding wards. The shift to a closed ward, placed in a new location and of-
fering many new challenges, had also meant that some of their colleagues had 
resigned or been transferred to another unit. Some professionals said that the 
new organization and the relocation to a new building far from their homes 






The treatment philosophy of the ward requires some closer explanation. The 
general model was inspired by Open Dialogue and network approaches, a 
treatment framework originally developed in Western Lapland in Finland. 
Open Dialogue is a network based, language approach to care, which inte-
grates different therapeutic models (Seikkula & Olson, 2003). In its original 
form, it draws on a postmodern, social-constructionist framework, with inspi-
rations from Bakhtin and Bateson. The model developed in Finland is based 
on the principles of tolerating uncertainty, dialogism and polyphony; it takes a 
critical stance to phenomena otherwise characterized as individual psycho-
pathology, viewing them as a crisis in a network of people (Seikkula & Olson, 
2003: 405). It subscribes to a socialconstructionist notion of truth, in that 
there is no conception of truth or reality outside of the effects of a dialogue 
(ibid: 410).  
 
The team’s application of the Open Dialogue paradigm was selective, and 
Open Dialogue’s potentially radical suggestions seemed to have been down-
played. From what I could tell mostly two practices inspired by Open Dia-
logue were applied. The first was that of inviting patients and their relatives to 
a network meeting with a loose agenda. During these meetings each partici-
pant would say what was on their mind, in accordance with Open Dialogue. 
The second practice was the idea of a reflecting team. Two professionals 
sometimes had a meeting with the patient - and once or twice during the 
meeting the professionals would turn to each other and reflect openly on 
what they had heard the patient saying. Many professionals expressed regret 
that time restraints and workload, however, made it increasingly difficult to 
find time to carry out this model of meetings.  
 
Other principles of Open Dialogue had not been adopted. A principle which 
many professionals regretted they were not able to observe for practical rea-
sons, was the principle to establish the first network meeting within 24 hours 
and to have continuous meetings on a daily basis, if needed. Instead, most 
patients had one or perhaps two network meetings during their hospitaliza-
tion. Among the other ideas of Open Dialogue which had been intentionally 
rejected was the principle to refrain from having meetings or discussions 
about the patient without the patient present. This principle in Open Dia-
logue is aimed at a more equal distribution of power and knowledge (Seikkula 
& Olson, 2003; Seikkula, 2011). The possibility of inviting patients to meet-
ings had been discussed in the team, but it had been dismissed. One nurse 
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explained this in the following way: If I was having surgery, it would trouble 
me if I had to listen to the doctors and nurses discussing my case. This choice 
seemed to result in a more traditional psychiatric hierarchy of knowledge, 
where the professionals continuously discussed the patients and their prob-
lems in their absence. 
 
The ward did not appear to be as preoccupied with implementing the instruc-
tions of the Danish Quality Model as the clinic. However, just as in the clinic, 
many professionals at the ward experienced an increased pressure of work-
load as well as budget cuts, which meant that many working-shifts were un-
derstaffed. On most days, the main structured activity they were able to offer 
patients was a group walk in the area - and even this activity was sometimes 
not possible, when a working shift was very understaffed.  
Differences, similarities and transferability 
If we sum up the most important similarities and differences between the set-
tings the following patterns may be noted. At the clinic, patients lived at 
home and most had voluntary contact with professionals; at the ward the pa-
tients stayed for shorter or longer periods and there was a mixture of volun-
tary and compulsory treatment. The patients had similar diagnoses at the 
ward and the clinic, albeit at the ward they were considered to be in a particu-
larly acute period. The patient turnover at the clinic was calmer and many pa-
tients had had the same case manager for many years, while at the ward the 
patients came and went - although some also retained contact to their contact 
person after discharge in outpatient meetings. In both settings the profes-
sionals experienced an increasing workload and time pressure. The profes-
sionals at the clinic were on average more experienced and older than those at 
the ward. A great difference was the amount of interventions offered. The 
clinic offered a range of different group activities and other psychosocial in-
terventions, and many patients were enrolled in these. At the ward, the group 
activities were limited to a walk a day (on most days), watching television and 
sometimes playing a game. From what I observed, no group interventions 
were offered, and individual psychotherapy was not a part of the standard of-
fers. 
 
Unfortunately, little information is available for a formal appraisal of whether 
the two settings are comparable to “a typical” Danish mental health clinic and 





The clinic worked with cognitive-behavioral techniques, which are largely be-
coming the norm in Denmark and it seemed to consider itself rather at par 
with other mental health clinics. There is therefore little reason to think that 
the clinic differed greatly from other mental health clinics. Judging about the 
typicality of the ward is more difficult. In the initial negotiations of access, it 
had been indicated that the ward was different and more concerned with user 
involvement than other acute wards. One nurse also told me that the profes-
sionals at the ward were known among surrounding wards as radicals or 
“hippies” who allowed the patients too much influence. Some patients also 
said they did perceive the ward to be different from others, as they felt the 
professionals were “nicer” here. However, other patients said they did not 
experience it as any different from other wards they had stayed in.  
 
There is very little systematized information available about life and daily rou-
tines in acute wards in Denmark, but studies from other countries point to a 
limited level of patient-professional contact, with most patients spending the 
day alone or with each other in the common room, as well as few activities 
for patients (Quirk & Lelliott, 2001; Sharac et al., 2010). Studies from Den-
mark and other countries (e.g. Barrett, 1996; Schepelern Johansen, 2005) also 
indicate the centrality of pharmacological treatment approaches. This seemed 
to reflect everyday life at the ward of study. Careful speculation may therefore 
show that the ward did perhaps differ from other wards on some measures 
(e.g. “nicer staff”/more idealistic attitudes), but not on others (e.g. level of 
patient-professional contact and the centrality of pharmacological treat-
ments).  
Methods 
Ethnography and participant observation 
A central method of producing data for the study was participant observation 
and situated, ad hoc interviewing. Participant observation was selected as a 
research method as it was appropriate for fulfilling the research purpose of 
obtaining a situated understanding of the language and the everyday life of 
patients and professionals. The observations at the psychiatric facilities were 
conducted in accordance with the wishes of Region Zealand to obtain 
knowledge on ”how it is talked with, to and about patients” in the institution. 
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This meant that the fieldwork was conducted without focusing on the effica-
cy of the treatment or whether the professionals fulfilled the explicit aims of 
the organization. Instead, I wished to explore what was going on in the facili-
ties, what people talked about, how they talked, and how this was experienced 
by the people in the field (Ahrenkiel, 2004). The ethnographic approach was 
therefore appropriate, since, as Emerson, Fretz & Shaw (1995:1) note, eth-
nography “involves the study of groups of people as they go about their eve-
ryday lives” (1995:1). 
 
Ethnography has a long tradition and represents many different schools of 
thought. The intention of this study was to work with an ethnographic ap-
proach that was helpful in answering my research question and that was con-
sistent with the general theoretical and meta-theoretical framework of the 
study. The ethnographic position I draw on places itself between realist and 
subjectivist approaches and may be termed constructionist ethnography, (Preissle 
& Grant, 2004). In this tradition it is assumed that the material world exists 
apart from human consciousness of it; however the meaning of the world is 
always prescribed by the human mind. In this sense, knowledge is created in 
the interaction between the researcher and the field. Thus, the process and 
the product of research are an interaction between the researcher and the 
outside world. Accordingly, producing a credible account requires an aware-
ness and reflexivity on the subjectivity of the researcher, but the data are still 
placed in the foreground.   
 
Such an approach has also had implications for my position during the field-
work. Spradley (1980) lists a continuum to describe the degrees of participa-
tion possible for researchers during fieldwork, ranging from nonparticipation 
to complete participation. On this continuum I shifted between actively par-
ticipating and passively observing. I did not try to make myself or others be-
lieve that I was a neutral “invisible” observer, but neither did I intentionally 
try to change a course of events. During formal meetings, e.g. patient-
professional meetings or staff meetings I remained silent, scribbling away in 
my notebook on the side. However, during informal meetings, such as lunch 
breaks at the clinic or while watching television at the ward, I often claimed a 
more participatory position. As will be elaborated in my analysis of researcher 
positioning in the first article, my participation approach was quite varied in 
the two settings. At the clinic, I followed the professionals and was intro-
duced to patients by them. At the ward I followed the patients and largely 






Whenever I had the possibility, I also conducted small informal interviews 
(DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002) with the participants, following their lead but oc-
casionally asking questions to clarify points or prompt them to keep talking. 
The informal interviewing was a useful way to obtain information and to 
learn about the social world of the participants. My degrees of involvement, 
i.e., what I said and did during each activity, were carefully noted in the field-
notes, which will be described next. 
Producing the fieldnotes 
My fieldnotes were written during periods of observation in formal situations 
such as a meeting between a professional and a patient, and after periods of 
observation in informal situations where a pen and paper seemed intruding. 
In the formal situations, where I could openly write notes, the participants’ 
statements were written almost verbatim.  
 
Regardless of when and where the notes were written, I developed a system 
for discriminating between direct quotes (in quotation marks), my paraphras-
ing, descriptions (in normal writing) and my personal reflections (in italic) to 
improve the reliability of the fieldnotes (Emerson et al., 1995:51). The divi-
sion was naturally artificial, since observations cannot be recorded without 
interpretation. However, marking my own reflections in a separate writing 
style made it easier for me to get closer to my own implicit preconceptions 
and understandings in the subsequent analytical process. This understanding 
of my reflections served as a step towards examining my own research posi-
tions critically.    
 
In the fieldnotes I concentrated on what was said and done by the partici-
pants. I also wrote what the people I met looked like, and how they were 
placed physically in relation to each other. I noted down if anything puzzled 
me or gave me an emotional reaction, how I was introduced to patients and 
professionals, and how people seemed to react to my presence. At both insti-
tutions I also sketched the physical appearance of the place, what was written 
on posters and information sheets on the walls and which type of brochures 
were placed where. Many of these details, obviously, have not been selected 
for analysis. However, all my impressions were noted as concretely and “lush-
ly” (Goffman, 1989:131) as possible, in order to try to let as little as possible 
“slip out of sight”, and to later make it easier for myself to (re)create the 
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scenes and my experiences as vividly as possible when reading the notes 
(ibid.).  
 
The fieldnotes were initially “jottings” (Emerson et al., 1995) written into ex-
tensive fieldnotes on computer later the same day and sometimes the next. 
This was done following the recommendations by many ethnographic schol-
ars (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002; Emerson et al., 1995; Goffman, 1989; Spradley, 
1980) to keep the observations fresh in memory. All fieldnotes were struc-
tured and written in chronological order, starting each day with my arrival to 
the site and ending with my getting on the train and leaving it.  
Daily rhythms and formal observations 
Both at the outpatient and inpatient facilities I attempted to follow the daily 
rhythms of the institution. At the outpatient facility, I arrived in the morning 
with the staff at 8:30 and I joined the morning meetings at 9 o’clock to 9:30, 
during which the professionals would discuss formal issues and share infor-
mation. Usually I scheduled to join between two and four meetings with pa-
tients every day and I usually left when the facility closed at 4 o’clock, or half 
an hour earlier, to catch the train. All in all, I spent 19 days at the clinic. 
 
At the ward I came at different times, but mostly in day hours. I spent three 
evenings at the ward, until 8 p.m., 9 p.m. and 11 p.m. respectively. In the be-
ginning of my fieldwork at the ward I spent most of the time in the common 
areas for patients, especially the living room and the activity room. Towards 
the end of the fieldwork, I also sat in with the staff during their meetings. I 
participated in all possible common activities when I was at the ward – which 
usually amounted to a walk a day - and twice we went to play boule and to sit 
on the grass in the sun. I also played table tennis a few times with patients 
and once a professional joined us. Altogether I spent 18 days at the ward.  
 
My approach in both settings was to not be selective, but instead to partici-
pate in as many activities as possible, to get a broad picture of the types of 
formal and informal activities that were taking place. I aimed at joining each 
type of available formal activity available at least once. Below, I present an 
overview of all the kinds of formal activities I ended up observing. I believe 
the activities I joined give a relatively comprehensive picture of the types of 
formal activities available to patients - with the exception of group therapy 
(only offered at the clinic), which the professionals thought was too sensitive 






Formal activity Observed  
Instances 
Staff meetings/handovers 28 
Staff treatment conferences 4 
Staff supervision/reflection 2 
Patient-staff morning/evening handovers17 11 
Contact person/case-manager meetings with patients18 10 
Patient home visits 7 
Doctor-patient meetings 6 
Sessions of psychoeducation19 4 
Network meetings 2 
Occupational therapy sessions 2 
Social worker sessions 2 
Psychotherapy sessions 2 
Psychiatric evaluation of patients hospitalized in general hospital 2 
Syringe injections 2 
Distribution of Electroconvulsive Therapy 1 
 
Five of these observations were additionally recorded and transcribed. As 
most of my time in both settings was spent on unstructured and informal ac-
tivities, the list gives a very incomplete idea about my fieldwork at the ward. 
However, it provides an overview of the type of formal situations I observed.  
Except for the different kinds of staff meetings, I believe the types and fre-
quency of formal activities I observed correspond more or less to the propor-
tions of meetings a typical patient may be invited to. That is, patients would 
have the most frequent meetings with their contact person or case manager, 
some meetings with a doctor, sometimes home visits, and perhaps some ses-
sions of occupational therapy or meetings with a social worker. At the clinic, 
but not at the ward, many would additionally have some sessions of psy-
                                                     
17 These were brief meetings at the ward, during which a professionals would inform 
patients about who were their contact persons for the day, the planned activities for 
the day and the patients could bring up AOB.    
18 Case managers/contact persons were either nurses, health care assistants or occu-
pational therapists 
19 Psychoeducation, i.e. patient education about their diagnoses was either in a group 
or individual format. It was reminiscent of a classroom situation, in which a profes-
sional would make use of PowerPoint slides to teach and head discussions about 
symptoms, aetiology and prognosis.  
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choeducation or other group activities. In both settings, but particularly at the 
ward, only a few selected patients were invited to individual psychotherapy 
(although many expressed such a wish), and consequently psychotherapy is 
not very present in the data. 
 
In the final analysis, I have clearly not made use of all the notes from the 
meetings I observed. During the fieldwork I joined as many activities as pos-
sible in an open manner, and had few preconceptions of what may be im-
portant for the final analysis. During the analytical process, as my knowledge 
of the data, the field and the research focus became more precise, I selected 
for analysis the cases and extracts which were the most relevant for my ana-
lytical interests. In this way, I have not sought to reach an even distribution of 
all types of activities in the data extracts in the final analysis, but instead I 
have let my particular analytical attention and the analytical procedure guide 
the selection of extracts. Since most of my notes of formal patient-
professional meetings are derived from case manager or contact person meet-
ings with patients, many of the extracts I make use of in the analysis are from 
these types of meetings, which are also the most frequent types of meeting a 
patient would attend. 
Interviews with patients and professionals 
Apart from the situated informal interviews conducted during the participant 
observation, the data set also consisted of recorded semi-structured inter-
views. For this purpose, I developed one interview guide for patients and one 
for professionals, based on the research questions of the study and my obser-
vations in the field (cf. Appendix 4 and 5). 
 
In recruiting patients for interviews in both settings my interest was mainly 
directed towards people who had somehow stood out in the talks among the 
professionals. Since my focus was on understanding contradictions and ten-
sions, I wished to focus on patients who were described as “difficult” or 
“complex”. In order to contrast the experiences of the “difficult patients” 
and to strive for maximum variation within the data set (Polkinghorne, 2005) 
I further strived to interview patients who were described as particularly co-
operative by professionals.  
 
Altogether, I interviewed 13 patients, at least four who had been explicitly 





least four who were pointed out as particularly well-liked and easy to work 
with. Seven patients were in voluntary treatment, four in involuntary and two 
were presently in voluntary treatment, but had previously received involun-
tary treatment. To preserve anonymity, I present further information on pa-
tients in a cluster. 
 
Gender Age Length of contact to 
MHS 
Diagnoses 
• 6 women 
• 7 men 
Range: 21-48 yrs. 
Mean: 33 yrs. 
(SD=10)  
• In 20’s: 5 
• In 30’s: 2 
• In 40’s: 6  
Range: First hospitali-
zation-20 years 
Mean: 9, 3 yrs. 
(SD=5, 9).  
• First hospitaliza-
tion: 1 
• 1-5 yrs.: 4 







• Borderline personality 
disorder: 1 
• Borderline personality 
disorder paired with 





• Depression: 1 
• Generalized anxiety: 1 
• Bipolar disorder: 120 
 
In the interviews with professionals I aimed at including professionals who 
were positioned differently within the organization (Staunæs & Søndergaard, 
2005:55). I thus interviewed at least one professional from each professional 
group in the interdisciplinary teams. This was to make sure that the study had 
access to different perspectives and views on psychiatric work. At the clinic I 
interviewed 7 professionals, at the ward 4. Below I present characteristics on 
the professionals, again in a cluster to preserve anonymity.  
 






• 9 women 
• 2 men 
 
• 2 nurses 
• 3 health care 
assistants  





• In 20’s: 1 
Range: 2-40 
yrs. 
Mean:16,8 yrs.  
(SD= 12,8) 





• 1-5 yrs.: 
                                                     
20 The ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for the most common diagnostic categories 
in the settings, psychosis and schizophrenia as well emotionally unstable per-





• 2 doctors 
• 1 Social worker 
• 1 Psychologist 
• In 30’s: 2 
• In 40’s: 2 
• In 50’s: 4 
• In 60’s: 2 
 
4 
• ≥10 yrs.: 
7 
8  
• ≥5 yrs.: 
3  
 
The table can be said to more or less represent the staffing of a typical mental 
health team in general psychiatry. Usually nurses and health care assistants 
make up the largest professional groups in a team. Additionally a team will 
typically have one or two physicians, an occupational therapist and a social 
worker. Usually a team will also have an affiliated psychologist who may, 
however, sometimes share his or her time between different teams. Further-
more, the gender make up is also quite typical for a mental health team – 
there are usually more women and few men.  
 
All interviews lasted between 30 minutes to two hours. At the outpatient clin-
ic most interviews were conducted at the facility. Based on their wishes, one 
patient interview was conducted in the person’s home and one was conduct-
ed at the public library in town. At the ward four interviews with patients 
were conducted in their rooms. At the request of the participant, one inter-
view was conducted upstairs from the ward, and another was conducted in 
another ward that a participant had been moved to. The interviews with pro-
fessionals either took place in the common professional office, in the profes-
sional’s own office, or in a secluded conversation space. All interviews were 
transcribed (cf. appendix 6). The final interviews and fieldnote extracts in the 
analysis were translated from Danish to English. 
 
Because some of the professionals (e.g. social worker, occupational therapist 
and psychologist) were only represented by a single individual in the team, to 
preserve their anonymity at times I refer to professionals as just “team mem-
ber”, “case manager”, or “contact person” in the final analysis without speci-
fying their professions.  
The interview guides 
In designing and developing the interview guides (Appendix 4 and 5), I 
wished for the questions to be both thematically relevant, so they could help 
answer the study’s research questions, and to function in the interviews on a 
dynamic inter-human level (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). My objective with 





about their experiences in psychiatry, and how they ascribed meaning to their 
role in the mental health services.  
 
In the first part of the interview, the patients were asked about their life be-
fore entering psychiatry. I asked open questions such as: “Can you tell me a 
little about your life before you came in touch with psychiatry?” “Can you tell 
me about what happened when you got in touch with psychiatry for the first 
time?” This part of the interview had the purpose of developing the partici-
pants’ self-narratives, their experiences earlier in life and the personal mean-
ings associated with entering psychiatry (Chase, 1995). The second part of the 
interview was about the person’s relationship to psychiatry and how they ex-
perienced their life as psychiatric patients. They were asked about particular 
events that had been important to them; and what made these events im-
portant. They were asked whether entering psychiatry had changed their un-
derstandings of who they were. The final part of the interview specifically ad-
dressed their experiences of participation and service-user involvement. Here, 
they were asked whether they felt they were listened to in the mental health 
services and how they experienced their possibility of influencing decisions.  
 
In the interviews with professionals, my focus was on understanding how 
they regarded their work and how they ascribed meaning to working with pa-
tients. The first part of the interview concerned how the professionals re-
garded their role in the mental health services. They were asked what made 
them choose the mental health field, and what they enjoyed the most and the 
least about their work. The second part was about whether their work and 
psychiatry had changed since they started working, and how they had experi-
enced those change. Finally, they were asked specifically about how they un-
derstood user involvement and whether it was something they thought about 
in their work. With most professionals, I was additionally able to ask them 
about specific patients that I had observed them with and about specific 
meetings with these patients. I wished to get their understandings of the situ-
ations I had observed, and wanted to hear their reflections about what made 
the specific patient difficult or easy to work with.   
 
In the beginning of the study, apart from participant observations and inter-
views, I additionally had an idea that I would explore the written language of 
psychiatric records, and I asked patients I interviewed for their consent for 
my access to their medical files (Appendix 3). However, I have made limited 
use of the records in the final analysis. This is not to say that an additional 
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analysis of the written language would not have been interesting, but rather 
that time and space restraints made it difficult for me to incorporate such an 
analysis. There is already a substantial amount of work dedicated to the writ-
ten language of psychiatric records (Barrett, 1988; N Buus, 2009; Hanganu-
Bresch & Berkenkotter, 2012; Swartz, 2005, 2006) that the reader may find 
interesting. While drafting the first sketches for the analysis, I found that the 
contribution of this thesis would be more substantial if I focused my analyti-
cal attention to the spoken language and actions that took place in meetings 
between professionals and patients.  
Analytic procedure 
The discourse theorist Ian Parker (1999:3) has noted that an analysis of dis-
course of clinical practice needs to be both respectful and critical. On the one 
hand it needs to do justice to the stories people tell about their distress, the 
experiences they have of living with it. On the other hand, it needs to be criti-
cal and acknowledge that therapeutic practices often are embedded in images 
of the self and others that may themself contribute to the experienced prob-
lems. Parker writes mostly about the dialectic of being critical and respectful 
about the experiences of patients. I would add that in this thesis the criti-
cism/respect must also extend to the work of psychiatric professionals. As 
the medical sociologist Nick Fox (1995) has noted, there is a tendency within 
critical health research to undermine the work of professionals and to see 
them solely as instruments of power. In the analytical process I have attempt-
ed to balance the dialectic of being critical and respectful in two main ways. 
Firstly, the critique that I strive to develop is not to be understood as passing 
a negative judgment, but rather as a curious stance which questions taken for 
granted assumptions. As Foucault writes: 
“A critique does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the way they 
are. It consists in seeing on just what type of assumptions, of familiar no-
tions, of established and unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices 
are based…To do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too 
easy.” (Foucault, 2003a: 172)  
 
The way I have explored taken for granted assumptions is by being specifical-
ly concerned with points of conflict and dilemmas in the field. Thus, in my 
analytical attention I have been especially attentive to circumstances and situ-





lyzing what is considered problematic, different, or a breach of norms allows 
for an optic of what is considered the norm: e.g. “normal patients” or “nor-
mal patient-professional relationships”. Because the norm is often taken for 
granted and may become invisible, looking at what is produced as problemat-
ic can work as a mirror to what is considered normal (Holen & Lehn-
Christiansen, 2010; Søndergaard, 2005). 
 
The second way I have strived to analyze the data with a critical and respect-
ful perspective, is to attempt to give both patients and professionals “a 
voice”. In order to develop an analytical strategy which is both critical and 
respectful, I have read the empirical data at three different stages and from 
three different angles, as reflected in the structure of the analysis.  
 
My first systematic engagement with the data was from the perspective of re-
searcher, during which I especially looked at the dilemmas I encountered in 
interactions with patients and professionals during the time of fieldwork. This 
reading resulted in the first article of the analysis. My second systematic en-
gagement with the data was approached from the angle of patients; I was es-
pecially concerned with the dilemmas they were facing and I tried to imagine 
how they experienced the discourses which positioned them in different 
ways. This reading resulted in the second article, on illness constructions and 
their implications for patients. My third systematic engagement with the data 
was approached from the angle of professionals. I looked specifically at the 
difficulties and dilemmas they were facing and tried to imagine how these 
were experienced.   
 
Concretely, I have worked at every stage of the process by locating themes in 
the data. This was an open process, which was neither deductive in the sense 
of aiming to test previous hypotheses, nor entirely inductive since my episte-
mological and ontological assumptions guided my attention. Below, I de-
scribe the concrete analytical tools I have made use of.  
Initial Thematic Analysis 
I had help from a friend who acted as research assistant in transcribing some 
of the interviews and we discussed initial ideas in the process. While tran-
scribing, she had many interesting thoughts and I encouraged her to write 
them down. In this way I both had my own notes as well as hers, when I read 
the interviews and fieldnotes. In the process of classifications and thematiza-
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tions I made use of the version of thematic analysis developed by Braun & 
Clarke (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I looked at and thematized the data altogeth-
er, starting with the patient interviews and then moving on to the fieldnotes, 
and finally the interviews with professionals. Braun and Clarke map out dif-
ferent stages for developing themes when working with text data. Briefly,  
these stages are:  
 
1. Familiarizitation with the data. I began the process of analysis by repeatedly 
reading and re-reading the fieldnotes and interview transcripts, while making 
small comments to myself. This is the common procedure for creating in-
depth familiarity with the empirical material in qualitative research. 
 
 2. Generating initial codes. At this stage the researcher unselectively codes as 
many themes as possible in the text. I did this mostly by ways of summing up 
what was in the data. I also made more interpretative and theoretical claims, 
marking these as NTM (notes to myself).  
 
Below is an example of a text extract with my codes. The example is taken 
from the first interview that I coded and so it is more detailed than the later 
processes of coding; as I worked on with the coding and started getting an 
overview of general themes, the coding became less detailed. However the 
general technique was similar throughout the process. 
 
Text Preliminary codes 
F: I had to get out of psychiatry, I was thinking 
[smiles] I was part of this huge game, you could 
call it, um, at the time (mm) and (.) 
A: Game? 
F: A game, sort of (yeah?) a mind game, god, Sa-
tan, something like that (.) um, which was going 
on at the time (.) um, s-, I was on a little mission, 
or what to say. And then I just had to get out of it 
[psychiatry] as much as possible, so I lied like cra-
zily much about how I was doing, and, kind of to 
(.) avoid taking medication and (.) to avoid all that 
stuff 
A: Mm, what did you say? 
F: Well, I can’t almost, I can’t really remember it, 





Characterization of first hos-
pitalization 
- Being part of “a mission” 
- Being in a “a game” (god 
Satan) (metaphors) 
 
- Lying as a strategy to leave 





- Trouble remembering the 
first hospitalization: 
“Blurred”, “Black and white” 
[NTM: unusual metaphor – 





totally black and white (7s.) yeah 
A: But was it stuff like that you were doing fine, 
or?  
F: Yeah, I was doing fine, in a way (.) I just didn’t 
really get much of it (.) I didn’t get much of what 
was going on (no?) Um, of the world, and yeah, 
just generally. Um, and then after that I just kind 
of got a little caught by (.) by voices and thoughts 
and (.) stuff like that which almost closed me in 
my room for a year or something (.) so. I couldn’t 
really get on from that (mm), or I am now, but it 
took some time, you could say.  
A: So you stayed in your room for a year?  
F: Yeah and just listened to this stuff, that (.) al- 
almost massacred me, or what to call it.  




derstanding between A. and 
M?] 
“Was fine” (triggered by A’s 
question?) 
- Confusion 
- Confinement as an action of 
the voices and thoughts: 
caught by voices and 
thoughts, which closed me in my 
room for almost a year 
[NTM: discursive self-
construction as non-agent, 
voices and thoughts as agents] 
- Moving on as time consum-
ing 
- Voices “almost massacred 
me” – non-agentic construc-
tion of person 
[NTM: interestingly, agency is 
present in most of the narra-
tive but when talking about 
the distress, agency seems to 
disappear] 
 
The end product of this stage was a long list of codes and potential themes.  
 
The next stage, stage 3, involved Searching for themes across the codes. At this 
stage, I started to look for patterns across themes such as overlaps, similari-
ties, differences, overarching themes and subordinate themes. In this process, 
I distanced myself from the initial data to focus my attention on the codes 
which have been generated. The result of this stage was a long, crude list of 
themes: 
 
- RESEARCHER POSITIONING 
- ILLNESS DEFINITIONS 
- PATIENTS’ SELF CONSTRUCTIONS 
- PATIENT IMPERATIVES AND NORMS 
- PATIENT STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING MHS 
- PATIENTS’ RESISTANCE 
- OBJECITIFICATION 
- SUSPICION 
- PATIENT-PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
- PROFESSIONAL RELATIONS AND PROFESSIONALISM 
- PROFESSIONALS’ STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING MHS 
- PROFESSIONALS’ RESISTANCE 
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- POWER AND CONTROL 
- ETHICS 
- VALUES ON WHAT CONSTITUTES GOOD PSYCHIATRIC 
TREATMENT 
- USER INVOLVEMENT 
- NEOLIBERAL TRENDS 
- CONDITIONS AND STRUCTURES 
- MEDICATION 
 
In the next stage, stage 4, I reviewed the themes and restructured them. At this 
stage I skimmed the original data and my themes to see if I could identify 
overlapping themes, overarching themes and sub-themes to synthesize the 
many disparaging themes. In this process many themes were grouped togeth-
er and re-arranged as some turned out to be overlapping, others turned out to 
be overarching and yet others became sub-themes.  
 
Among the themes that were grouped together were: patients’ strategies for 
managing MHS, patients’ resistance, patient self-constructions, patient imper-
atives, illness definitions, objectification and suspicion – these were grouped 
into the overarching theme that became the main topic for article 2: construc-
tions of mental illness and patient identities. The other themes that were grouped 
together were: professional relations and professionalism, patient-professional 
relationships, power and control, professionals’ strategies for managing MHS, 
professionals’ resistance, ethics, values on what constitutes good psychiatric 
treatment and user involvement – these were assembled under the overarch-
ing theme that became the topic for article 3: patient-professional relationships and 
user involvement. The theme researcher positioning became a main theme itself, and 
developed into the outline for article 1: on researcher positioning. Finally, the 
themes on conditions and structures, medication and neoliberal trends turned 
out not to be independent themes in themselves, but were divided into dif-
ferent sub-themes that were sorted under the other main headings. In this 
way, I ended up with three general themes, each of which provided the out-
line for an article: 
 
- RESEARCHER POSITIONING AND ITS MEANING (Article 1) 
- CONSTRUCTIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND PATIENT 
IDENTITIES (Article 2) 
- PATIENT-PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND INVOLVE-
MENT (Article 3) 
 
Some poststructuralists have questioned the extent to which coding is fit for 





Brian Massumi (2002) has argued that coding necessarily constitutes a “stop-
operation” which freezes the text - and thus fails to grasp fluctuations, pro-
cesses, movements and change. According to him, structure and orderliness 
are forced on to the text by the researcher, who creates neat and applicable 
structures which cut narratives into pieces and reduces the “messiness” of re-
ality.  
 
The criticism is not unwarranted; there inevitably is a loss involved in the 
process of coding - with the greatest challenge perhaps being grasping com-
plex speech acts such as irony and jokes. At the same time it can be argued 
that any analysis must to a certain extent reduce complexities and simplify the 
world in order to arrive at specific conclusions (MacLure, 2011). Moreover, as 
I have argued before (Chapter 5), there may be a tendency in some poststruc-
turalist work to overemphasize fluctuations, instability and change, for exam-
ple when it comes to identity formation and self-understandings. The same 
argument may be made concerning the issue of coding and analysis. Lan-
guage, apart from being changeable and dynamic, also does incorporate cer-
tain stability. Working with language data, then, entails both elements of sta-
bility and movement (MacLure, 2011).  
 
Coding has the additional strength of involving a long process of engagement 
with the text and familiarization with the data. It therefore allows the re-
searcher to have a detailed knowledge of the data, enabling a detailed and 
specific analysis to emerge. Moreover, the process of coding makes it possible 
for the researcher to distance herself from the text - allowing for reflexivity to 
arise (MacLure, 2011). Thus, although coding may not be an ideal tool, it is a 
way of working with the text which entails many strengths. 
Asking questions from Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
Having categorized the different codes and having arrived at the stage of 
writing the analysis, I found inspiration in the questions asked by the version 
of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis developed by Carla Willig (2008). Willig’s 
(2000) work is especially concerned with developing an understanding of the 
relationship between discourse, experience and subjectivity. She outlines six 
general themes, with a number of questions each, for conducting a discourse 
analysis in the Foucauldian tradition.  
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The first sets of questions concern discursive constructions and discourses. They 
ask: How is the discursive object constructed through language? What dis-
courses are drawn upon? What are their relationships to one another?  
 
Subsequently, the analyst asks questions about action orientation and positioning: 
What do the constructions achieve? What is gained from using that particular 
construction here? Which subject positions are made available through the 
constructions?  
 
Finally, the researcher asks questions concerning practice and subjectivity: What 
possibilities for action are mapped out by the constructions? What can be 
said and done from within the subject positions? What can potentially be felt, 
thought and experienced from the subject positions? 
 
I have employed these questions to guide my interpretation of concrete data 
examples - and with each extract in the analysis I have allowed the questions 
to open up new interpretations. At different stages in the process of writing 
the articles I have made small drafts where all six sets of questions were raised 
and explored in the form of bullet points. Naturally, not all points from these 
drafts have found their way to the final analysis. With most extracts in the 
analysis, some questions rather than others have been emphasized. For in-
stance, in one particular extract I may have been especially interested in posi-
tioning, in another in discourses and yet in another in the implications for 
practice or subjectivity. In this way I have used Willig’s model as an inspira-
tion for developing interpretational sensitivity, rather than actually structuring 
the final text according to it.  
Ethical considerations 
Since the study took place in a psychiatric setting, I start by briefly outlining 
the formal ethics that apply to research in such a setting and how I met these 
demands. I then move on to a discussion of my ethical considerations 
throughout the research process.  
Formal ethics  
Prior to the fieldwork I gained approval for conducting the study by the Dan-





plied to the psychiatric research unit of Region Zealand. I also contacted a 
representative from the The National Committee on Health Research Ethics (Den 
Nationale Videnskabsetiske komité), and was informed that it was not neces-
sary to apply to them, because the study did not make use of biological mate-
rial nor did it involve a planned intervention.  
 
The initial consent for conducting the study was provided by the manage-
ment of each setting. Upon entering the settings I first held meetings with the 
professionals during which I informed them about the purpose and design of 
the study. I also made it explicit that anyone who did not wish to participate 
could decline. I provided written information on the study (cf. Appendix 1) 
and I made sure that it was available at all times during the fieldwork. Before 
observing each patient-professional meeting I also obtained verbal consent 
from both parties. If one of the parties disagreed (which happened a few 
times in each setting), naturally I accepted this decision. At the outpatient 
ward, the process of consent was less straightforward. The professionals had 
consented to have me present, but, as such, the patients were not given a di-
rect choice if they wanted to have me present at the ward. Instead, a week be-
fore the beginning of the field work I hung a poster on the ward (Appendix 
2) on which I informed about the study and stated that anyone who wished 
to could decline participation. On my first day of the fieldwork, I presented 
the study during the morning meeting and repeated that participation was 
voluntary, and that if anyone wished not to be part of the study I would not 
write about them. None of the patients made use of this option.  
 
Prior to each interview I explained how the interview would precede, the 
types of questions that I would ask and I informed each participant that they 
could decline to reply to a question that they did not wish to answer. I also 
told each participant that participation in the interview was voluntary and that 
if they regretted their participation after the interview they could contact me 
any time and withdraw their consent.  
 
The interviews with the professionals were based on their verbal consent. For 
the interviews with patients, I asked for both verbal and written consent (Ap-
pendix 3). Additionally, I asked them if they wished to sign a consent form 
for access to their patient files for me to analyze written language about them. 




All the data were kept locked up in an anonymous form according to the 
standards of the Danish Data Protection Agency and I used an encryption 
program (TrueCrypt) for working on the data on my computer. The names of 
the settings as well as all the participants have been made anonymous and 
confidential personal information which may compromise anonymity has 
been changed. To further distort the possibility of recognizing individuals, I 
have at times varied my use of pseudonyms when citing or referring to the 
same person: i.e. a person in reality named X may in one example be referred 
to as Y, in another example as Z, and yet in another as W. 
Instrumentality and “faking friendships” 
A procedural, checklist type, of approach to research ethics may lead a re-
searcher to believe that once she has fulfilled the formal ethical requirements, 
the research is intrinsically ethical or risk-free (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2006). 
Instead, I consider the question of research ethics to be an on-going critical 
reflection that needs to be addressed at all stages of research. Below I outline 
some ethical reflections concerning my interactions with the research partici-
pants and the consequences of the study.  
 
I cannot say if all participants were happy to have me present. This was per-
haps less of a dilemma during the formal observations of patient-professional 
meetings, during which I always asked for both the professional’s and the pa-
tient’s consent - but more of a problem during the informal participation dur-
ing morning meetings, in the office with the professionals, or while watching 
television or smoking with patients at the ward. Many ethnographers have 
written about the nuisance participants may experience by having a researcher 
observe them (e.g. Wind, 2008) and this, I imagine, was also sometimes the 
case in this study. I strived to accommodate this by spending a lot of time 
“hanging out” without obviously recording observations, but attempting to 
naturally take part in discussions and activities.  
 
Brinkmann & Kvale (2006) have written about the concealed forms of power 
inherent in modern, qualitative research interviews, which stress warmth and 
empathy in the interview situation. They warn about the dangers of applying 
therapeutic techniques, which lure the participant into revealing personal in-
formation that will later be used instrumentally by the researcher. Especially 
in interviews with patients, I was aware of the risk of the research interview 





professional interaction, e.g. by bringing sweets to the interviews, and also by 
telling them details about myself. For some, however, I believe, the possibility 
to talk about their experiences and their life history to someone who mostly 
listened, may have resembled psychotherapy. Some patients asked me about 
my professional background or otherwise found out that I was a psychologist 
(cf. first article). One patient, who had asked about my education as a psy-
chologist by education, asked if I would like to become his psychotherapist 
after the interview. For ethical reasons I declined his offer.  
 
Brinkmann & Kvale (2006) point out the unethical aspects in the researcher 
“faking friendships” by simulating personal closeness to the participants. 
They remind us that the fieldwork relationship is inescapably an instrumental 
relationship, which is time-limited and serves the researcher’s end of generat-
ing new knowledge; it is not a goal in itself. This served as an important re-
flection for me throughout the fieldwork. At the same time, as Angrosino & 
Mays de Pérez (2000: 694) have pointed out, the idea that one can predict, 
and thereby avoid all possible harm in research is deceptive. Just like in any 
other human interaction, it is impossible to know all the elements and possi-
ble outcomes beforehand.  
 
Being in an institution in which many of the participants experienced much 
emotional distress and often seemed grateful to share their experiences, it was 
difficult to avoid emotional attachments to research participants and perhaps 
vice versa. I could only apply a type of trial-and-error learning, in which I at-
tempted to correct or omit problems and dilemmatic situations to the extent 
possible, once they were occurring (Angrosino & Mays de Pérez, 2000). 
Who is made vulnerable by the research? Consequences of 
the study  
Apart from reflections associated with the participant observations and inter-
views, my ethical reflections have considered possible consequences associat-
ed with the publication of the study. The Norwegian ethnographers Oeye, 
Bjelland & Skorpen (2007) have pointed out that the common criteria for 
ethics and vulnerability in psychiatric research are built on a bio-medical 
model. According to the model, psychiatric patients are considered an espe-
cially vulnerable group due to their biological impairment (the mental illness), 
which is thought to impair their decision making and reasoning. Much discus-
sion in psychiatric research therefore concerns how patients’ impairment may 
 118 
constrain or influence them in making decisions about participating in re-
search projects. Because of this construction of psychiatric patients, the re-
searcher is often expected to cooperate with the medical staff in charge when 
deciding on which patients to ask for consent for observation and interviews, 
and to be especially cautions when interacting with this group. Oeye, Bjelland 
& Skorpen (2007) argue that this is a simplified and decontextualized ap-
proach to research ethics, inapplicable to social research and participant ob-
servation. They argue instead that defining a person or group as vulnerable 
should always depend on the research objective and the context of the re-
search.   
 
Although I acknowledge that my study could possibly have an impact on pa-
tients, I believe there is potentially more at stake for the professionals than 
for the patients. The participant observation I have conducted could produce 
vulnerabilities and hurt professional identity, since the design of the study 
scrutinizes how the professionals talk to, with and about patients. My analysis 
can therefore possibly lead the professionals to feel exposed and misunder-
stood, or to see themselves in ways they do not feel are attractive. For this 
study, then, considering the patients as an especially vulnerable group per se 
is not fruitful, as different issues may be at stake for different participants 
(Oeye et al., 2007). The awareness of such potential harm has encouraged me 
to try to make the analysis as nuanced as possible and to acknowledge the dif-
ficulties that the professionals face in their everyday work. Although I have 
tried to show in my analysis how the professionals are not free to act as they 
please - that when they say things or do things which may be experienced as 
harmful by patients, this is associated with norms that make some decisions 
more feasible than others - I cannot be sure how the thesis will be read and 
interpreted.  
 
The fact that access was negotiated through a top-down process, and the 
management is familiar with the particular settings in which the fieldwork 
took place complicates the question of anonymity. I have done what was pos-
sible, changed names, professions and other personal information such as 
gender, so as not to reveal individuals, but the fact that the particular research 
settings were familiar to the management could not be changed. In any study, 
it is impossible to predict the exact consequences it will have - how the study 
will be received and used (Angrosino & Mays de Pérez, 2000). One particular 
risk associated with this constraint on anonymity is that, although I have 





cultural rationales, the criticism that I raise may be interpreted as concerning 
only specific individual professionals. I sincerely hope, however, that my 
analyses instead will be interpreted in terms of institutional and cultural ex-
pectation that concern the whole system of mental health – and that they 
therefore will give rise to broader reflexivity.  
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Chapter 6: Articles 
1. Ringer, A. (2013). Researcher-participant positioning and the discur-
sive work of categories: Experiences from fieldwork in the mental 
health services. Qualitative Studies, 4(1), 1-20 (published) 
 
2. Ringer, A. & Holen, M.* “Hell no, they’ll think you’re mad as a hat-
ter”: Illness discourses and their implications for patients in mental 
health practice. (Submitted to Health: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the 
Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine).  
 
3. Ringer, A. “I would like to maintain your compulsory treatment, is 
that alright with you?”: Discursive constraints and possibilities for 
user involvement in day-to-day mental health work (soon to be submitted 
in an abridged version) 
 
* Contribution of co-author: The first author has done the ground work and 
most of the writing. Mari has contributed with constructive ideas throughout 
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Article 1: Researcher-participant positioning and 
the discursive work of categories: Experiences 
from fieldwork in the mental health services 
Abstract 
This paper reports on methodological experiences from an ethnographic 
study in psychiatric institutions in Denmark. Drawing on a poststructural 





odological problems as sources of data, the paper analyzes how the challenges 
encountered in the fieldwork were indicative of discursive norms within the 
mental health services. It is argued that the multiple ways the researcher was 
positioned by participants revealed that the categories “patient” and “staff” 
were produced as polarized binaries with little leverage for negotiating posi-
tions in between. At the same time, it is shown that the patients find ways to 
resist the objectifying practices of the researcher as well as of the mental 
health services. The conclusions are discussed against recent attempts within 
the mental health services to promote a more patient-centered approach and 
involve patients in the treatment.  
 
Keywords: qualitative methods, researcher positioning, field relations, eth-
nography, mental health 
 
Please cite this article as: 
Ringer, A. (2013). Researcher-participant positioning and the discursive work 
of categories: Experiences from fieldwork in the mental health services. Quali-
tative Studies, 4(1): 1-20 
Introduction 
In this paper I analyze methodological experiences from an ethnographic 
study on mental health institutions. The study focused on language within the 
mental health services – on how patients are talked to, with and about in psy-
chiatric treatment. The mental health services of the Danish Region Zealand 
initiated the study, based on a wish to promote a patient-centered approach 
and service user involvement. They were interested in the ability of the lan-
guage used in communication with patients to either restrict or promote in-
volving patients in the treatment. Thus, I was present at two psychiatric insti-
tutions with the purpose of producing data on language and service user in-
volvement within mental health care.  
 
The first institution in which the fieldwork took place was an outpatient clinic 
where patients lived at home and had regular or sporadic contact with the 
professionals. The second was a secured inpatient ward, where patients stayed 
for shorter or longer periods of time behind locked doors – but, by proving 
that they were well enough, could leave the grounds of the ward unsuper-
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vised. These two sites were chosen as they represent very different modes of 
organization within psychiatry. The first is for patients who are considered 
well enough to live at home, typically with voluntary contact to the mental 
health services. The other is for patients who are often considered too ill to 
even go for a walk alone - and are frequently sectioned or admitted on an in-
voluntary basis. Three months were spent on participant observations of the 
everyday practices within the institutions - such as patient-professional meet-
ings, therapeutic sessions, staff meetings, and treatment conferences. I also 
interviewed 13 patients and 11 members of staff. 
 
As the study progressed, it increasingly came to focus on language, not just as 
immediate communication between patients and professionals, but as natural-
ized forms of wider discourses that restrict and open up possibilities for how 
it was possible to define and think about patients in the mental health services 
(Foucault, 1991c, 2005; Holen, 2011; Speed, 2011). Thus, a poststructural 
framework became the framework for analysis. Such a framework attempts to 
look beyond the participants’ immediate understandings of themselves and 
the world to analyze the discursive norms and repertoires that participants 
draw on when they talk. What is said in a meeting between a nurse and a pa-
tient, for instance, is regarded as a system of representations that reflects wid-
er systems of meaning within the institution of psychiatry and within society 
(Speed, 2011). The language used may therefore be said to draw on and con-
struct discursive norms that create and restrict possibilities of defining who 
patients and professionals are. From this perspective, the discourses and 
norms available also set conditions that define who the researcher can be, 
since the researcher temporarily inhabits a part of the social worlds of the 
participants. 
 
The paper focuses on the methodological challenges that I encountered dur-
ing the fieldwork, particularly related to how the research participants reacted 
to and positioned the researcher. Drawing on newer debates that view meth-
odological problems as sources of data, (Angrosino & Mays de Pérez, 2000; 
Hastrup, 2010; Jensen, 2009; Järvinen & Mik-Meyer, 2005; Savvakis & 
Tzanakis, 2004), the paper proposes that by analyzing the positions that be-
come available for the researcher in interactions with participants, it is possi-
ble to gain important insights on the features of the field under study. This 
type of understanding transcends the traditional division between methods 





and methodological dilemmas solely as issues of method, but sees them as a 
point of departure for analysis. The paper specifically analyzes what the mu-
tual processes of researcher positioning indicate in terms of the discursive 
norms of the institution of psychiatry. The cases used in the paper have all 
been selected as they are indicative of many dilemmatic situations in which 
the researcher’s position became entangled in the web of the discourses of 
the institution.  
Researcher positioning as a starting point for 
analysis 
It is often stated as a goal that the ethnographic researcher finds a credible 
place for herself within the structures of the field she is entering; a position 
that provides opportunities for building trust and rapport so that she may be 
invited into different activities. Traditional discussions have been concerned 
with how the researcher may establish the best “role” in the field ( Snow, 
Benford, & Anderson, 1986; see also Harrington, 2003 for an overview). The 
researcher is often thought to be able to take on roles initially when engaging 
with participants and stick to them throughout the research process. Prob-
lems with establishing a role, or with confusing roles, may be construed as 
problems of the individual researcher’s method. However, newer debates 
within qualitative research argue that ethnographic researchers cannot unilat-
erally choose or control roles and options during fieldwork, no matter how 
carefully they have planned their studies (Harrington, 2003; Preissle & Grant, 
2004). Research participants are active in accepting, refusing or re-negotiating 
a researcher’s identity claims. Furthermore, participants rarely perceive the 
researcher as a unique and decontextualized individual, but define the re-
searcher in terms of categories and norms that pre-exist in the field 
(Angrosino & Mays de Pérez, 2000; Harrington, 2003). This is why the ways 
the researcher is understood by participants and the negotiations of access 
that the researcher encounters in the course of fieldwork may constitute an 
index to qualities, norms and structures in the social world of participants 
(Savvakis & Tzanakis, 2004). 
 
The question of the position of the researcher seems to pose a particular 
problem in qualitative research within health institutions. Van der Geest & 
Sarkodie (1998: 1375) note: “[qualitative researchers] in a hospital or clinic 
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find themselves out of place. Not being a doctor, nurse or other type of 
health worker and not being a patient either makes their position somewhat 
awkward”. Perhaps due to this reason, ethnographic research in mental health 
institutions in the past has sometimes been conducted covertly, with the re-
searcher masquerading as a patient (Caudill, 1958; Rosenhan, 1973). Nowa-
days it is more common for researchers in health institutions to engage in 
overt research, dressing like, and following professionals (Barrett, 1996; Buus, 
2005; Grigg et al., 2004; Holen, 2011; Johansen, 2005; Lester, 2009; 
Søndergaard, 2009; Warren, 1983; Weiss, 1993) - and thereby not infrequently 
be positioned as a member of staff by both professionals and patients. Many 
qualitative researchers in health institutions report on dilemmas associated 
with researcher positioning; however, the analytical implications of either be-
ing positioned as a patient or as a professional by the participants in the field 
are rarely discussed (van der Geest & Finkler, 2004; Wind, 2008). At the same 
time, when different researchers in diverse times and settings have encoun-
tered similar challenges, it is unlikely that the dilemmas can solely be attribut-
ed to questions of methods or individual characteristics among the research-
ers (Jensen, 2009). Rather, they may be considered a starting point for under-
standing some structural qualities of the research field. 
 
Taking these debates as points of departure, the paper applies the concept 
“positioning”, derived from Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harré (1990) and 
Harré & Van Langenhove (1999), to analyze the researcher - participant rela-
tionship as a meeting between positions. Positioning may be understood as 
mutual negotiations of social positions that occur when people engage in 
conversation. When people position each other, they are assigning rights and 
duties of speaking and acting, based on pre-existing categories, metaphors 
and discourses (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999). Positioning, therefore, al-
ways draws on wider discourses and norms, which are inseparable from the 
context of the interaction. At the same time, people can exercise notional 
choice; they can draw on a repertoire of multiple and even contradictory dis-
courses in their self-and-other positioning. People are therefore active when 
they position themselves and others, but at the same time the amount of 
available discourses sets the parameters of possible positions. Analyzing the 
processes of positioning that take place between researcher and participants 
may thus open up an understanding of the categories and discursive norms 





tural approach to the field relationship can be helpful in unpacking aspects of 
the field.  
 
I will now turn to look at the positioning processes I became a part of during 
the fieldwork in the psychiatric institutions and how these can be understood 
as indicative of the discursive norms that operate in the mental health ser-
vices. I begin by looking at the outpatient clinic. Because I was introduced to 
the clinic by the professionals and followed them to meetings with patients, I 
firstly discuss the positioning process I entered into with the professionals. I 
then move on to discuss how the frequent interaction with the professionals 
contributed to positioning me as a member of staff in the eyes of some pa-
tients. I look closely at an interview with a patient at the clinic and analyze 
how the ways I was positioned in the interview provided clues on the discur-
sive norms that operate for patients. Subsequently I turn to look at the posi-
tioning processes I became a part of in the other setting of the fieldwork, the 
inpatient ward. I discuss how I strived to distance myself from a position as 
part of staff and I analyze the positioning processes I entered with the pa-
tients at the ward. Finally, I look at how the professionals at the ward reacted 
to me and the position of “least staff” that I strived to reach. In the conclu-
sion I relate the discursive norms that emerged in the researcher positioning 
processes to the question of involving patients and their perspective in men-
tal health care.  
First field: Researcher positioning at an outpa-
tient psychiatric clinic 
In preparation for the entry to the fieldwork in the first institution, the outpa-
tient clinic, I emphasized my clinical background as a psychologist and the 
study’s affiliation with the mental health services in meetings with the profes-
sionals. The intention was that this might facilitate access (Grigg et al., 2004) 
and minimize the potential threat that being a complete stranger to psychiat-
ric work may pose (Savvakis & Tzanakis, 2004). Ethnographic literature in 
general encourages researchers to make themselves seem familiar and to find 
common grounds with the participants in order to “fit in” (Borbasi, Jackson, 
& Wilkes, 2005; Glesne & Peshkin, 1992; Hammersley & Atkins, 2010; 
Harrington, 2003; Jorgensen, 1989). I wore a name tag with the logo of the 
mental health service, like the professionals, but one stating that I was a PhD 
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student. I also tried to resemble the staff in clothing. I usually wore a clean, 
simple blouse, dark jeans and a suit-jacket. I was presented to the clinic by the 
professionals and I was introduced to the patients by them. Following the 
professionals and getting access to patients with their help was practical and 
seemed feasible. In any fieldwork, material and physical features of the world, 
as well as social and cultural aspects allow, encourage or block specific possi-
bilities (Hastrup, 2010; Preissle & Grant, 2004). Because the institution was a 
clinic, the professionals were there constantly during working hours; however 
the patients came and went. If I were to follow someone then, it was neces-
sarily the professionals. I will now look at how some of the professionals at 
the ward positioned me as a critical evaluator in a position of power above 
them. I suggest that this is indicative of a discursive norm among the profes-
sionals to be wary of criticism in the face of recent standardization processes. 
Standardization and the researcher as a representative of the 
system  
One of the professionals says “I have something for our group therapy, but I 
almost don’t dare to ask with Agnes here. I have a test in English, the newest 
test that is not translated to Danish yet. Isn’t it okay if I use the English one? 
Is that okay?” Everyone says that it is all right. She looks at me with an in-
quiring look and asks if I have any objections. I answer “No, not at all”.  
P/O, p. 3 
 
The fragment above is derived from the staff morning meeting during the 
first day of fieldwork at the clinic. The team member’s statement positions 
the researcher as someone who has the right to veto a decision approved by 
the team - and therefore in a superior position to them. Although I had tried 
to position myself as a naïve student among the professionals and said that I 
was there to learn from them, there were numerous examples from my field-
notes of the professionals reacting to my presence with self-consciousness 
and something akin to submissiveness. During the fieldwork I interpreted 
these reactions as methodological problems. Perhaps I had not explained the 
aim of the study well enough or I had chosen the wrong approach. However, 
as the number of similar instances grew, I began to understand the profes-
sionals’ positioning of me as more than problems of access. The reactions of 
these team members seemed to extend the relationship to me as a person and 





and criticized by outsiders. The health services in Denmark have been subject 
to an increased level of standardization and neo-liberal governing reforms 
(Holen, 2011; Magnussen, Saltman, & Vrangbæk, 2009) and the team was 
working hard on implementing these. Their progress was regularly surveyed, 
and praise or reprimands were given based on the team’s efforts. Although 
some level of suspicion and wariness towards the ethnographic researcher is 
not uncommon in fieldwork in general (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002; Harrington, 
2003), it appeared that the specific positioning of the researcher as powerful 
and critical was connected to a discursive climate induced by the neo-liberal 
reforms. In the other setting of the fieldwork, the inpatient ward, a nurse 
even told me directly that some of her colleagues regarded me as a spy, and 
that in these times of standardization and quality development one can never 
be too sure. This indicates that the researcher positioning processes could be 
read as indicative of the discursive norms that operated in the context. The 
prevalence of neo-liberal discourses in mental health care thus seemed to 
have affected how the professionals could position themselves towards me. It 
was important for them not to be perceived as unprofessional, incompetent 
or to “lose face”. In such a context, following the correct standard procedure 
became an important frame of reference for professionalism. The guidelines 
and benchmarking, intended to provide a higher standard of care, in practice 
therefore seemed to undermine the autonomy of professionals and made 
them cautious of making independent decisions (Holen, 2011; Speed, 2011). 
 
Through following staff, my contact to the patients was mediated by the pro-
fessionals and they influenced who, among the patients, I could interview and 
join in meetings. This provided few opportunities to negotiate or destabilize 
the position (Spanger, 2010). Although I emphasized confidentiality and my 
independence as a researcher, for some of the patients my position as re-
searcher became blurred with the professionals. In the next section I look 
closely at the processes of researcher positioning during an interview with a 
patient, Frederik. The case is chosen as it is illustrative of the way many pa-
tients were inclined to position me as one of the professionals at the clinic. 
Furthermore, the case illustrates that a researcher position as “part of staff” 
sometimes had consequences for the way patients found it possible to inter-
act with me. I suggest that the seemingly methodological problems that arose 
during the interview were indicative of a norm of the primacy of biomedical 
discourses within psychiatric care, excluding and rendering problematic alter-
native understandings of distress. However, I also argue the norm of bio-
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medicine does not become entirely encompassing for how patients may de-
fine themselves in other contexts. 
Biomedical discourses and the researcher as a member of 
staff  
Frederik was a man in his twenties who had been sentenced to treatment and 
medication following a minor felony. His main psychiatric contact, the nurse 
Magda, told me that Frederik was a co-operative and low-maintenance patient 
with whom she had a good working-relationship. He had agreed to have me 
observe his meeting with Magda, and later interview him. As many profes-
sionals, Magda introduced me as a psychologist working on a research pro-
ject. During the meeting Magda and Frederik mainly talked about medication. 
Frederik had stopped taking his medication for a few days and said that not 
taking it had made him feel better. Magda said that it was dangerous for him 
to experiment with it and it would be better to make an appointment with the 
doctor to make adjustments. She also said that she was obliged to mention 
that due to his sentence, it was compulsory for Frederik to take medication, 
and not doing so could lead to involuntary hospitalization. Although this el-
ement of coercion was present, the meeting was kept in a friendly, under-
standing and familiar tone. During the meeting Magda made some further 
references to me and my status as a psychologist. 
 
Later the same day I interviewed Frederik. Trying to avoid a position as part 
of staff from the beginning, I had brought fruit and chocolate with me to the 
interview. As with all interviews I conducted, I started by asking about his life 
before entering psychiatry. This choice was motivated by a wish to not focus 
immediately on mental health issues (Deroche & Lahman, 2008) and to di-
verge as much as possible from a patient-professional meeting. However, 
Frederik answered that there was nothing “noteworthy” [bemærkelsesvær-
digt] about his life prior to hospitalization. Thereby he applied a criterion of 
topic-relevance from a biomedical discourse, which prioritizes issues directly 
related to illness and distress, while topics concerning other parts of life often 
are deemed less relevant (Boyle, 2011; Holen & Ahrenkiel, 2011). Despite my 
attempts, this situated the interview within the discursive genre (Wetherell, 
2001: 18) of a patient-professional meeting, with me positioned as the profes-
sional.  





Frederik: Mm, But it was, that is (.) if you call it a psychosis or whatever you 
might call it, er, what happened anyway was, er, that my brain anyway played 
(.) a thought trick and my life, and made all sorts of things (.) yeah, it is also 
written in my file, er, what happened back then (.) er, I almost can’t even ex-
plain it but, but I’m almost tired of talking about it. 
Frederik, IV, p. 2 
 
Within a bio-medical discourse mental distress and diagnoses are understood 
as underlying biological forces that act upon a person’s personality and identi-
ty (Parker et al., 1995; Rapley, Moncrieff, & Dillon, 2011). By talking about 
the brain playing a trick, Frederik positions himself as a repository for cere-
bral forces and uses the psychiatric term “psychosis” to make sense of his ex-
periences. He implies that his patient file may provide me with information, 
perhaps more factual and objective information than he could provide. I did 
look at medical records as part of the study and I had asked for his consent 
for getting access to the file. I made a point of explaining that my interest in 
the file was to see how professionals wrote about patients, not to get infor-
mation on medical conditions. However, Frederik positions me as a person 
interested in expert statements on his psychiatric history - and himself as 
someone not well suited to provide these, or less suited than a patient record 
written by professionals. The statement that he is tired of talking about it fur-
ther indicates that he does not wish to elaborate. However, the fragment also 
seems to indicate the existence of other possible discourses, specifically in the 
statement “psychosis or whatever you call it”, even though these do not be-
come immediately available. Later in the interview he described his first hos-
pitalization: 
 
A: What did you think about it at the time [during the first hospitalization]? 
F: At the time I thought it was a terrible thing [noget herrens noget], it was phew! 
You shouldn’t be here, like, I don’t think it’s good [rise in tempo of speech] 
because I am not sick or I am not, there is nothing wrong with me or what 
can you say (A: mm) So, so I fought like, a little against, like, that, the idea 
about it (A: mm) erm (5 s.) Erm, and I don’t know if I still do, like a little (A: 
mm) but erm, I don’t really know what I think about it (A: mm) with regards 
to just that. I haven’t thought that much about it, heh [laughs], it’s just some-
thing that has helped me, just through a period of time.  
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A: What has helped you? 
F: Psychiatry 
A: Mm (11 s.) 
Frederik, IV, p. 4 
 
Here, Frederik first talks about himself as someone who once did not think 
he belonged in a psychiatric ward - as someone who did not consider himself 
ill and was in opposition to the mental health services. Thereby he invokes 
potentially anti-psychiatric discourses (Speed, 2011). He also implies that this 
is a position he currently may identify with. Then he seems to wish to shake 
the position off by saying that he has not thought it through well. This may 
serve to make his previous account seem more throwaway (Margaret 
Wetherell, 2010) as if it was something he just thought of now. Jonathan Pot-
ter (1997) has coined the term stake inoculation for discursive strategies that 
people may use when they wish to say something potentially bold, but then 
do not wish to be perceived as having a stake or interest in a certain position. 
This may have the function of preventing the interlocutor from undermining 
their accounts. For Frederik, the “I don’t know if I still do”, “I really don’t 
know what to think about it”, “I haven’t thought that much about it” and the 
subsequent laugh, may function as just that; as a shield against a possible crit-
icism or judgment of him, thereby positioning me as a person who could po-
tentially undermine him. In response to many other questions, Frederik an-
swered in a similar evasive or truncated manner and I grew increasingly frus-
trated that the interview was not proceeding well. 
Alternative discourses and reworking the position of staff 
Halfway into the interview, Frederik and I took a coffee-break and I turned 
off the recorder. I felt it necessary to explicitly readdress the question of my 
position. I told Frederik that it was true that I had studied psychology, but I 
was not a mental health professional. I did not have specific preconceptions 
about who and what may be considered ill. I was a researcher interested in his 
experiences. When we resumed the interview, this seemed to have caused a 
shift in Frederik’s way of addressing me and the stories he told. He asked if I 
was interested in hearing more about the voices he heard, despite previously 





how he perceived the voices to be external to him, that they were of an ab-
stract spiritual and sometimes positive nature, and not pathological. At the 
same time, he said he believed he could not share these thoughts with the 
mental health staff: 
F: I just think that feeling comfortable and feeling, feeling comfortable with 
saying what you, kind of what your inner torments are [is not possible] be-
cause erm, I feel like they [mental health professionals] understand it one 
way, or the way that is uh, the prevailing understanding (A: mm) and I under-
stand it in a totally different way and I don’t think I can explain myself out of 
it like that: ”I see it this way instead”. So, so I keep it to myself instead and I 
try to avoid talking to them about it (A: mm) Yes, I have always seen it as 
something that just needs to be gotten over with. 
Frederik, IV, p. 25 
 
In this fragment towards the end of the interview, Frederik positions himself 
as someone who has learned to manage the contact with mental health pro-
fessionals, specifically by avoiding disclosures of too much personal infor-
mation. A similar dynamic appeared to have taken place between interviewer 
and interviewee throughout the first part of the interview, when he had posi-
tioned me as a mental health professional. Researchers have noted the resem-
blance between the qualitative research interview and clinical or psychothera-
peutic encounters (Fog, 2004; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). They note that 
there is a risk that the intimacy of an interview situation may cause partici-
pants to reveal personal information they will later regret. This is an im-
portant point that should always be taken into consideration when doing in-
terview research, perhaps especially within clinical settings. For Frederik, 
however, the proximity of the research interview to a clinical session and the 
positioning of me as a mental health professional seemed to have had the op-
posite effect. Instead of excessively revealing personal information, he wished 
to reveal as little personal information as possible, when that information po-
tentially diverged from a mainstream psychiatric discourse. It was only when 
the interviewer could be positioned outside of the category of “mental health 
professional” that he could draw on alternative discourses to the dominant 
psychiatric one. 
 
At first glance, Frederik’s uneasiness and evasive answers in the first part of 
the interview might have been thought of as mere technical problems be-
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tween the interviewer and the informant. However, a closer look suggests 
that the methodical problems become meaningful in light of discursive norms 
and subject positions within the institution. Barrett (1996) and Parker et al. 
(1995) have noted that through repeated interactions with professionals, psy-
chiatric patients learn to define their experiences in relation to professional 
categories and norms - and thus learn to become competent patients. On the 
other hand, patients risk rejection or being discredited if they position them-
selves within less established forms of knowledge (Parker et al., 1995). 
Throughout the fieldwork, I learned that there was a potential risk involved 
for patients who admitted to unconventional understandings of their distress. 
Patients who said they were not ill or whose explanations for their distress 
diverged a lot from psychiatric discourses were frequently labeled as “lacking 
in insight” into their illnesses (Dillon, 2011). Within the mental health ser-
vices, patients who were thought of as “lacking in insight” were often consid-
ered uncooperative and very ill. Consequently, it was not an attractive posi-
tion to be placed in. Seen in this light, Frederik’s strategies for mitigating po-
tentially problematic utterances in the interview can be seen as a way of 
shielding against being positioned as “lacking in insight” by the interviewer - 
whom he perceived to be part of the professional group. What I experienced 
during the interview as technical problems thus rather seemed to be an indi-
cation of norms and expectations regarding how patients could talk and posi-
tion themselves within the mental health services in order to be perceived as 
easy to deal with and co-operative.  
 
What the case of Frederik further illustrates is not that alternative discourses 
of distress become absent in a person’s self-constructions when becoming a 
psychiatric patient, but rather that there can be difficulties and risks involved 
in expressing these in interactions with professionals. At the same time, the 
interview illustrates that there is a potential for resisting psychiatric discourses 
in accordance with the demands of the discursive context (Parker et al., 
1995). As much as reductionist discourses of illness and disease may become 
the main frame of reference in meetings with professionals, they do not nec-
essarily become generalized to how patients define and position themselves in 
other contexts. This showed me the importance of studying not only how pa-
tients are talked to and about in the mental health services, but also how they 
themselves talk about the mental health services - and the self-constructions 
that become available to them when doing so. I thus became aware of the 





of the material on observations and by following professionals, I risked ignor-
ing discourses that could sometimes not be expressed in patient-professional 
interactions. 
Second field: Negotiating “least staff” researcher 
positions at a secured psychiatric ward 
The interview with Frederik made it clear that if I wished to gain access to 
discourses that were sometimes silenced in interactions with professionals, it 
was important that the patients did not position me as part of the profession-
al group. In the second field, the secured inpatient ward, I therefore sought to 
negotiate an approach that would make it possible for me to be positioned as 
“least staff”21: to diverge from the staff category as much as possible and not 
be seen as affiliated with them. On the entrance meetings with the profes-
sionals of the ward during which I told them about the study, I therefore ex-
plained that I wished to get to know the patients first and spend time with 
them, as my research design made it important that the patients did not think 
of me as part of staff. As I also wished to produce data on how the profes-
sionals talked about the patients in their absence, I added that towards the 
end of the fieldwork I would like to deviate from this rule – and join the pro-
fessionals on staff meetings and interview them. 
 
In order to avoid being positioned as staff, when entering the ward I had to 
create a visible connection with the patients. Having made up my mind to 
position myself as recognizable to patients, I was aware to signal with body 
signs (Søndergaard, 2006), my clothes and body language, a stronger belong-
ing to them than to the professionals (S Estroff, 1985). I learned to wear 
worn jeans and loose t-shirts, no jewelry, and sport shoes, thereby resembling 
the way some of the patients dressed. I refrained from wearing an identity tag 
or a security alarm like the staff. In the beginning of the field work I avoided 
                                                     
21 The term ”least staff” is inspired by Nancy Mandell  (1988), who, while doing re-
search on children’s social worlds in nurseries, developed an approach she calls the 
“least adult” role. Mandell’s “least adult” role is practiced by her participating as one 
of the children and subordinating to the authority of the teachers, although with a 
constant awareness that she cannot actually become one of the children. More re-
cently in a Danish context, Hanne Warming (2005) has redeveloped the concept 
within a poststructural framework.  
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going near the staff room. Only professionals were allowed into the staff 
room, and patients would knock on the door and stand outside while talking 
to a professional. I also joined the patients’ activities rather than the profes-
sionals: used the patient lavatory, rather than the one reserved for staff, drank 
coffee when it was served to patients, and, lastly, went to the smoking room 
with the patients who smoked. Smoking turned out to be an important activi-
ty for many patients and some spent a great proportion of their time in the 
smoking room. The strategy opened a forum for just sitting with the smoking 
patients on the pretense that I “just needed a smoke”. At other times I at-
tempted to “just hang around”, sitting relaxed and silent, folded up on the 
couch (S Estroff, 1985) in the common room. However, for my identity 
claims as “least staff” to work, they had to be accepted by the research partic-
ipants (Harrington, 2003). The next section looks at how the patients at the 
ward reacted to and positioned the researcher in light of my attempts to posi-
tion myself as “least staff”. I discuss that my attempted positioning as “least 
staff” triggered more implicit or explicit resistance from the patients than 
what I had experienced at the clinic. The resistance to me, I suggest, was as-
sociated with a resistance to objectification; a resistance that at the same time 
could be difficult for patients to express when interacting with professionals.   
Decoding the researcher’s interests and resistance to objec-
tification 
 
Unlike the patients at the clinic, with whom I mostly talked during formal in-
terviews or observed during meetings with professionals; with my “least 
staff” identity-claim I was able to develop more informal and long-lasting re-
lationships with many patients at the ward. However, just as with the inter-
view with Frederik at the clinic, there was a tendency that some patients at 
the ward initially positioned me as interested in their “illness”.  
I am sitting with some of the female patients in the activity room. One of 
them has brought a kit for painting and decorating finger nails. They have 
asked if I want to join them and also have my nails painted and I have happi-
ly agreed. I bring some sweets that I have kept in my backpack and we share 
them while we are getting our nails painted by Julia, who has been a patient at 
the ward for some time. Julia says: “Ha, you’re giving us sweets so that we 
will tell you about our mental problems”. I answer that I’m actually more in-
terested in how they experience the mental health services than in their prob-





P/O, p. 253-254 
 
Julia’s attempt to decode the researcher’s aims and interests reveals something 
about what patients at a psychiatric ward might expect others to find interest-
ing about them (Jensen, 2009). She is used to talking about her personal diffi-
culties with professionals and knows that being a psychiatric patient, having 
“mental problems” and a psychiatric diagnosis, positions her as different 
from the norm; a norm of which the researcher in this case is a representa-
tive. At the same time she makes fun of the researcher’s intentions and prac-
tices. The researcher is positioned as someone who wishes to objectify the 
patients by studying their ”mental problems” - but at the same time doesn’t 
have the authority of the professionals to do so - and thus is forced to bribe 
her way to gaining access. Julia’s reaction and articulation of what she per-
ceives to be the researcher’s aims may be seen as a type of resistance against 
being objectified by the researcher’s gaze (Foucault, 2003b; Jensen, 2009). She 
practices resistance by the use of irony - and throughout the fieldwork there 
were numerous examples of her reacting to my presence this way. In the 
former setting, the outpatient clinic, I wrote fieldnotes during almost all my 
observations. The professionals had sometimes commented on this, but the 
patients never mentioned my writing practices. At the ward, however, the in-
formality of my interactions with the patients often prevented me from taking 
notes (Emerson et al., 1995). In the few situations in which I tried jotting 
some words down in the presence of Julia, she commented on it and mocked 
me: “Oh, there the journalist appeared in her!” or ”Are you getting something 
to write about? You love this, don’t you?”. Her reactions may be read as con-
fronting the researcher with the fact that the researcher, because of her aca-
demic position, has the possibility of producing authoritative accounts on the 
patients (Jensen, 2009). Thus, they are an ironic comment on the power that 
lies in the objectifying practices of the researcher - and at the same time an 
indication that she opposes to the objectification. Other patients sometimes 
showed resistance to the researcher’s objectifying practices by avoiding talk-
ing about the things the researcher was interested in, or what they thought 
the researcher was interested in. In my fieldnotes I wrote about another pa-
tient, Mark: 
Mark walked by my side all day today and followed me around, but he did 
not want to talk about the mental health services when I asked about his ex-
periences of them. Whenever I tried asking him he changed the subject and 
talked about different songs he had listened to, films he had seen and books 
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that interested him. He asked me many questions about these and whether I 
had heard of them. I finally asked him directly if he would like to participate 
in an interview, but he said no. I asked him why and he said he doesn’t like to 
blabber and go on and on. I asked what he meant and he said “well, about 
things like my illness and stuff”. I said that I actually rather wanted to ask 
him about how he experiences the mental health services. He answered “it’s 
personal”.  
P/O, p. 225 
 
My questions about Mark’s experiences of psychiatric care places him in the 
position of “psychiatric patient”. Thereby I implicitly point out the differ-
ences between us, positioning myself as the norm and him as deviant from it. 
Mark’s avoidance of my questions and resistance to participating in an inter-
view can be read as him resisting precisely the categorization as “psychiatric 
patient”. Like Julia he positions the researcher as primarily interested in a bi-
omedical condition – “my illness” – and distances himself from that position. 
Experiencing or thinking that others may find you interesting only because of 
an illness that makes you deviant and perhaps inferior to the norm, calls for a 
rejection of that position. Mark’s response is to disidentify (Jensen, 2009; 
Skeggs, 1997) from the position of “mentally ill” by rejecting any topics in-
troduced by the researcher that hint at his status as psychiatric patient. 
Thereby he markedly distances himself from the position he perceives the re-
searcher to place him in - and normalizes the situation by drawing on a reper-
toire of topics from everyday conversations: books, films and music.  
 
Mark and Julia’s mockery and resistance to me can be read as subtle antago-
nisms within the institution and in society moving into the researcher’s rela-
tions with the participants. They both expected me to be interested primarily 
in their illness, but seemed to resist this classification of them. It is interesting 
that the patients in the former field, the outpatient clinic, had not reacted in 
the same ironic and resisting way  when I was introduced to them by profes-
sionals. One interpretation of this could be that when the patients had me 
positioned as part of the professional group they expected me to objectify 
them and, as in the case of Frederik, objectified themselves to me - by con-
structing themselves as passive repositories of pathology (Speed, 2011). This 
can be tied to Foucauldian notions of how psychiatric patients learn to make 
themselves objects for biomedical interventions and in the light of these learn 





objectification may become invisible for patients, as it just becomes a natural-
ized form of interaction within the mental health services (Barrett, 1996). 
However, engaging with the researcher, who shifted positions between regu-
lar talk and objectifying note-taking, might have made the objectifying prac-
tices more visible. The patients’ reactions to me can thus be read as an index 
to the varying and complex forms of resistance that become available to pa-
tients in different discursive contexts. In the next section, I will look closely at 
one specific context of my interactions with the patients, the smoking room. I 
argue that the patients’ reactions to my presence there and the positioning of 
me as a “fellow smoker” point to the importance of physical space in creating 
pockets of resistance for the patients.  
The symbolic meaning of the smoking room and the re-
searcher as a fellow smoker 
 
The patients Dina, Julia and Laura go out to smoke in the smoking room. I 
take out my own pack of cigarettes and go out with them. Dina makes a sur-
prised, slightly disapproving face and asks: “What are you doing?!”. Laura an-
swers: ”she wants to smoke”. I ask if that is alright. Julia says “of course it 
is”. ”Oh”, Dina says, “I thought you were from the staff, they’re not allowed 
to smoke with us”. I say, no I’m not, and I introduce myself. She answers: 
“Oh, so you’re the one doing that study”. I say yes. They keep talking. Dina 
turns to the group and says that she tried to burn her jeans yesterday. Then 
she describes a suicide attempt involving 300 painkillers. She explains that af-
ter she had swallowed them she called her boyfriend who called an ambu-
lance for her. She says that she has done the same thing four times before. 
P/O, p. 226 
 
Joining the patients in the designated smoking area – the smoking room – 
turned out to be the most important way for me to attempt being positioned 
as least staff. As I learned from Dina’s reaction to my presence, smoking in 
the smoking room was an activity reserved for the patients alone; the profes-
sionals were not allowed to smoke with them. When the specific event above 
took place I had already joined Laura and Julia in the smoking room on nu-
merous occasions. Dina had largely stayed in her own room and hence I had 
not had the chance to speak to her before. Dina’s negative reactions to my 
presence when she thought I was part of staff, and her subsequent willingness 
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to speak openly about her suicide attempt, when the others assured it was le-
gitimate for me to be there, can be read as indicative of some of the norms 
and practices guarding the patients’ everyday interactions at the ward. As the 
professionals were afraid that some patients would disclose personal infor-
mation they may later regret, the ward had a rule that patients were not al-
lowed to talk to each other about emotional distress. I observed a few times 
how the rule was implemented: if a patient attempted to share experiences of 
distress with other patients in front of professionals, that person was escorted 
away from the other patients and invited instead to have a talk with one of 
the professionals. Most patients thus learned to balance what they could say 
to each other in the ordinary spaces of the ward - and the topics discussed 
were typically on mundane, everyday themes. However, Dina’s openness 
about her suicide attempt and positioning of me as a fellow smoker in the 
context of the smoking room indicates the “otherness” of this particular 
space (McGrath, 2012). In it, as opposed to other contexts of the ward, the 
patients could talk freely about their distress and negotiate the topics of dis-
cussion among themselves.   
  
Perhaps because of its status as a special or “other” place, the smoking room 
was subject to discussions and conflicts between professionals and patients. 
Explaining to me that they wished to reduce the time spent in the smoking 
room and prevent the formation of cliques, the professionals introduced a 
rule that smokers were not allowed to sit on the floor while smoking, but had 
to stand up. This rule was subject to discussions both within the patient 
group and during common meetings with professionals. Not all patients 
showed interest in the rule, but most smokers disagreed with it. The conflict 
led to tensions regarding me and who I would side with. As I also wished to 
be positioned as trustworthy by the professionals, I adhered to the ban on sit-
ting down, but kept going to the smoking room with the smoking patients. 
I go out to smoke with Hanna, David and Carl. The nurses Niklas and Ida 
are sitting in the common room just by the smoking room watching televi-
sion. Hanna sits down by the wall in the smoking room, so the nurses can’t 
see her. David, who is standing in front of the transparent glass door, visible 
to the professionals, starts to sit down too, but rises quickly again. We talk 
about Hanna’s plans to move to a group home [..] Then Hanna turns to me 
and says jokingly: “You know that you are violating the rules. You are talking 






P/O, p. 293-294 
 
Hanna introduces a discourse of resistance against the rules evoked by the 
professionals. She exaggerates the ban on sitting down and calls it a ban on 
talking, thereby positioning the professionals as unnecessarily authoritarian. 
At the same time, she positions me as someone who, like her, is violating the 
rules and is oppositional to them. Thereby she constructs sameness and 
commonality (Khawaja & Mørck, 2009), implying that we have the same rules 
to adjust to - as we are engaging in the same activity. Although I had not ear-
lier addressed the conflict, in an effort to position myself as trustworthy, I ac-
cepted the position, implicitly marking my sympathy to her viewpoints and 
distancing myself from the rules in a slightly mocking fashion. This action 
was a way of “doing trust” (Jefferson & Huniche, 2009), creating a connec-
tion with Hanna by positioning myself off the staff category. I thus co-
constructed the discourse of resistance towards the professionals’ authority 
that Hanna initiated.  
 
The positioning of me as a fellow smoker in the context of the smoking 
room, I suggest, points to the “otherness” of this specific place, in that it 
could provide a pocket of explicit resistance for the patients at the ward. At 
the ward, all other places were potentially places of “treatment” where the pa-
tients were “being treated” and the professionals were treating them 
(McGrath, 2012). Patients were openly subject to the psychiatric gaze – ex-
pressed in fine mechanisms of surveillance and control (Foucault, 1991c, 
2003b). The interactions in the smoking room, however, provided occasions 
for other types of positioning than “patient being treated” and in it, the pa-
tients could negotiate topics of conversation without the influence of profes-
sionals. The smoking room was thus produced as a “private space” 
(McGrath, 2012) that could temporarily destabilize a patient position. Had I 
not been invited into a position as a fellow smoker, this function of the 
smoking room would have escaped my attention. The positioning of the re-
searcher as a fellow smoker thus made visible the norms and practices of pa-
tients in the particular context of the smoking room. The “otherness” of the 
smoking room in term indicated some aspect of the discursive norms shaping 
how to be a patient in the other spaces at the ward; often involving negotiat-
ing a patient position in an institutionally sanctioned manner. 
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As much as some patients came to position me as a “fellow smoker” or out-
side of the staff category in many instances, the professionals of the ward ap-
peared to position me as belonging to the category “most staff” or “least pa-
tient”. The next section analyzes how some professionals at the ward ex-
pected me to participate with the rights and duties inherent in a staff position. 
I suggest that this is indicative of a discursive norm within the mental health 
services that is based on a polarized dichotomy of “normality” and “patholo-
gy”.  
Discourses of pathology and normality - the researcher as 
“least patient” 
 
Because I wished to establish a “least staff” position at the ward, in the early 
days of fieldwork I had rare contact with most professionals. However a few 
professionals did approach me, mostly two nurses and a nursing student. At 
one point during the first weeks of the fieldwork, the nurse Andrea ap-
proached me when I was alone in the common room and addressed a prob-
lem they were experiencing. It was prohibited to have romantic relationships 
at the ward, but the patients Clara and Frank had formed a couple: 
Andrea sighs and says that there is a bad atmosphere at the ward because 
they have a lot of personality disordered patients at the moment. She says 
that she has noticed that I walk around without a security alarm […] She goes 
to the staff room and brings an alarm that she gives me. She says: “Hey by 
the way, if you see Clara and Frank kissing, you can correct them” I answer 
”ehhmmmm… I don’t think I can”. She says: “Then go get Stine [another 
nurse] to do it, she will be at work while I am away now, so she can correct 
them. They are not allowed to kiss; it creates an uneasy atmosphere among 
the other patients.” She shows me how the alarm works and that she wears 
hers under her shirt. I go to the toilet and I try out different solutions to hide 
the alarm. I think about how wearing it really associates me with the staff. 
P/O, p. 240-241 
 
Here, despite the explicit efforts I had made to distance myself from the cate-
gory “staff”, Andrea expects me to participate with the same rights and duties 
as the professionals. She constructs the patients as easy to distress and posi-
tions me and herself outside the category patient. As I also wished to be posi-





and I did not openly oppose the idea of fetching a nurse if I saw the patients 
kiss, although I did not make use of it later on, as it would have compromised 
my position of trustworthy among patients. The position that I was invited 
into and my response to it were further made more complex by some inci-
dents that had occurred recently: one patient had acted threateningly towards 
me, which had made me more willing to accept the alarm. This shows that 
Andrea’s concern and wish to protect me, although she probably was una-
ware of the incidents, was not meaningless or uncalled for. In the light of this, 
I also began to experience some patients as unpredictable and easy to distress, 
which at times complicated my position and relationship to them. This indi-
cates how the positions of researcher, professional, and patient intersected 
and produced relationships that could not be controlled or predicted prior to 
the fieldwork. The researcher-participant positioning had to be constantly ne-
gotiated and re-negotiated, if I wished to be positioned as trustworthy by all 
participants.  
 
The position that the professionals invited me into was a dilemmatic one.  
While an increasing amount of patients came to position me frequently as 
“least staff”, the professionals usually seemed to position me as “least pa-
tient” when I interacted with them.  The issues of belonging to one group or 
the other became increasingly challenging when I started having more regular 
contact with the professionals. I felt as if I was being disloyal to one of the 
groups when I was with the other. The challenges were amplified when I was 
with both professionals and patients in the same room: 
I’m sitting in the common room with Julia and with the nursing intern Jas-
min. The patient Emma comes in and sits down next to me. Frank comes in 
and sits down too. Emma asks Frank: “What actually happened between you 
and Clara, are you a couple now, or what?” Frank says that they are, that he 
only wants Clara and that’s the way it is. Emma asks if he is in love with her. 
Frank says that he is very much in love, and then he leaves. The nursing in-
tern Jasmin looks at me and says “we really have to report this to the other 
staff”. I mumble indistinctly that I won’t. The others go out to smoke. I ask 
Jasmin if she thinks it’s okay if I join them. She says she thinks it’s alright. 
According to house rules, she says, one is not allowed to join the patients, 
but maybe that has nothing to do with me. I go to the smoking room. The 
patients in there are talking about Frank and Clara. They say they think it’s 
disgusting. Julia says that they’re not allowed to kiss according to house rules. 
She looks at me and says: “yeah, Jasmin said that she would tell the staff”. I 
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say “I won’t tell, it’s important that you know that I won’t tell the things you 
say to me”.   
P/O, p. 242 
 
Here, the nursing student Jasmin, like Andrea, assigns to me the same duties 
as the professionals: reporting a violation of house rules. And just as with 
Andrea, I found it difficult to respond properly. Not opposing Jasmin’s sug-
gestion that we should report the violation to the other members of staff 
would have positioned me as untrustworthy in the eyes of the witnessing pa-
tients. However opposing Jasmin’s suggestion may have positioned me as dis-
loyal from her perspective. My response was to very hesitantly disagree with 
Jasmin at first and later to attempt to disidentify from the staff category ex-
plicitly among the patients. 
 
Again, here I suggest that the dilemmas encountered with Jasmin and Andrea 
can be read as indicative of norms in the mental health services. The often 
mutually exclusive expectations about who I was and what my duties were 
indicate that the staff and patient categories were produced as polarized bina-
ry pairs. The “we” that the members of staff constructed with the researcher 
was not based on a commonality of people participating in similar activities 
or presenting similar body signs, as I had strived to act like and to look differ-
ent from the professionals. The common link between us seemed to be based 
on something else; a discourse of pathology and normality, offering the cate-
gory “mentally sane” as a decisive marker of commonality between the re-
searcher and the nurses. According to the discourse, since the researcher is 
not a psychiatric patient, and therefore in the “normality” end of the dichot-
omy, she may take on the duties of the professionals and be in a position of 
authority above the patients. 
 
Parker et al. (1995) note that pathology versus normality, reason versus un-
reason, professional views versus patient views are culturally produced as bi-
nary opposites. These make certain versions of reality thinkable and practica-
ble, while excluding others. From this perspective, the categories “staff” and 
“patient” just as “pathology” and “normality” may be seen as regulating and 
dividing practices that differentiate between people. Such dividing practices 
affect the categories of behavior that are considered pathological, removing 
them from the realm of normalcy, and thus from being understood within 





atric patients do at a ward, their behavior can be interpreted as pathological 
simply because they have been labeled psychiatric patients. Similarly, whatev-
er I seemed to do at the ward, because I was not a psychiatric patient, I was 
constructed by the professionals as non-patient and therefore closer to the 
members of staff. This is indicative of a discursive norm that produces the 
categories “patient” and “staff” as binary, with little leverage for negotiating 
spaces in between. Thus, just as the binary pairs were active in positioning the 
researcher constantly during fieldwork, with few possibilities of negotiating 
positions “in between”, so might the binaries have been difficult to penetrate 
for both patients and professionals.  
Concluding reflections across fields 
This paper illustrates the importance of reading the processes of researcher-
participant positioning as sources of data. This perspective invites us to see 
methodological problems as based on discursive norms that operate within 
the field. In the study, the researcher positions that were made available be-
came an important source of knowledge about the discursive norms and so-
cial categories that operated within the mental health services. 
 
Firstly, throughout the fieldwork, the categories “patient” and “professional”, 
and the binary pairs “pathology” and “normality” worked as a structuring 
norm in all my interactions with participants. It seemed as if in order to get 
closer to the patients and understand how they made sense of their experi-
ences within the mental health services, I often had to be positioned as “least 
staff”; while for the professionals to relate to me I had to be positioned as 
“least patient”. Just as discourses of sanity and insanity provided categories 
that structured the researcher-participant interactions, they appeared to pro-
vide boundaries that shaped how the patients and professionals could be de-
fined. The problems associated with negotiating a position from which I 
could reach both groups therefore seemed to be indicative of the norms and 
dividing practices that separate patients and professionals. 
 
Secondly, the patients’ expectations that I wanted them to talk about “illness” 
indicate the power of biomedical discourses in structuring how the patients 
define themselves in relation to the mental health services. At the same time, 
the patients who participated in the study were far from passive in their inter-
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actions with me and in their self-positioning. They resisted the objectifying 
practices of the researcher as well as those of the mental health services in 
several ways. This capacity to resist psychiatric discourses is often down-
played in the literature on psychiatric institutions and patient identities. How-
ever, during the study it became evident that discourses of resistance became 
more available to the patients when they could position me as “non or least 
staff” or when I could join them in settings that were seen as “other” than 
psychiatric. This indicated that the patients modulated what could be said in 
accordance with the demands of the discursive context.  
 
Thirdly, the reactions of the professionals to my presence were to position 
me as “least patient” and sometimes as a powerful evaluator who had the 
right to criticize them. These, I have argued, can be read as indicative of a 
discourse that polarizes pathology and normality and of a norm that sets ad-
hering to standards as an ideal for professionalism. This indicates that, just 
like the patients, the professionals were not entirely free, but relied on discur-
sive norms that formed what they could do and how they could understand 
themselves.  
 
The paper thus points to the importance of understanding researcher-
participant relationships as processes of positioning among people who are 
already positioned in different ways. The centrality of a discourse of patholo-
gy in the researcher-participant relationships indicates the power of this dis-
course in shaping interactions in the institution. However it also indicates that 
the institution is embedded in a wider cultural reality that puts in place a firm 
distinction between normality and deviance (Jensen, 2009). In conclusion, 
then, the paper shows that researcher-participant positioning is shaped by  
pre-existing discursive norms, but also that psychiatric patients, who are often 
thought of as marginalized and passive, are active and reflexive when they 
position themselves in relation to the mental health services. 
 
This raises some questions regarding service user involvement and patient-
centered care. Service user involvement is often defined as treatment: “taking 
as a starting point the patient’s experiences and wishes” (Psykiatrien Region 
Sjælland, 2010:3, my translation). Such a statement assumes an uncomplicated 
and static relationship between patients, their wishes and the role of the men-
tal health services. However, as we have seen, these are not free from issues 





If patients learn that they are valued and regarded as competent insofar as 
they demonstrate a willingness to accept and actively adapt the understand-
ings of the mental health services, the question of how to involve their per-
spectives in the treatment is not a straightforward matter. Furthermore, ser-
vice-user involvement is often constructed as a concept that can be imple-
mented smoothly if the individual professionals are more attentive to the 
wishes of patients. However, the analysis indicates that the actions of profes-
sionals are never entirely free, but rely on interplays of wider discourses that 
form what they can do. If professionals undermine their own reflexive choic-
es in the face of standards and benchmarking - and if patients learn not to ask 
questions or challenge prevailing discourses and norms - the question of in-
volving patients’ perspectives is a complex matter that does not only depend 
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Illness definitions and classifications of patients’ conditions play a central role 
in the way mental health professionals interact with patients and the way pa-
tients may make sense of their difficulties. This paper examines how ideas 
about mental illness are negotiated in mental health practice and the implica-
tions of these negotiations for psychiatric patients. Based on a Foucauldian 
analysis of ethnographic data from two mental health institutions in Denmark 
– an outpatient clinic and an inpatient ward – the paper defines three dis-
courses that were found to play a part in definitions of the patients’ difficul-
ties. We name these the instability discourse, the discourse of “really ill” and the lack 
of insight discourse. The paper indicates that patients are required to develop a 
finely-tuned and precise sense for the discourses and to make strategic con-
siderations as to how to appear in front of professionals if they wish to have a 
say in the treatment. Thus we argue that illness definitions in mental health 
practice are not only materialized as static biomedical understandings, but are 
complex and diverse. The implications of the discourses for the policy and 
practice of service user involvement are discussed.  
 
Keywords: Mental illness; Psychiatric practice; Discourse; Discursive position-
ing; Patient experience 
Introduction 
A central tenet of mental health policy and practice in recent decades has 
been to work towards a more active involvement of patients in the treatment. 
However there is an increasing amount of research which calls into question 
the extent to which patients and their perspectives are actually being involved 
in the delivery and planning of mental health services (Bowl, 1996; Pilgrim & 
Waldron, 1998; Roberts, 2010). While there may be a number of obstacles to 
involving patients in the treatment, it has been suggested that psychiatric def-
initions of mental illnesses, with their restrictive deficit-oriented categories of 
mental distress, may serve as a barrier to involving patients’ perspectives 
(Roberts, 2010). However, how mental illness is negotiated in psychiatric set-
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tings and their implications for the patients and for involving them in the 
treatment has not yet been extensively researched. 
 
This paper examines how definitions of mental illness are negotiated in meet-
ings between patients and professionals in psychiatric settings and their impli-
cations for patients and for the practice of user involvement. We analyze data 
from an ethnographic study of two mental health institutions in Denmark – 
one outpatient clinic and a secured inpatient ward. We identify three local 
discourses derived from how the professionals and patients in the institutions 
talked about mental illness, which we name: the instability discourse, the dis-
course of “really ill” and the lack-of-insight discourse. We examine the effects 
of the discourses on the patients’ possibilities to understand themselves and 
to become understandable and receive help from professionals. Towards the 
end of the paper we relate our discussion to the policy and practice of user 
involvement.    
Narratives and discourses of mental distress 
It has been well documented that people who use mental health services use a 
range of explanatory strategies to make sense of their mental distress, often 
diverging from formal diagnostic definitions. Studies have demonstrated that 
when defining their distress, psychiatric patients tend to either draw on a bi-
omedical discourse, some version of a psycho-social discourse, or take a 
stance which negates a bio-medical definition of distress by drawing on alter-
native spiritual or anti-psychiatric discourses (Cardano, 2010; SE Estroff, 
1991; J. Larsen, 2004; Speed, 2006). For example, in Italy, Cardano (2010) in-
terviewed psychiatric patients and members of the Hearing Voices Network, 
a critical non-psychiatric movement for people who hear voices, to study 
their narratives of distress. He identified three “ideal types” of illness-
narratives: bio-medical, psycho-social and spiritual-religious narratives. Bio-
medical narratives constructed the “illness” as due to brain or body dysfunc-
tion and called for pharmacological solutions. Psycho-social narratives con-
structed the distress a resulting from social and psychological factors such as 
loneliness and dependence on others. Spiritual-magical narratives constructed 
the distress as either due to the malice of the devil, or reflecting voices from 
ancestors. Cardano found that among the participants who were psychiatric 





one participant who had not been receiving psychiatric treatment was able to 
qualify her diversity as charisma, as a gift, making sense of her voices through 
her work as a medium. Similarly, in a study on narratives of patients with psy-
chotic experiences in Denmark, Larsen (2004) distinguished between patients 
who dogmatically embraced the narratives of the psychiatric system and un-
derstood their distress in terms of cognitive or bio-medical deficits, and those 
who were reflexive and creative bricoleurs of different systems of meaning, in-
corporating spiritual and non-psychiatric explanations. 
 
What these studies share is a focus on the individual patient, investigating 
personal sense-making strategies of distress in terms of their proximity to 
standard psychiatric models - while often portraying mental health services as 
institutions which solely or mostly make use of bio-medical, psychiatric dis-
courses. Analyses of illness discourses and practices in institutional settings 
have offered an alternative and valuable perspective on the discourses in psy-
chiatric institutions, focusing on how these are complex and multiple and do 
not just consist of straightforward biomedical definitions. Ethnographies of 
mental health services have e.g. shown how professionals tend to make use of 
pragmatic choices, rather than biomedical reasoning, in diagnostic practices 
(Rhodes, 1995); how professionals, rather than relying on one model, make 
use of a patchwork of social, clinical and even anti-psychiatric theories in 
their clinical work with patients  (Rhodes, 1995); and how clinical practice is 
permeated by a constant tension between practices which construct the pa-
tient as a passive object versus practices which construct the patient as a voli-
tional and moral subject (Barrett, 1996). A central tenet of these approaches 
has been to focus on the relation between psychiatric knowledge, professional 
practices and patients’ experiences. However few have explored particular lo-
cal discourses drawn on and emerging in everyday psychiatric practice - or 
their implications for patients and for involving them in the treatment.  
 
This article is dedicated to analyzing discourses on mental illness in everyday 
practices of mental health services - how these have implications for psychiat-
ric patients and for the practice of user involvement. During the study it be-
came evident that a range of local discourses on illness which were connected 
to, but not synonymous with broader psychiatric discourses, were present in 
the settings we studied. We therefore suggest that the ways of talking about 
mental illness in mental health care ought to be understood as complex and 
diverse - and not just as literal translations of diagnostic classifications.  
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The discourse analysis applied in this article draws from poststructural per-
spectives which challenge modernist assumptions about truth, identity, ra-
tionality and the individual. Discourses are understood here in a Foucauldian 
sense, as groups of signs and practices that systematically form the objects 
and subjects of which they speak (Foucault, 2004:54). From this perspective 
discourses provide particular ways of ordering and making sense of the world, 
including ourselves. They make available certain discursive positions which 
we can occupy, with implications for how others will perceive us and how we 
will experience ourselves. The positions provide rights and responsibilities to 
those who occupy them and shape what can be said and done from within a 
certain position (Davies & Harré, 1990). Some positions are more stable, but 
in theory all positions can be contested and renegotiated by speakers, who are 
active users of discursive resources.  
 
Based on interviews and participant observations, we develop a framework 
consisting of three discourses on mental illness that were drawn on in the 
practices of the studied psychiatric settings. The three discourses seemed to 
cut across the spectrum of psychiatric diagnoses, but could manifest them-
selves in slightly differentiated ways, depending on whether the specific con-
versation was about schizophrenia, borderline, bipolar disorder, etc.  
Research design 
The material on which this paper is based on is drawn from a three-month 
(240 h) ethnographic study conducted by the first author (AR) at two general 
psychiatric institutions for adults in Denmark in 2011. One of the institutions 
was an outpatient clinic and the other an inpatient ward; both were situated in 
two medium-sized towns in Denmark. The clinic had a staff group of 13 mul-
ti-disciplinary professionals who provided services to 280 patients who came 
in for scheduled appointments. The ward was a secured acute unit with a staff 
group of approximately 27 professionals and a number of substitutes who 
provided inpatient services to 14 inpatients.  
 
The fieldwork involved participant observation of everyday life at the institu-
tions: meetings between professionals and patients, treatment groups, staff 
meetings and periods of idle time. Semi-structured interviews with 13 patients 





ing the informants for interviews, a principle of maximum variation 
(Polkinghorne, 2005) was applied; professionals and patients positioned as 
diversely as possible in the organization were invited to participate in inter-
views. A postmodern theory of knowledge informed all the stages of the re-
search process, including the data collection. The researcher was not cast as a 
neutral observer, but as an active participant whose positionality and subjec-
tivity were seen as crucial for the production and analysis of data (Haraway, 
1988; Ringer, 2013). Notes were written during or immediately after each par-
ticipant observation and were elaborated into fieldnotes later the same day. 
Extracts from participant observation data are marked in the paper as “P/O”. 
All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim; data extracts 
from the interviews are marked in the text as “name, IV”. All names of par-
ticipants are pseudonyms and information which may compromise anonymity 
has been changed.   
 
The analysis was informed by a version of discourse analysis inspired by the 
work of Foucault (Willig, 2008). This type of analysis involves asking ques-
tions about constructions, discourses, action orientation, discursive positions 
and their implications for subjectivity and practice. It is based on the notion 
that discourses construct the objects and subjects of which they speak. Dis-
courses thus enable and restrain what can potentially be said, done, thought, 
experienced and felt - and thus have implications for subjectivity and practice 
(Willig, 2008). In the preliminary coding of the data, illness definitions turned 
out to be an important and widespread theme. All instances of talk about ill-
ness or distress were therefore highlighted and grouped into subthemes in 
order to identify specific discourses that the participants drew on. All the cas-
es presented here were cross-checked between the two authors and were fi-
nally selected as some of the most illustrative examples of each discourse. 
 
Approval for conducting the study was granted by the Danish Data Protec-
tion Agency and the hospitals, in accordance with the Danish standards for 
health research. Quotations and fieldnotes presented in this article have been 
translated from Danish to the nearest equivalent English. 
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The instability discourse  
In both settings constructions of patients’ identities tended to oscillate be-
tween constructions as moral subjects who could be responsible for their ac-
tions and passive objects without agency or volition. When the patient was 
constructed as a moral subject, she was seen as responsible and volitional, 
when she was constructed as an object, she was seen as influenced by forces 
beyond voluntary control. The instability discourse often emerged as a ver-
sion of the latter, especially in situations when patients’ behaviors did not 
immediately make sense or were difficult to understand. In these situations, 
the patients’ distress was often attributed responsibility, and the illness was 
endowed with unpredictable and unstable powers:  
Six professionals are having a supervision session with an external supervisor. 
One of the nurses has just brought up a case: a patient who all of a sudden 
said that he did not wish to see her again. The nurse says the rejection caught 
her by surprise since she thought that she had developed a good relationship 
with the patient. The supervisor turns to the whole group and says, “People 
with mental illness oscillate a lot. We are very stable, but they have this insta-
bility. We are on automatic pilot, but when we meet them we need to think 
about where we place the explanation. In normal relationships we usually 
think ‘oops, it’s my fault’, but when we get knowledge about the patient, 
when we know what happens to schizophrenics, what should we be aware 
of? […] Because they are so unstable and you are so stable.” 
P/O, p. 158-159 
 
In the extract above, the supervisor had initially asked some questions regard-
ing what happened between the nurse and the patient, but finally resorted to 
the patient’s illness or inherent “instability” in order to make sense of the re-
jection. In this way, the rejection was constructed as reflecting an inner un-
stable state within the patient, rather than being explicable through references 
to the context or to the relationship between the nurse and the patient. The 
statement invites the professionals into a position as “stable” and “normal”, 
whereas the patient is positioned as “unstable” and “schizophrenic” – two 
positions that seem irreconcilable. Parker et al. (1995) have noted that when a 
person’s actions are considered pathological, they become removed from the 
realm of normalcy, and thus from being understood within their social con-
text. In this way, the conclusion of the patient’s actions as stemming from an 
illness seemed to rule out other explanations and discourage further explora-





to portray the illness as a decontextualized, unstable and unpredictable entity 
being out of the patient’s and the nurse’s control.  
 
Foucault (1985) writes that discourses produce and uphold “moral codes” 
that construct what is wrong and right, true or false. One such moral code 
within the professional discourse of mental health may be that professionals 
are expected to develop trusting, empathetic and stable relationships with 
their patients. If a patient wishes to break off the relationship this can there-
fore be construed as a failure on the part of the clinician, potentially posing a 
threat to professional identity and institutional expectations. In this case, the 
instability discourse may function as a welcome explanatory tool for avoiding 
blame and responsibility. It invited the supervisor and the nurse to locate the 
responsibility for the failed relationship in the patient and his illness, thus 
evading moral responsibility. Although the instability discourse was some-
times contested by the professionals, sometimes, as in the extract above, it 
seemed that once it was invoked, it made it more difficult for the clinicians to 
examine their practices critically.  
 
Arthur Frank (1995:6) has argued that in medical care a person “not only 
agrees to follow physical regimens that are prescribed; she also agrees, tacitly 
but with no less implication, to tell her story in medical terms.” Similarly, the 
instability discourse invited many patients to adopt, or “inscribe within them-
selves” (Foucault, 1991:203) an understanding of their distress as a decontex-
tualized illness out of their control: 
Christine (patient): So I lived in a [psychiatric center] but went to school dur-
ing the day (.) but then my illness got out of control and I couldn’t be in high 
school any more so I (.) quit and became a day patient. 
Interviewer: You said it got out of control? 
Christine: Yes. 
Interviewer: How, well, what does that mean? 
Christine: Erm, my illness become stronger and stronger and then boom! It 
exploded. 
Christine, IV, p. 5 
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In Christine’s account the illness is vested with principles of explosive power, 
whereas Christine becomes a passive repository, whose actions, thoughts and 
feelings are controlled by the illness (Barrett, 1996) – a narrative in accord-
ance with the instability discourse. This portrayal serves to construct her as a 
clinical object, which may make it difficult to claim a status as a social subject 
at the same time (Speed, 2006). Other patients talked explicitly about the im-
plications for their sense of self and subjectivity associated with a self-
narrative in accordance with the instability discourse.  
Interviewer: What I was thinking about was just whether […] the meetings 
you’ve had, if they’ve influenced the way you view yourself? 
Anna: Well, that, I believe so because I’ve got to know myself better, but I’m 
happy that I’ve met people [other patients] who feel the way I do, because if I 
hadn’t met anyone who was like me, then I think psychiatry would quickly 
have turned it into, or I would feel […] that it was me that was schizophrenic 
[…] that is if I’ve had it since childhood, and the course is chronic, well (.) 
how could I ever know what is me? Is it when I take the symptoms away, 
that the rest is me, or would that only be side symptoms, or what? (.) well, 
you can almost turn anything into symptoms […] when you come out and 
meet some other people who are like you, you don’t feel wrong all the time, 
you don’t feel like a diagnosis. 
Anna, IV, p. 17 
 
For Anna the psychiatric care has on the one hand helped her to “get to 
know herself better” but on the other it has made her insecure of the bound-
aries between her unstable “illness” and her identity. Thus, she touches upon 
a core ambivalence that many psychiatric patients experience with the con-
struction of diagnostic identities (Tucker, 2009). On the one hand, the psy-
chiatric models provide her with what appears to be an explanatory tool for 
making sense of her distress; on the other they seem to largely strip her of a 
sense of identity and agency. For Anna, the antidote becomes meeting other 
people who are like her, with whom she can negotiate an identity as a social 
subject rather than “a diagnosis”. Her statement that “you can almost turn 
anything into symptoms” points towards a colonizing quality of the dis-
course; she can never be sure that the instability is limited to only a specific 
part of herself and that it will not spread. It becomes a source of continuous 
self-monitoring and self-pathologization. This construction of her distress 
thus extends from the formulation of a descriptive psychiatric label and be-
comes an existential dilemma. As she says: how could she ever know what is 






Like several other patients, Anna describes a weakened sense of agency and 
identity as a result of the instability discourse. A weakened sense of self, or 
“self-disturbances” are well-documented in psychiatric literature and are often 
considered a core pathology in illnesses such as schizophrenia (Sass & Parnas, 
2003). However, Anna’s statements indicate that her insecure sense of identi-
ty may rather be understood as derived from a discourse that constructs her 
as a repository of unstable forces, and not from the initial mental distress that 
she experienced. In this way, the construction of her distress as an unstable 
intrinsic force at least did not appear to be beneficial for her sense of agency 
and identity. 
The discourse of “really ill”  
The second discourse we have identified may be called the discourse of “real-
ly ill”. It draws on an idea that some patients are more ill than others, but also 
on a notion that some are more “genuinely” or “authentically” ill than others. 
In the following extract the nurse Catherine describes one of the patients 
who were considered “really ill”. 
Catherine says that she is very fond of the patient Patricia and that the re-
searcher (AR) ought to ask anyone in the team, they will all say the same – 
there is something special about her and all the other “real schizophrenics”, 
the really ill patients.  Catherine says “Patricia’s fantastic. I’m sure you’ll notice 
the same when you meet her. She makes you want to care for her. Just to get 
a tiny insight into her life and to get to know her a bit, it’s amazing. It’s the 
same with all the real schizophrenics”. AR asks her what she means with “re-
al schizophrenics”. She answers, “Well, the heavy, heavy, heavy ones.”  
P/O, p. 143-155 
 
Not all patients with a schizophrenia diagnosis were described like Patricia as 
“real schizophrenics”. In this way the category seemed to suggest more than 
the patient presenting the appropriate symptoms or having a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. The nurse Catherine felt there was something special about 
Patricia and the other “really ill” patients that she found difficult to explain, 
namely a certain enigmatic quality that spoke to her and the rest of the team. 
The patients who were described as authentically “really ill” were often pa-
tients like Patricia, whose problems seemed clear-cut psychiatric, and who 
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somehow managed to achieve a balance in which they could secure the pro-
fessionals’ continuous interest. In both settings of the field work, many pro-
fessionals explicitly stated a preference for patients whom they considered to 
be “really ill”, echoing the findings of another mental health ethnography in 
Denmark in which the professionals stated a preference for the patients they 
called “really wonderful schizophrenics” (Schepelern Johansen, 2007:36).  
 
Although the specific position as “really ill” was often offered to patients who 
were diagnosed with schizophrenia, it seemed to be related to the presence of 
a general discourse on illness as either “authentic” or “less authentic” that ex-
tended beyond specific diagnoses. In an interview, the nurse Stephanie re-
flected on two patients’ ways of doing “really ill”: Susanne, who had been di-
agnosed with borderline personality disorder and Astrid, who had been diag-
nosed with periodical depression, but who was informally named 
“borderline” (Koehne et al., 2013) among the professionals.  
Stephanie: Whether [Susanne] has been self-harming, I actually don’t know. 
[…] But, well I do think that in reality she could be a self-harmer, but maybe 
in another way. There are some who do it on their inner thighs and the skin 
of their belly and stuff, so that you don’t notice it. And it’s actually those that 
you should treat really seriously. I’d imagine she could be one of those who 
hide it (.), but we say that Astrid, if she ever kills herself, I’m sure that it will 
be an accident, that it will be something about the strangulation thing she 
does that goes wrong or something […] I can remember, with Astrid [anoth-
er patient asked the question]: “how can she show it to everyone the whole 
time?” Because […] for many others there is simply so much shame, but 
Astrid, she gladly cuts herself in her breast, so that we can all see it […] and 
wears a blouse with cleavage the next day, doesn’t she? (.)  And I think [un-
like Astrid] Susanne is one of those (.) that may succeed with suicide.  
Stephanie, IV, p. 20 
 
Stephanie indicates that for the patients, being recognized as “really ill” was 
about a lot more than presenting the appropriate symptoms. Although Astrid 
continuously cut herself and tried to strangle herself with plastic bags, the bla-
tant visibility of her self-harm and her apparent lack of shame became a rea-
son why she still could not be considered “really ill” and suicidal. Her ways of 
doing “ill” were constructed by the professionals as something she did for 
show: a deliberate or demonstrative act, rather than a sign of illness. Astrid 
was often discussed at treatment conferences, as a patient who just cut herself 
as a way of craving attention, and hence should preferably not be given atten-





more convincing, to the extent that the nurses judged that she had the poten-
tial to cut herself, i.e. visualize illness, but in places on her body that were not 
visible.  
 
One way of interpreting this is in the light of the previously discussed “moral 
codes” of professional discourse of mental health clinicians. The patients who 
were able to find a suitable balance between visibility and invisibility seemed 
to allow the illness to be unearthed by the professionals - offering them a po-
sition as important. When Astrid “exaggerated” her symptoms as she did, the 
professionals lost their position as those who could “discover” the illness in 
her. In this sense, Astrid posed a threat to the autonomy and clinical insight-
fulness of the professionals. Her actions were perceived as caricatures - and 
her “real” condition became blurred for both the professionals and herself.  
 
The presence of the discourse of “really ill” may be understood against the 
backdrop of the organization of mental health services today. In contrast to 
the 1960s, when many critics complained of the excessive use of compulsory 
institutionalization, access to contemporary mental health services has be-
come a scarce resource available only to those who are judged most urgently 
in need of help (Griffiths, 2001; Rhodes, 1995). This implies that the poten-
tial patient has the responsibility to prove that he or she requires and deserves 
care. Many patients seemed to be aware of the importance of visualizing ill-
ness in a recognizable way, as demonstrated in the following interview ex-
tracts: 
Hanna: I […] have the feeling whenever I’m admitted, well I’m almost scared 
of combing my hair and dressing properly, because then they can’t under-
stand it, then they can’t see how ill I am inside. It’s like they can only under-
stand what they see, that is, if you cut yourself or if you’re aggressive, or if 
you run around and touch the walls when you walk or something like that 
then they notice you, but if you make sure you keep it all inside you, then 
they can’t understand it, then they can’t understand how you can be so ill.  
Hanna, IV, p. 14 
Susanne: Yeah, I can’t even remember what [the nurse] said but she was all 
like “Ah, you’re not that ill” (.) but that (.) I can’t really handle that; I can’t re-
ally handle the resistance that I’ve faced so many times in psychiatry. It’s like 
you have to persuade them that you’re ill (.) while you’re in need of help. So 
you’re scared to be happy, you’re scared of having a good day (.) because 
what if they see it and think, “So there, she’s fine” […] [If it happens again] I 
think I’ll just break up inside. 
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Susanne, IV, p. 7 
 
Hanna and Susanne seem to be aware that true and “authentic” illness is not 
only something that needs to be “inside them” - as the instability discourse 
may invite them into believing - but also something that should be displayed 
in suitable ways when meeting professionals. Just like the nurse Stephanie, 
they point out that the discourse of “really ill” requires a specific form of vis-
ibility; the illness should be visualized and made accessible for the profession-
als to observe and interpret. Hamilton & Manias (2007) have shown that psy-
chiatric nurses rely at least as much on their observational skills in judging 
psychopathology and mood states as on their skills in communicating with 
patients. They demonstrate that psychiatric inpatients are constantly subject 
to gazes and scans that occur both explicitly and subtly. Hanna and Susanne 
seem to have acknowledged this aspect of psychiatric practice; they are aware 
that they cannot rely on being recognized as in need of care solely by express-
ing such a need verbally. Their need for care must also be continuously visu-
alized in a recognizable manner. For Hanna and Susanne, doing “ill” in ap-
propriate ways when they’re feeling distressed and in need of care becomes 
crucial; although, as Susanne paradoxically points out, doing “ill” in the right 
way requires her to find energy and resources that she does not necessarily 
have. For her, the pressure to do “ill” and the feeling of a distrustful gaze 
judging her becomes, in itself, a source of despair.  
 
The struggle to persuade others of illness seemed particularly pertinent 
among the patients whose distress was not attributed to psychosis. Many of 
the patients who were considered psychotic were instead invited to a relative-
ly fixed position as “really ill”. At the same time as many patients struggled to 
be recognized as “really ill” there were also numerous examples of patients 
who resisted the position of “really ill” due to its ambivalent nature: the posi-
tion did not only provide legitimacy, but also potentially imposed treatment 
upon the person (e.g. hospitalization and medication) and was a stigmatized 
position in society. This brings us to the final discourse we will discuss: the 





The lack of insight discourse 
Psychiatric patients’ initial ideas about their difficulties often diverge greatly 
from how mental health professionals view them (Kinderman et al., 2006). A 
central task for the mental health services then become to persuade the pa-
tient that her distress are due to a mental illness which can be alleviated by 
psychiatric treatment. The psychiatric concept of “illness insight” entails an 
expectation that the patients subscribe to a psychiatric definition of their dif-
ficulties (Hamilton & Roper, 2006). It therefore becomes problematic when a 
patient does not accept the explanation of his or her situation offered by the 
professionals. In such situations, the disagreement between the two may be 
installed in the patient as “lack of insight”. This sometimes resulted in discus-
sions between professionals and patients about the nature of their problems 
and definitions of truth, as in the following extract of a conversation between 
a nurse and a patient: 
Johan: It’s the medications that ruin it for me. We have to work on getting 
rid of the drugs. There’s nothing wrong with my head. 
Lisa: No, but you’re out of touch with reality. As such reality can be a lot of 
things, but the way the world works, reality is what most people perceive it to 
be. You’re the only one who thinks that plants talk.  
Johan: That is reality. 
Lisa: That’s your reality. 
Johan: It’s the truth. 
[…] 
Lisa: You have to admit that a lot of things happen to you and not to other 
people. […] I don’t know, some of it may be true. But with the plants, I 
know it’s just you. We just haven’t been able to find the right medication that 
will remove it.  
P/O, p. 363 
 
Johan seems to have a different view of his situation from his nurse. For Jo-
han, there was nothing “wrong with his head” and taking medication was a 
problem; the medication was experienced as more detrimental than helpful. 
For Lisa, the question to be answered was whether Johan had been pre-
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scribed the right medication, but not whether Johan needed medication at all 
to adjust his world view. In the conversation between the two, the problem 
did not seem to be that Johan had a different reality; the problem rather ap-
peared to be that he did not want to acknowledge and take moral responsibil-
ity for the different reality. Having the right insight and taking moral respon-
sibility for it was perceived as a road towards recovery - a road that Johan did 
not seem to want to embark on.  
 
The lack of insight discourse may be said to be based on an assumption about 
pathology existing “within the patient” and is thus aligned with the discourse 
we have called the “instability discourse”. At the same time it may be said to 
add an extra layer; pathology becomes something that the patients have to 
acknowledge in order to recover. Thus, having illness insight implies willing-
ness by the patient to work on his or her problems and to go through an in-
dividualized process of self-development. In this sense, insight implies a mor-
al responsibility; taking up a particular reflexive relationship to the problems 
(Blackman, 2007). While the instability discourse largely stripped the person 
of agency and morality, the lack of insight discourse may be said to reinstall it 
in the patient. For the patients, this also seemed to imply a moral responsibil-
ity of knowing “their place”: 
In the group called “psychoeducation for bipolar patients” the patient Chris-
tian is very active and comes up with new topics and advice for the other pa-
tients. Diana, the group therapist, corrects him a few times when he brings 
up subjects that are not on the agenda, but at other times she encourages him 
to continue. In the break between the sessions Diana comes up to AR and 
we talk about how it went. She asks ironically if AR has noticed her co-
therapist. AR asks if she is referring to the nurse Mina, who is absent today, 
but who is usually the co-therapist in the group. Diana answers, “No, Chris-
tian. With a co-therapist like that I almost don’t need Mina.” She says that 
she likes Christian, but he has a hard time limiting himself. Then she adds 
that Christian has a terrible life history and she tells about it.  
P/O, p. 196 
 
In the group meeting, Christian appeared to have assumed the authority of a 
person who defines topics and solutions – an authority he did not automati-
cally have access to from his position as patient. Diana interpreted his actions 
as a sign that Christian had difficulties in limiting himself, difficulties she im-
plicitly related to his “terrible life history”. Thus, Christian’s desire to help his 
co-patients is not construed as a resource, but as a sign of something “inside 





illness insight does not only imply that the patients define themselves as ill, 
but also that they recognize that the professionals have deeper insight into 
the illness - and acknowledge the need for professionals to define the implica-
tions of the illness (Blackman, 2007).  
 
Some professionals reflected on the ethical aspects of having to persuade the 
patients about their lack of insight. In the following interview the nurse Fran-
cis reflects on an episode with a patient whom she partly succeeded in con-
vincing that his perceptions of being controlled by an abstract organization 
were in fact due to his illness.  
Francis: …had I become too eager, too eager in thinking: now I will help you 
even though you haven’t asked to be helped […]. At one point he told me 
that he would never have survived the twenty-five years if it hadn’t been for 
the organization. When they came they saved his life, so what had I done by 
trying to remove them […] (.) that’s one of the few times when I look back 
and think: maybe it wasn’t totally good what I did (.) and you never really get 
an answer to that, and that’s the downside of being in psychiatry, because 
there’s no right or wrong.  
Francis, IV, p. 2 
 
Francis’ statements indicate that the lack of insight discourse sometimes re-
quired the professionals to treat the patients in ways they did not always feel 
comfortable with. Francis’ statements can be read in line with some of the 
challenges to the illness paradigm from service user and survivor movements, 
which stress that it is important to accept as valid the experiences of delu-
sions and hearing voices (Blackman, 2001; Harper, 2004). However, her re-
flections do not extend beyond her own personal ethics, and she leaves un-
challenged the general notion that patients lack insight and that it is the duty 
of professionals to provide insight for them. Instead, she relates her reflec-
tions to a general assumption about the mental health services as a place 
where “nothing is right or wrong” – as an almost free platform for action, 
ungoverned by norms and expectations. Contrary to this assumption, our dis-
cussion here indicates that the discourses operating in the mental health ser-
vices lay down relatively strong norms that influence how the patients and 
professionals could act and think. Perhaps these norms had become 
knowledge taken for granted and were difficult to spot for the professionals. 
However, for many of the patients, they seemed to be more visible: 
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Noel: If you come and say “there’s nothing wrong with me” then that’s a 
symptom that you’re ill […] they wanted me to come to a doctor’s appoint-
ment and then I was supposed to acknowledge that I was ill (.) 
Interviewer: Mm, and what happened? 
Noel: Then I just said, “I’m not ill” […] and then they said, “that’s your ill-
ness” (.) 
Interviewer: And what did you think about that? 
Noel: I was speechless I must say, because it’s like punching a pillow […] 
can’t you see? You’re totally at their mercy and in their power. 
Noel, IV, p. 10 
 
Noel’s statements tell a story of not having been understood and seen the 
way he expected to be. As Barrett and others have pointed out, the stories 
told to clinicians by psychiatric patients are certainly heard and listened to, 
but the process of hearing is filtered through diagnostic and psychiatric 
lenses, molded to fit pre-existing categories (Barrett, 1996; Swartz, 2005). No-
el’s insistence on not being ill becomes construed as yet another sign of ill-
ness and he is urged again to interpret his rejection of psychiatric definitions 
as a symptom of illness. As Noel describes it, “like punching a pillow”, no 
other discursive repertoires or positions are made available for him than the 
one he opposes. In this sense he is stripped of possibilities to say anything 
meaningful about his situation, because his statements are only ascribed 
meaning in a discourse that he does not identify with.  
 
It is interesting to see how Noel is well aware of the existence of a discourse 
of “lack of insight”. In contrast to the nurse Francis, the psychiatric setting 
for him is not a place where there is “no right or wrong”. He knows that 
there is a “right” interpretation, but he does not agree with it. Noel’s state-
ments reveal that he understands the rules of the game in which he is caught 
up - rules that demand that he assumes a specific position in order to become 
a recognizable psychiatric subject. For him this means that his own explana-
tions do not become legitimate. We will now return to the patient Johan’s re-
flections on his conversation with the nurse Lisa, which we discussed in the 





Johan: But they don’t believe me when I tell them that the plants follow me 
around and the flowers, and all that and the trees (.) and dammit, it’s the 
truth […] 
Interviewer: What, well, have you said this to anyone from psychiatry, these 
things? 
Johan: Hell no, they’ll think you’re mad as a hatter, hahaha. 
Interviewer: They will? 
Johan: Hahaha, you’ll get locked up, hahaha. No, I’ll just have to learn to live 
with them following me around. […] I’ve never told anyone before yesterday. 
And she didn’t believe me either, the nurse. 
Johan, IV, p. 6 
 
Johan is aware that his experiences may be rendered illegitimate by others. He 
expected not to be believed and he was afraid that revealing his thoughts 
would lead to an intensification of a treatment that he did not believe in. This 
was why he ordinarily chose not to speak about his mental distress. For him, 
the proof that he was right not to talk about it comes when he finally makes 
an exception and tells the nurse Lisa about what he perceives to be the prob-
lem - and she, as he predicted, does not believe him either. From now on, he 
knows that he has to consider strategically how to appear in front of the pro-
fessionals in order to have a say in his treatment.  
Conclusion 
The paper has illustrated the complexity of “illness talk” in the psychiatric 
settings we studied.  We have demonstrated the ways in which different dis-
courses that featured in the settings brought to the foreground particular 
ways of “doing ill”, rendering inauthentic or problematic other expressions of 
mental distress. This implied that the patients were required to develop a fine-
ly-tuned and complex sense for the discourses and to make strategic consid-
erations as to how to appear in front of professionals if they wished to have a 
say in their treatment. In this sense, the extent to which the individual patient 
was positioned as ill seemed to depend more on his or her ability to adapt to 
the discourses and to the psychiatric setting, rather than on any objective di-
agnostic criteria. The emphasis on “real illness”, illness insight and explosive 
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instability found in this study is hardly particular to the settings of our field-
work, but is likely found in other mental health institutions. At the same time, 
some illness constructions may work as a type of “reversed order” in relation 
to the rest of society. For example, the relatively high and attractive status in-
herent in the position of “really mentally ill” in the settings may be contrasted 
with the stigmatization inherent in such a category in broader society. There 
may therefore be significant risks of disempowerment if patients learn to 
strive for and embrace a position as a “really ill” subject. This underscores the 
importance of studying discourses of illness as negotiated and managed con-
textually and locally.  
 
As noted in the introduction, illness discourses have implications for how pa-
tients may be actively involved in the treatment. We now turn to a discussion 
about how the policy and practice of service user involvement in the mental 
health services can be understood in light of our results. Service user in-
volvement is often construed as the practice of listening to and respecting the 
individual patient as well as allowing him or her an important say in the 
treatment. However, this paper indicates that it is when patients’ experiences 
and perspectives are formed and molded to fit particular psychiatric narra-
tives that the patients may be recognized as authentic and legitimate persons 
who can be involved in the treatment. In this way, psychiatric practice seems 
to rely on some relatively fixed ideas about the characteristics of the patient 
who can be involved. Firstly, it is a patient who assumes a specific reflexive 
relationship to his or her difficulties, one who recognizes a dependence on 
mental health professionals and psychiatric definitions. Secondly, it is a pa-
tient who is able to display his or her distress in a fine balance between visi-
bility and invisibility in a manner that allows her to appear as a subject and 
object at the same time. A patient who becomes too visibly “really ill” and 
positioned as caught by an inner instability risks being positioned entirely as 
an object. On the other hand, a patient who acts too much as a subject with 
volition and intentionality may be positioned as not authentically “really ill” 
and thus risk exclusion from psychiatric care. Thus, the practice of service us-
er involvement seems to rely on the patient managing a fine balance which 
allows her to be both object and subject, independently reflexive and depend-
ent at the same time. This balance is difficult to manage, and as we have seen 
many patients seem unable to do so. 
 
At the same time, the discussion indicates that the discourses were not all-





patients and professionals. Taking service user involvement seriously would 
mean allowing for a loosening up of the discourses we have described, where 
more subject positions could have access to legitimate and rightful participa-
tion. This would imply reflexivity and increased attention to the local, contex-
tual and constructed nature of psychiatric narratives - as well as sensitive re-
sponsiveness to perspectives that diverge greatly from traditional psychiatric 
understandings. 
 166 
Article 3: “I would like to retain your compulsory 
treatment, is that alright with you?”: Discursive 
constraints and possibilities for user involve-
ment in day-to-day mental health work  
Abstract 
The practice and policy of user involvement have become a major political aim in the 
mental health services. This article approaches the topic by studying mental health 
professionals’ day-to-day practices of user involvement in the context of concrete 
meetings and relationships with patients. The article draws on data from an ethno-
graphic study of two psychiatric institutions in Denmark to explore when and how it 
became possible for the professionals in the study to involve patients’ perspectives in 
the treatment. It is shown that many dominant discourses in mental health care work 
as constraints against user involvement; for the professionals user involvement there-
fore involved a complex balancing act among contradictions. This balancing act was 
difficult and demanding, particularly when it came to involving patients’ ideas about 
the origins of distress. It is argued that if the impact of user involvement initiatives is 
to extend beyond tokenism, mental health professionals need to be supported in their 
endeavors to involve patients’ perspectives by a system which allows for more loose 
and complex definitions of mental distress, patienthood and the professionals’ 
“roles”.  
Introduction  
The idea of involving users and their perspectives in the delivery and plan-
ning of mental health services has been a widely recognized position among 
policy makers and politicians the last decades. User involvement and partici-
pation has been inscribed in the legislature and official treatment documents 
of the mental health services in many Western countries. Many patients have 
similarly embraced the idea, sometimes forming organizations with the explic-





(Bowl, 1996; Connor & Wilson, 2006; Petersen et al., 2012; D. Rose, 2003). 
There is also evidence to suggest that many mental health professionals are 
positive to the idea of user involvement (Anthony & Crawford, 2000; 
Summers, 2003). However, although user involvement and a patient-
professional relationship based on collaboration and partnership have been 
an aim in mental health care, there is a growing amount of research and criti-
cal discussions which call into question the extent to which patients and their 
perspectives are actually being involved in the treatment (Bowl, 1996; S. M. 
Hodge, 2009; Pilgrim & Waldron, 1998; Roberts, 2010). When policy makers, 
patients and many professionals alike seem positive to the notion of user in-
volvement, why does the extent to which it actually occurs seem so limited?  
 
While rarely empirically researched, constraints to user involvement have 
been the focus of theoretical discussions. Some of these have emphasized the 
power and knowledge structures inherent in psychiatry as obstacles to active 
patient participation and involvement. Thus, Roberts (2010) has focused on 
the language and diagnostic categories of psychiatry to argue that active user 
participation is constrained by the discourses on mental illness which domi-
nate mental health practice and research. Roberts suggests that when mental 
illness is exclusively conceptualized as consisting of deficiencies such as a 
lacking sense of reality and rationality, the person with the illness is con-
structed as deficient. This makes the professional less prone to explore the 
person’s possibilities for personal development and more prone to emphasize 
control and monitoring in the treatment. Borg, Karlsson, & Kim (2009) have 
similarly emphasized the medicalized assumptions about patients’ problems 
inherent in definitions of mental illness as barriers, but propose a number of 
additional challenges to involving user perspectives in community mental 
health care. These are: the power of defining “true knowledge”, typically as-
sociated with the expert knowledge attributed to professionals, allowing them 
to have unique control; stigmatization, negative stereotypes and micro-
aggression against users outside and inside the mental health services; and a 
potential maximization of the “patient” role to other arenas of life associated 
with de-institutionalization – turning patients’ own home into arenas of po-
tential control and regulations. Pilgrim & Waldon (1998) have additionally 
identified as barriers for user involvement in mental health care the creation 
of “quasi-markets”, resulting from an increasingly consumerist model of 




While theoretical accounts have provided important insights into the macro-
processes which may constrain the practice of user involvement, empirical 
studies on how professionals attempt to practice user involvement in light of 
possible constraints have received considerably less attention. A common 
strand of empirical research on user involvement has instead focused on pro-
fessionals’ attitudes to the concept of user involvement. For example, Antho-
ny & Crawford (2000) found that mental health nurses generally value the 
concept of user involvement but consider it to be problematic in specific sit-
uations, due to limited resources, individual differences between patients and 
limitations in nursing care. Similarly, Summers (2003) found that psychiatrists 
differ in terms of the degree to which they endorse the concept, but that 
many find it useful, at least to a certain extent. While studies on professionals’ 
attitudes offer insight into the reflexivity of individual professionals in rela-
tion to involving patients, little insight is provided into how professionals ac-
tually practice user involvement, and the barriers and possibilities that emerge 
in the process. This article presents a more contextual approach, in which 
practices of user involvement are studied in the context of specific patient-
professional relationships and interactions. The data presented are based on a 
larger ethnographic study on two mental health institutions in Denmark. In 
previous articles (Ringer, 2013; Ringer & Holen, 2013) I have focused on the 
barriers to user involvement as these may be experienced by patients. In this 
paper, I focus mainly on mental health professionals and present an empirical 
account of the possibilities of practicing user involvement in the profession-
als’ day-to-day “discursive doings” (Middleton & Uys, 2009) when meeting 
patients.  
The study and its theoretical framework 
The cases presented in the paper are derived from a three-month (240 h) eth-
nographic study conducted at two psychiatric institutions for adults in Den-
mark in 2011. Situated in two medium sized towns in Denmark, one of the 
institutions was an outpatient clinic and the other a “closed” inpatient ward. 
The study was carried out in Region Zealand, which in 2009, had launched 
the three year project “User-led Psychiatry” (Brugerstyret Psykiatri), with the 
aim of raising awareness among professionals, and implementing a higher de-





workshops, theme-days and other educational initiatives to promote working 
towards active involvement of patients. In continuation of the project User-
Led Psychiatry, an initiative towards establishing a PhD-project which fo-
cused on language and user involvement was developed. This PhD-study is 
the backdrop of this article.  
 
The fieldwork of the study involved participant observation of everyday life 
at the institutions: of meetings between professionals and patients, staff meet-
ings and periods of idle time. Semi-structured individual interviews with 13 
patients and 11 professionals lasting between 0.5-1.5 hours were conducted. 
A principle of maximum variation (Polkinghorne, 2005) was applied in select-
ing participants for observations and interviews; professionals and patients 
positioned as diversely as possible in the organization were invited to partici-
pate in the study. Notes were recorded during or immediately after each par-
ticipant observation and they were elaborated into extensive fieldnotes later 
the same day. All interviews as well as some observations of patient-
professional meetings were additionally audio-recorded and transcribed ver-
batim. All names of participants are pseudonyms and information which may 
compromise anonymity has been changed. 
 
The analysis was theoretically informed by a version of discourse analysis in-
spired by the work of Foucault (Willig, 2008). Such an approach is based on 
the notion that discourses construct the objects and subjects of which they 
speak. Since discourses make available certain types of subject positions (e.g. 
doctor, patient, mentally ill) they are implicated in the exercise of power and 
knowledge. Within any system or institution, power is exercised through the 
language and practices employed, which become naturalized as taken for 
granted assumptions. The dominant discourses further preserve their power 
by keeping competing discourses in a subjugated position. In this way, lan-
guage, power and knowledge are intrinsically intertwined. However, discours-
es and power/knowledge structures can also be resisted. As Foucault 
(1980:142) writes: “there are no relations of power without resistances […] It 
exists all the more by being in the same place as power; hence, like power, re-
sistance is multiple”. From this perspective, although mental health profes-
sionals and patients may be regarded as enmeshed in a web of power, they 
also have the possibility to resist dominant discourses. For the purpose of the 
paper, I am particularly interested in the strategies and multiple ways in which 
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mental health professionals negotiate and re-negotiate the regimes and discur-
sive constraints which guide their work.  
Definitions and degrees of user involvement 
User involvement is not a uniform concept and there are many ways to define 
it. There are also a number of different terms used in the literature, suggesting 
different degrees of involvement: e.g. user participation, user control, user-led 
services, empowerment and user perspectives (Borg et al., 2009). The terms 
appear to refer to different assumptions concerning patients’ roles in receiv-
ing as well as planning mental health services. For example, on a simple in-
spection, “user-led services” seems to refer to users being directly and actively 
involved in the planning, policy and development of services while e.g. user 
participation seems to refer to users being less influential, but rather just “par-
ticipants” (ibid.). However, the differences between the terms are subtle, and 
they are often used interchangeably (Borg et al., 2009).  
 
Often, what is meant by user involvement is not specified in detail, and there 
seems to be some confusion regarding the term in psychiatric practice and 
research. Beresford (2002) has argued that much of the confusion stems from 
the fact that there are two inherently different models of involvement: the 
“consumerist” model and the “democratic” model. While the two models at 
points overlap in terms of interests and objectives, they have entirely different 
roots, philosophies and ideologies. The first model stems from market forces 
in the state and the second is derived from liberation and grass root move-
ments such as survivor organizations. The “consumerist” model of user in-
volvement is closely aligned with the political right, couched in terms of “get-
ting the product right” through consumer feedback. The “democratic ap-
proach” is linked to user and disability organizations and is inherently 
political - it is concerned with people having more of a say in the institutions 
which impact upon them. In contrast to the consumerist model, it aims at a 
re-distribution of power. In the context of mental health practice, Pilgrim 
(2005) has distinguished between a “conservative” and a “radical” approach, 
which bears similarities to Beresford’s distinction between consumerist and 
democratic models. While the conservative approach is concerned with im-
proving and optimizing services, the radical approach aims at changing and 





terested in exploring when and how it becomes possible for mental health 
professionals to make motions towards practicing a democratic type of user 
involvement, which progresses beyond eliciting consumer feedback. Thus I 
wish to examine how mental health professionals in the study practiced user 
involvement in terms of a redistribution of authority; in terms of being atten-
tive to and acting upon individual patients’ needs; and in terms of a re-
definition of their and the patients’ positions.  
 
Tait and Lester (2005) cite four different levels on which user involvement 
may take place: between service users in the form of self-help; between pro-
fessionals and users; in the management of local services; and in planning of 
overall services. While I share the understanding advanced by Pilgrim (2005), 
that to instigate actual social change user involvement ought to be backed up 
by policy and programs which encourage patients to be directly involved in 
planning and re-organizing services, in this paper I am interested in how user 
involvement is practiced in the context of discursive constraints and possibili-
ties in concrete day-to-day meetings between patients and professionals. The 
increasing policy focus on user involvement in mental health management 
has been criticized for being tokenistic and not involving any real democratic 
ambitions. I suggest that, although perhaps mostly in a subtle way, user in-
volvement may still occur in meetings between patients and professionals, e.g. 
if some forms of power are resisted or changed in the encounter. For this 
purpose, I take as my point of departure the definition used in a folder on 
“User-led Psychiatry” issued by the mental health services in Region Zealand 
(Psykiatrien Region Sjælland, 2010:2) in Denmark, which defines user in-
volvement as: “treatment […] based on a co-operation between patient and 
professional, which takes as its starting point the patient’s experiences and 
wishes” and as something which: “takes place in the relationship between pa-
tient and practitioner. It is about values in the encounter, about roles and 
about the concrete co-operation” [my translation]. In this paper, I am there-
fore concerned with the possibilities for practicing user involvement that be-
came available for professionals in specific day-to-day encounters with pa-
tients. I will argue that many of the dominant discourses in mental health care 
place restraints on involving patients in the treatment, demanding that the 
professionals engage in a complex balancing act between contradictory dis-
courses, when they strive to practice user involvement. 
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The cases used in this article have been selected based on thematic analysis, in 
which patients’ and professionals’ definitions of user involvement were 
grouped together and points of overlap were noted. Based on these categori-
zations, four areas important for user involvement emerged: the “personal 
professional”, “standardization vs. unique needs”, “efficiency vs. individuals’ 
wishes” and “de-pathologization”. These form the structure of the analysis.  
The limits of authority: practicing “personal” 
and “professional” 
 
Many professionals were preoccupied with what they called a tension be-
tween “being personal” and “being professional”. Generally, the profession-
als believed it was important to keep a professional distance and not be “too 
private” with patients. When individual professionals stepped out of the 
boundaries of what was perceived as “professionalism”, by being overly 
friendly and intimate with patients or by continuously asking them their 
views, they were sometimes mocked by their colleagues. Individual profes-
sionals also lamented if they had developed relationships with patients that 
were too intimate and could not be ended efficiently after the treatment. This 
understanding was cultivated by an assumption that the patients needed 
boundaries and would become insecure if they did not know who the profes-
sional was. At the same time, subscribing to an ethical ideal of co-operation 
and partnership, many wanted to avoid an all-embracing professional dis-
tance, or being a “stone-faced professional”, as one nursed called it. Thus, 
many discussed the difficulties involved in finding the right balance between 
being professional and personal. As Marie, a health care worker said: 
“It is a job where you can’t avoid giving something from yourself as a human. 
If you, if you don’t give anything from yourself you become one of those that 
the patients typically don’t like, because then they notice that you are very 
distanced, so it’s that tight-rope walking, to give a bit of yourself and take 
care of yourself (mm) that fine balance. That is, I don’t know how many 
years I will be able to last here in psychiatry, but I believe you can quickly be-
come burned out, if you don’t watch out” 






Some professionals said they did not like to be associated with a professional 
role, experiencing the boundaries of the role as a restraint for reaching out to 
patients. Being aware that the professional-patient relationship was produced 
as one of authority, many professionals said they intentionally attempted to 
position themselves as “personal” in order to gain a patient’s trust. One case 
manager22 explained: “If the patient is sitting and feeling like a patient and 
I’m feeling like a practitioner, we won’t make it very far”. Another case man-
ager said: “they have to know me a bit like a person, know that sitting across 
them is a person who is human. But they should also be able to sense that the 
guy knows what he’s talking about”. In these statements, professional and 
personal are constructed as two antagonistic processes, “professionalism” 
implying a distance to the patients, “being personal” implying intimacy and 
closeness. Navigating in between these two poles, most professionals strug-
gled to find some middle ground. It seemed as if neither “too professional” 
nor “too personal” were attractive positions. The professionals’ attempts at 
managing “personal” and “professional” are echoed in Lipsky’s (2010) classi-
cal study on front figures in social work. Lipsky found that many front line 
professionals experienced a dilemma in being placed in an institutional frame 
which demanded a specific standardized bureaucratic form of interaction, and 
simultaneously living up to the ideals of meeting an individual person in a 
unique situation in the settings. For the professionals in this study, one way 
of managing the institutional frame was to position themselves as opposition-
al to the system they represented, as Magda, a nurse, said: 
Magda: Well, there are a few times when you (.) can tell [patients] that the 
systems are very rigid […] I say (.) that’s bloody not good enough from the 
municipality and they should really (.) I had really counted on you getting 
through with it. So I use myself a lot and what I myself, um (.) what my own 
(.) opinions are, without it becoming the norms, but more my own opinion 
about stuff. So you can really show (.) that you disagree with your own sys-
tem or the municipal system or the government or something […] it gives 
more equality I think, to meet that way (.) so they can see a bit more of what 
I am, so I just don’t bring a very professional, um (.) gaze or façade, because 
I’ve seen that too, colleagues that are very, who never say anything about 
themselves or never say what they think (A: okay) and that (.) I don’t want to 
do that.   
                                                     
22 Case managers are contact persons for patients, with whom a patient has the most 
frequent contact. They can be e.g. nurses, health care workers, occupational thera-
pists or social workers. 
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Magda, IV, p. 8 
 
Magda constructs herself as disavowing the “role” of the stereotypical profes-
sional, by positioning herself in opposition to the system she represents. In 
this way, she similarly constructs “personal” as in opposition to “profession-
al”. She points towards a fundamental contradiction inherent in the positions 
of the professionals: on the one hand they are part of a system that exercises 
visible power over patients (e.g. by making decisions for them), on the other, 
the ideal commands a kind of egalitarianism, emphasizing equality, co-
operation and partnership. Barrett (1996:28) has noted how the official histo-
riography and self-narrative of contemporary mental health services tend to 
construct custodialism, coercion and authority as a problem of the “dark 
past” - and yet how they are still central to the contemporary functioning of 
psychiatry. Constructing a distinction between her “personal opinion” and 
the stark rules of the game allows Magda to disidentify for a moment from 
the authority inherent in her position as representative of the system. In do-
ing this, she may be said to make an identity claim I have previously referred 
to as “least staff” (Ringer, 2013). Such an identity was attractive in some con-
texts, in that it represented a possibility to reach out to patients in ways that 
deflected the visible power of the position of “professional”. 
 
In situations of explicit patient-professional conflict, however, the difference 
in authority became unavoidably visible. Particularly the mandate to make de-
cisions on behalf of patients and to practice coercion and restraint seemed to 
be a point of discomfort and difficulty for many of the professionals. This 
was especially the case at the ward, where detention and sectioning were rela-
tively common. One health care worker commented: “The patients don’t un-
derstand that it is also hard for us to use coercion - that we can also get 
frightened and feel bad about it”. Some professionals at the ward complained 
about feeling more like “prison wardens” than providers of care. This conflict 
between on the one hand a professional ideal of partnership and “being 
good” (Rhodes, 1995:142) and on the other using restraint and working 
against the will of an individual, at times nurtured paradoxical effects. During 
an inspection of a reluctant patient for a re-assessment of his restraint, one 
doctor interviewed the patient for a few minutes and subsequently asked: 
“Well, I would like to retain your compulsory treatment, is that alright with 
you?” The oxymoronic quality of this question reflects the contradictions that 






Another point of patient-staff conflict revolved around psychotropic medica-
tion. There were numerous instances in which patients either refused medica-
tion or wanted substantially less (e.g. anti-psychotics), or, contrary, wanted 
significantly more (e.g. benzodiazepines) than the professionals thought was 
responsible. The professionals who were not involved in the distribution of 
medication, such as social workers, occupational therapists, psychologists, 
physiotherapists or psychotherapists, could avoid taking part in these con-
flicts. One such professional was Rebecca, whose background did not grant 
her the right to distribute medications. She explained that not having to med-
icate at times meant that it was possible for her to be positioned as “least 
staff”:   
 “I differ from the nursing staff in the sense that the patients don’t have the 
contact around medication with me, which sometimes gives another alliance 
[…] I have often heard the patients ask me: “Where are the staff?” um, so 
I’m not thought of [as part of the staff] in the same way (.) so sometimes you 
get to know some other stuff about the patients, sometimes they tell me oth-
er things than they tell the nursing staff (.) um, I think often the patients 
equate nurses, [health care] assistants and doctors (.) and they are like the 
staff. Um, and I’m allowed to be on the sideline (.) and bring some other 
things in, and like, a bit different way of doing things. And then I’m maybe 
not completely perceived to be part of this, slightly dangerous decider group 
(mm) if you can say it that way that, um, that I can be the one who maybe 
does the kind of fun stuff […] so I think I get a slightly different role, my ex-
perience anyway is that I get a slightly different role than being staff” 
Rebecca, IV, p. 7 
 
Whereas Rebecca related her identity-claim as “least-staff” to her not distrib-
uting medication and therefore not being part of what she calls the “decider 
group”, in my observations I have noted an additional way in which it would 
appear that Rebecca negotiated a “least-staff” position: when she was alone 
with the patients, she tended to engage in the informal practice of cursing.  
There are four table tennis bats and I’m in the game together with Rebecca 
and the two patients Amanda and Isabella. Maya, another patient is watching 
us play. Isabella and Rebecca laugh a lot together. Rebecca curses a great deal, 
when she misses the ball or jokes around. She keeps saying “goddamn” and 
“bloody hell”. The patient Amanda shouts playfully: “Ey, where did you get 
that language?” Rebecca laughs and says that it comes from this room and 
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she makes a gesture towards Isabella and Maya. Maya makes a funny offend-
ed face, crosses her arms and says: “Ey, it’s not from me anyway!” 
P/O, p. 251 
 
At psychiatric wards, the boundaries between leisure time and treatment are 
loose and difficult to spot. Patients are potentially at any single moment posi-
tioned as “being treated” and the professionals are potentially at any time po-
sitioned as “treating” or “observing” them (McGrath, 2012; Ringer, 2013). In 
such a panoptical space, a pastime such as playing table tennis could be con-
strued as a rehabilitation activity aimed at restoring the patients to normal 
functioning, or alternatively, as a way of normalization by “distracting” them 
from distress. However, by cursing, Rebecca seems to undermine this poten-
tial disciplinary function of the game of table-tennis. Instead, she opens up 
for inscribing it into a discursive genre other than that of a therapeutic inter-
action - and challenges the boundaries of her position of authority. Amanda’s 
playful remark about Rebecca’s “dirty language” appears to be both an en-
dorsement of Rebecca’s identity claims and a subtle reminder of the other-
wise apparent differences in their positions. Rebecca’s reply that she has 
learned the language from “this room” picks up on Amanda’s call and seeks 
to smooth out her own position as “other” from the patients in the room.  
 
The professionals’ endeavors to construct some wiggle room may be regard-
ed as ways of re-negotiating the position of authority over patient that they 
occupied. This can be couched in terms of Foucault’s (1980) view of power 
as never linear or top-down, but working in a network. As Foucault (1980:16) 
notes: “everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those 
over whom it is exercised”. Foucault’s well-known statement bears resem-
blance to a maxim often repeated by the professionals at the mental health 
clinic in this study: “If the patient is sentenced to treatment, I am sentenced 
as well - to taking care of the patient”. It seems that in the instances when 
this mutual penal relationship was destabilized, it became possible for the 
professionals to re-negotiate their position of authority – and, at least for an 
instant, to open up a different distribution of power. One such episode oc-
curred at the ward during an outing to a garden adjacent to the ward, which 
unexpectedly ended elsewhere.  
We walk out through the exit but cannot locate the garden that the health 





are still a little unknown to the professionals. We instead find a bench on the 
grass and settle around it. Marie and some of the patients start talking about 
music. Marie says that she used to like metal music, like Judas Priest. Her in-
terlocutors become a little surprised, they like metal music too - especially 
Hanna and David. Then they discuss psychiatry. Marie says: […] “I remem-
ber when I was a health care student, it sometimes seemed as if the life of the 
staff was all pink. But what do you prefer, if we tell you when we’re having a 
bad day, or not? We don’t want to load you with our problems.” Hanna says 
she prefers when the professionals are honest so they should say what’s on 
their mind to make the relationship more equal. Rose says that she’s had ex-
periences when the staff just “offloaded” and that wasn’t good either. Hanna 
says that she really likes the nurse Mike, who was at the ward yesterday, that 
he told her personal things about his childhood. She says it’s important that 
the staff listen to the patients as “we have sensible things to say”.  
P/O, p. 305 
 
While the excursion was originally headed by the health care worker Marie, 
her authority as the “leader” of the excursion was destabilized when she 
failed to find the garden. And so Marie and the group of patients shared a 
common experience: none of them were able to find their way around. This 
opened up an informal space, where a repertoire of topics from everyday life 
could be drawn on. In discussing music preferences and finding commonali-
ties, it becomes possible for Marie to practice “personal” - and even surprise 
her interlocutors, since a taste for metal music is perhaps not usually associat-
ed with the position of a psychiatric professional. Consequently, she is able to 
share with the accompanying patients the concern that preoccupied her and 
many other professionals: the extent to which professionals can allow them-
selves to be intimate and reveal details from their own life. In doing so, she 
positions the patients as valuable interlocutors whose opinions are important 
for delivering a good service.  
 
Furthermore, by asking the present patients what they prefer, she admits to 
not being in the know. These types of conversations, concerning how to act 
with patients, would often take place among professionals in the absence of 
patients. However, the discursive context and the informality of the situation 
appear to make it possible for Marie to share her concerns with the patients. 
She offers them two choices: a preference for whether the professionals 
should reveal if they are having a bad day or a preference for the opposite. In 
this way, she may be said to open up for a type of “consumerist” model of 
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user involvement. Her questions resemble, to some extent, the forced-choice 
format of consumer satisfaction studies with predesigned answers. While the 
question calls for a straight “yes-or-no” answer, the replies Marie receives are 
far from straightforward. Hanna seems to prefer when the professionals are 
honest and to appreciate it even when they tell her things from their child-
hood, while Rose emphasizes that it is important for her not to be burdened 
by the professionals’ personal problems. In the process of the discussion, and 
almost unnoticeably, a further development occurs: the terms of Marie’s 
questions become subtly renegotiated by Hanna. Although Marie’s question is 
framed in a yes-or-no format and is perhaps primarily aimed at her using the 
feedback to develop “best practice”, Hanna inscribes the question in a demo-
cratic equality discourse. She uses the question as a starting point for a fun-
damental discussion on equality and power in psychiatry, stating that the rela-
tionship should be “more equal”. She says that the patients have sensible 
things to say and should be listened to more by professionals, thus implying 
that patients are often considered to say senseless things that should not be 
listened to. In this way, Marie’s question becomes a stepping stone for a dis-
cussion on the boundaries of expert power and the construction of psychiat-
ric patienthood in general. Marie’s positioning of the patients as people with a 
valid viewpoint thus opened up for Hanna and Rose to share their thoughts, 
and thus for important reflections on patient rights and democracy to 
emerge.  
 
The subtle re-negotiation of the professional-patient relationship could per-
haps only occur in the context of locating a space which was produced as 
“other” than psychiatric; in this case, perhaps befittingly, a place placed geo-
graphically outside of the walls of the psychiatric institution. Getting lost to-
gether seemed to challenge the professional authority inherent in Marie’s po-
sition, and made available a possibility for her to practice “personal” profes-
sional. This in term made possible the emergence of a discussion on 
democratic rights and citizenship.  
 
Altogether, the examples illustrate how some professionals strived to re-
negotiate the power and knowledge regimes that positioned them as experts 
and authorities over patients. As we have seen, this was attempted by the pro-
fessionals by negotiating positions that were “other” than mental health pro-
fessionals, such as a position as “least staff”, and by locating or constructing 





was in the instances when taken for granted assumptions and positions were 
somehow changed, inverted or transformed, however slightly, that patients’ 
perspectives could be embraced in a more open manner.  
Sneaking standardization and complex diversity  
 
Being subject to administrative standards and benchmarking, in both the out-
patient and inpatient settings, it was important for the professionals to dis-
charge the patients or to end the treatment quickly, efficiently and according 
to set expectations. Administrative norms had been issued on how long the 
patients should receive treatment and on how a typical meeting with a contact 
person should take place. A set of standards derived from a national model, 
the Danish Quality Model, published at fixed intervals and the professionals 
were expected to implement these in their practice. The standards concerned 
almost all aspects of work, from how the professionals should wash their 
hands, through what they should ask patients during the first meeting to how 
they should store and distribute medication. Additionally, there was a number 
of teaching materials that the professionals were expected to use in standard-
ized psychoeducation, i.e. patient education about the essence of psychiatric 
illness. The focus on standards and efficiency was relatively new in the set-
tings, but had increasingly come to dominate the professionals’ space. Thom-
as, a health care worker, said, illustrating the fears and frustrations of many 
professionals: 
There’s more and more standardization. More and more rules and control 
and uniformity. It has come slowly, sneaking up on you. In the beginning we 
were just practicing charting all our meetings with patients, like a preparation. 
Now we have to chart them for real. And in the future not living up to the 
norms will mean rounds of layoffs.  
P/O, p. 44 
 
Some professionals complained that the standards had little to do with the 
type of work actually being carried out. A frustrated doctor remarked that the 
standards required him to make a treatment plan after two meetings with a 
patient: “It’s nonsense! Would you say that I would know you after having 
talked with you for two hours?” This type of resistance towards standardiza-
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tion and the increasing focus on efficiency was commonplace in both set-
tings. The standards which increasingly “came sneaking up” represented a 
threat by broadening the disciplinary space that made the work of profession-
als more “visible”. From the professionals’ point of view, rather than aimed 
at improving quality of care for patients, the standards were an exposure of 
them (Rhodes, 1995:115). Indeed, the standards and the surveys conducted at 
regular intervals were aimed at revealing the extent to which the professionals 
were doing their work “properly”. Thus a principle of “omnipresent surveil-
lance, capable of making all visible” (Foucault, 1991:214) may be said to have 
permeated the institutions, subjecting the work of the professionals to “com-
pulsory visibility” (Foucault, 1991: 187; Rhodes, 1995: 115). Additionally, the 
standards made it increasingly difficult to make professional judgments relat-
ed to unique patients, standardizing the process according to a set norm. In 
this way, the standards sometimes functioned as a direct obstacle to accom-
modating individual patients’ needs.  
 
However, from the professionals’ point of view, the standards could also to 
some extent be ignored, mocked or subverted into a means of protest 
(Rhodes, 1995). When this latter function applied, the standards could be 
turned into an ironic commentary on the discrepancy between the idealized 
and de-contextualized image of psychiatric care conveyed by the standards 
and the “reality” of the work life of the professionals. This was especially evi-
dent at the clinic, where the presentation of new standards during the morn-
ing meetings was most often received with mockery and irony. One time, a 
group of professionals gasped in exasperation when the team leader read 
aloud a standard requiring the professionals to test schizophrenic patients for 
the risk of suicide by the help of standardized tools. This, they said, could 
simply not be done with the amount of patients they had, which amounted to 
approximately 300. The professionals talked about finding “loopholes” in the 
standards in order to continue to provide the same care and quality as before. 
Some professionals additionally subverted or “bent the rules” by sometimes 
outright refusing to follow administrative standards in situations when they 
sensed this would interrupt contact with a patient. For example some profes-
sionals allowed the patients or their relatives to smoke when the professionals 
came for home visits, even if this was not allowed. A doctor remarked that 
the standards at times demanded that she ask the patients irrelevant ques-





the case, she chuckled: “No there haven’t, because then I just haven’t asked 
the questions, hehe”. 
 
The standards were built on an idealized notion of psychiatric work, empha-
sizing systematic work and thoughtful planning, which indeed had little in 
common with the actual work being carried out – which was much more 
fuzzy, complex and hectic. Quite often the standardized tools the profession-
als had been given did not fit the situation at hand - and so they had to at-
tempt to find a way to make them fit. This was also the case with the type of 
authoritative knowledge concerning the patients constructed in the tools de-
veloped for use in patient education. The following discussions took place 
during two sessions of individual psychoeducation, in which Diana, a case 
manager at the clinic, made use of a set of standardized PowerPoint slides. 
Diana turns the screen on and a projected slide lights up. It says “Welcome 
to education in schizophrenia” 
Diana: the first signs that one is in the process of developing the disease… 
[she reads from the screen] “anxiety in social situations” 
Paul: I’ve never had that. If anything, I’ve been anxious of being alone. 
Diana: [continues reading]: “lack of interest, reduced sense of desire” 
[lystfølelse] 
Paul: When I was ill I became tremendously interested in astrology – I 
thought getting a better knowledge of horoscopes would be a solution to 
many of the world’s problems. I really wanted to be the best astrologist. I al-
so became totally preoccupied with Jack the Ripper. It was funny [laughs] 
Diana: Wasn’t it frightening? 
Paul: No, I wanted to become a king in the astrology milieu. Cure sick peo-
ple. 
Diana: That wasn’t maybe very realistic 
Paul: No 
Diana: It was good that you got some medication. 
[…]  
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The screen says: “co-operation with relatives” 
Diana reads this aloud and asks: Do you think they’d be interested in coming 
in for a meeting? 
Paul: You can give them some material, but I don’t think they’re interested… 
Diana: How do you think it affected your family when you became ill? 
Paul: Well, offhand I don’t know if anything big happened. But we didn’t 
have contact for a long time, so I don’t really know. 
Diana: Do you think they missed you when you weren’t in touch? 
Paul: My parents got really pissed off. They still are. It’s like they think it was 
some terrible treachery [that I got ill]. I don’t think anyone could change that. 
So that way it did affect them. And afterwards it was like they had to set me 
straight. It’s because they think I’m weak. They don’t like weak people. 
Diana: You’re not weak just because you have an illness. 
Paul: No, but they don’t really get that. My family doesn’t really get me. 
Diana flips the screen. It says: “The relatives are the ones with the greatest 
knowledge about the patient” 
Diana: well, yeah, they can often be a support. 
P/O, p. 79-80; 109-11 
 
Paul’s narrative does not match the authoritative text presented in the slide 
show. He has not felt anxious in social situations; rather than experiencing a 
lack of interest, he experienced an elevated interest in certain activities when 
his distress developed. Similarly, the slide which claims that the “relatives 
have the greatest knowledge about the patient” - rather than supporting and 
expanding the narrative about a family conflict - becomes an unwarranted 
and inaccurate interference. The slideshow thus constructed a specific version 
of “psychiatric patient” and “schizophrenic”, which, as became evident, did 
not fit with Paul’s lived experiences. The construction was one of a standard-
ized linear “course of illness” with predictable “symptoms” and “outcomes” 
developing independently of social contexts and relationships with other 





ing the multiplicity and diversity of experiences of distress among different 
people. For Diana, this posed a dilemma: most likely she would have liked to 
present an account which would help Paul make sense of his experiences and 
normalize them - but in fact, the slides appeared to do the opposite. When 
Paul’s narrative cannot be captured by the authoritative voice of the psycho-
educational slides, she attempts to open up for a discussion of Paul’s own ex-
periences, but is restrained by the fact that she has to go through all the 
slides. She needs to “make the standards fit” and thus is obliged to cut Paul’s 
narrative short by rounding it off with remarks such as that it was good he 
got medication and that the family often can be a support - well aware that 
this does not seem to be the case for Paul. 
 
This example demonstrates a difficulty that some professionals were also 
acutely aware of: standardization inevitably constrained the ways narratives 
and processes of sense-making could be constructed in meetings between pa-
tients and professionals. The standards and standardized tools gave the dom-
inance of psychiatric “expert” discourses a tangible and unquestionable form. 
In this way, they were in themselves contradictory to the ethical ideal to ap-
proach the patient as a unique individual. As one doctor said: 
Tina: the more things we standardize and say “well this here, we need to do 
this, this needs to be fulfilled” the more constraints we place on where a 
conversation [with a patient] may move towards, and that is what I perceive 
to be the big problem with it. It’s not that we have to secure quality, it’s not 
that we are examining people, but it’s the inherent limitation which makes us, 
at least sometimes in some instances, move towards something other than 
what actually matters the most for the patient 
Tina, IV, p. 7-8 
 
The doctor constructs the standards as an obstacle for contextual initiatives 
and for approaching the person as a unique individual with wishes and needs 
extending beyond those of the standards. In relation to the discussion pre-
sented in this paper, the point to be made here is not that the standards re-
strained an otherwise “free” space for spontaneous exploration, but rather, 
that the standardization presented yet another discursive constraint for the 
professionals, which again worked as an obstacle to acknowledging perspec-
tives other than well-established psychiatric discourses. 
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The virtue of efficiency and making exceptions 
 
The emphasis on efficiency, standardization and short treatment plans fos-
tered a climate in which patients were expected to be “finished off”, dis-
charged or turned out of the system as quickly as possible. This made the 
work of professionals sometimes seem more about managing flux, movement 
and change than about providing a coherent treatment effort. A health care 
worker defined his most important role in the following way: “When we can’t 
do anything more and the situation is acceptable, we have to end it. So the 
role is: be aware of how long we can keep making the situation better and 
when we can stop. […] The resources are always limited”. I have previously 
(Ringer & Holen, 2013) noted that a discourse of “really ill” was present in 
both settings of the study, which required patients to prove that they were ill 
and deserving of care - and required the professionals to constantly observe 
and judge the degree of pathology in patients. The power of the discourse of 
“really ill” may be understood in terms of the regulations and efficiency de-
mands guarding the professionals’ practices. For them, closing a patient’s case 
became a virtue in itself, and as soon as a patient was judged “stable”, “habit-
ual” or somewhat well-functioning, the professionals had to start thinking 
about cutting the process short. In both settings many professionals empha-
sized that they provided a treatment which, as one nurse said, resisted “clingy 
care” which infantilized the patients and was overprotective of them. Another 
nurse stated more bluntly that she was harsh and strict with the patients and 
had to be, so that they did not become overly dependent. This philosophy 
was presented as in contrast to the overprotective and inefficient attitude of 
traditional psychiatric practice, which the professionals saw as shielding the 
patients away from society - making them fragile by placing them in psychiat-
ric care for prolonged periods of time.  
 
While the professionals’ focus on efficiency and on discharging patients may 
be seen as an acquiescence of the demands of management and standardiza-
tion, there were also examples of the professionals resisting these demands 
for certain patients. For example, one patient, who perpetually had night-
mares about losing her contact person and having her treatment terminated 
before she was ready, was promised by her psychiatric contact person that no 
matter what, she would be allowed to continuously receive psychiatric care 
for at least half a year and perhaps a full year. At other times, the profession-





be allowed to continue in treatment. The following scene at the ward repre-
sents such an exercise in persuasion: 
A group of professionals are sitting in the staff room during a break, chatting. 
There is a natural pause in the talk. The health care worker Sandra looks up 
at the white board, which contains information on all patients at the ward 
and asks: “Shouldn’t Laura be discharged soon?” Marianne, who is Laura’s 
primary contact person answers that Laura is still “feeling really bad”. She 
just keeps up a façade when she’s out among the others. The nurse Sylvia 
comes in and asks who they’re talking about. Marianne explains that they’re 
talking about Laura and that Laura’s feeling really bad and has difficulties 
with meetings […] Sylvia comments that it’s true; she also thinks Laura’s 
looking worse. She doesn’t see her friends as often […] Marianne says that 
the doctor is of the opinion that Laura has a depression - and “after all, that 
takes time”. Laura takes Cymbalta, maybe also something else. Marianne says 
that she is much more worried about Laura than about another patient, 
Astrid. She says she would be more worried if Laura was discharged tomor-
row than if Astrid was […]. She adds that Laura spends so much energy on 
keeping up appearances to convince everyone that she’s doing ok. Sandra an-
swers: ah, so that’s why, I only see her when she’s out with the others. 
P/O, p. 433 
 
Sandra’s seemingly innocuous remark about whether Laura was fit for dis-
charge potentially carried consequences for Laura’s continuous treatment at 
the ward. It could be read as a threat to Laura’s future stay, a threat picked up 
by Marianne, Laura’s contact person. In order to make a case for why Laura 
should stay, Marianne invokes the discourse of “really ill”. If Laura can be 
constructed as “really ill”, despite her not visualizing the appropriate symp-
toms, Marianne may secure her continuous stay. She thus applies a familiar 
psychiatric construction: the patient as consisting of both “a deep core” and 
“a surface” (Barrett, 1996). In this constellation, patients are regarded as hav-
ing a core –the source of genuine emotions, trouble and illness, and a surface 
zone, allowing for the possibility of a false façade which may deceive the un-
knowing observer. By constructing Laura this way, Marianne can fend off al-
legations that Laura is not “really ill” and manage to position her as an ideal 
patient: one who is indeed very troubled and ill at the “core”, but at the same 
time does not allow herself to display symptoms in a too obvious manner. In 
this way, Laura is constructed as fitting a familiar and well-liked patient posi-
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tion: the responsible, tough and not-clingy patient who nonetheless has a pri-
vate soft side which she only displays to certain carefully selected individuals.  
 
Marianne further contrasts Laura to another patient, Astrid, about whom 
there was a general consensus that she misused the ward as a “hideout” 
(Rhodes, 1995), and was not “really ill” (cf. Ringer & Holen, 2013). The 
comparison and the construction of a sharp contrast between the two, further 
functions to supports Marianne’s construction of Laura as deserving care. At 
the same time, it perpetuates the consensus construction of Astrid as some-
one who should be discharged quickly and does not deserve continuous 
treatment (and indeed, shortly after the conversation took place, Astrid was 
told that she would be discharged against her will). To further underpin her 
case, Marianne changes “footing” (Goffman, 2010) by positioning the resi-
dent physician, rather than herself as the author of the statement that Laura 
genuinely is “really ill” - in terms of qualifying for the diagnosis depression. 
This allows her to draw on expert opinions in order to argue that Laura 
should be allowed to stay and needs time to get well. When Marianne draws 
on these discourses and constructs Laura as “really ill”, she opens up for an 
understanding from the other professionals engaged in the conversation, who 
support her account by contributing to the positioning of Laura as “really ill”; 
and so there can no longer be any doubt that Laura should be allowed to stay 
at the ward if she pleases. Additionally, Sandra, who initially brought the re-
mark up, finally agrees to this version of Laura by positioning herself and her 
previous remark as due to her being deceived by Laura’s “tough façade” - and 
her lack of knowledge of Laura’s “true core” (“that’s why, I have only seen her out 
there with the others”). This way, Laura’s continued treatment at the ward was 
secured for a while. 
 
The example illustrates some of the tensions and difficulties that the profes-
sionals faced when they attempted to meet the individual needs of a patient in 
the face of demands of efficiency. Had Marianne not been so quick to react 
and construct Laura as ‘really ill’ and fitting within a familiar template, Laura’s 
future at the ward would possibly have been insecure. It is difficult to know 
for sure what Laura thought about this, but based on her contact person’s ef-
forts to convince the other professionals about her need to stay, it is likely to 
presume that Laura had expressed a wish to stay at the ward and to continue 
to receive treatment. This demonstrates the cunningness and creativity in 





sionals had to exercise if they wished to be attentive to the unique wishes of a 
patient. This movement required defining patients and their actions according 
to well-established local categories. The example additionally demonstrates 
the difference between patients in relation to how far their contact persons 
would be willing to go for them. For Laura, this was rather easy, as the way 
she generally performed herself allowed for a relative straightforward con-
struction of her as “really ill”. Had she, like Astrid, not managed the proper 
act of balance between “core” and “façade”, it would perhaps have been sig-
nificantly more difficult for the contact person to argue for her continuous 
stay at the ward. 
 
Finally, altogether the examples reveal a more general point about contempo-
rary psychiatric work. When the professionals favored continuity in treatment 
over efficiency, when they favored meeting a unique need over standardized 
care, when they attempted to find spontaneous and unexpected ways of inter-
acting with patients, they risked being at odds with management and the 
dominant ideal of efficiency and standardization. The widely adopted dis-
courses of management and organization valued short and standardized 
treatment with clear goals and a deadline in site. The rhetoric of efficiency 
and standardization was highly critical of allowing an individual patient to re-
ceive care for a prolonged time just because he or she wished for it. This re-
quired a balancing act of the professionals with a constant attention to “mak-
ing exceptions” - turning the treatment into a sanctuary for some patients, 
while hurriedly discharging others against their will.  
Pathologization, normalization and the ordinary 
human being 
The concept of mental illness and the diagnostic model are fundamental to 
psychiatric knowledge and practice. Irrespective of profession, the profes-
sionals in this study, to varying degrees, all seemed to subscribe to a diagnos-
tic model of the patients’ distress. However, some professionals also reflected 
on the value of normalizing the patients’ experiences. A psychiatrist stated 
that once the patients were diagnosed, he saw one of his tasks as that of nor-
malization of their experiences.  
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Frank: if they have thoughts about the neighbor being annoying (.) because 
he’s playing loud music in the evening and you’d like to hit him (.) but then 
“I’m schizophrenic, so I’m not allowed, and it’s probably a schizophrenic 
thought, and that’s criminal” (.) and then you can tell them “but, you know 
what, it’s really kind of ordinary to get annoyed at others” […] that’s what I 
mean by having the power to define [normality], because it gives people a 
huge relief, huge […] to know that it’s actually, um, a normal thought.  
Frank, IV, p. 8 
 
The psychiatrist’s experience that many of the patients had difficulties distin-
guishing what is “normal” from what is “abnormal” in their experiences may 
be related to the construction of mental distress that I have previously (Ring-
er & Holen, 2013) called “the instability discourse”. This discourse defines 
the patient as having a mentally ill core, which can spread and act unpredicta-
bly and take over their whole identity. Consequently, it invited patients into 
an exercise in self-discipline by self-monitoring and self-scrutinizing, continu-
ously searching for signs of pathology. Thus, many patients made self-
pathologization an integral part of their identity. In this context, Frank seems 
to perceive his role as one who should assist in restoring and rebuilding the 
patients’ “sane sides” and acknowledge that not everything the patients think 
or feel is pathological. He constructs some experiences, such as being an-
noyed at a neighbor as “just like the rest of us”. Barrett (1996: 270ff) has 
demonstrated how a fundamental tension between “sameness” and “differ-
ence” is integral to contemporary psychiatric practice. Constructions of psy-
chiatric patients oscillate between constructions of the patient as “the same as 
others” and “fundamentally different from other people”. In the settings of 
this study this tension materialized itself in terms of a dialectic relationship 
between normalization and pathologization. When the patients self-
pathologized, the response of the professional would often be normalization, 
as illustrated by the psychiatrist’s statement. Conversely, when the patients 
resisted the positioning of them as “ill” and normalized their own experienc-
es, the response of the professional would often be one of pathologization. 
By moving between these poles, the professionals seemed to construct differ-
ent versions of the patient’s identity. In a strict psychiatric sense, when e.g. a 
patient diagnosed with schizophrenia claims a status as “not ill” or when she 
makes sense of her distress by drawing on systems of knowledge other than 
psychiatric, this may be viewed as evidence of her illness and she can be cate-





er (2006: 418) note, when patients resist psychiatric explanations and draw on 
other discourses in defining their distress, the professionals’ authority and 
caring subjectivity is undermined. According to them, when this happens: 
“the professionals can reverse this power exchange by colonizing individuals’ 
refusal of diagnosis and patienthood, framing this within the psychiatric dis-
course as a ‘lack of insight’, whether viewed as a symptom, a neurological def-
icit or as a defense mechanism” (p. 418). 
 
Hamilton & Roper’s observation is valid and applicable to the context of psy-
chiatric knowledge and theory. In the context of the practices of the profes-
sionals in this study, their exercises in pathologization and normalization ap-
peared to be much more complex and oblique. They often seemed to strive 
to remain open to patients’ narratives of distress, but ultimately often found it 
difficult to accept these as legitimate when they diverged too greatly from 
psychiatric discourses. Therefore, many seemed to manage an intricate bal-
ance between the forces of pathologization and normalization, looking for 
ways to be attuned to patients’ self-positioning. The following fragment of a 
nurse-patient meeting illustrates this tension.   
Philip: I’ve started seeing it in a different way, um, instead of like, for a long 
time now I’ve seen myself as schizophrenic, in a way […] and I’m beginning 
to understand it in a different way and to view it in a different way, and after 
[I’ve started seeing it differently] there have been some changes (yeah) both 
with the voices and um with the stuff I’m experiencing 
Petra (nurse): So what, in a positive way? 
Philip: Mm 
Petra: Yeah? 
Philip: Um, I’m seeing myself, understanding it that way, that it’s not like re-
ally a disease, but something that’s kind of a very natural experience, in a way 
(yeah) and yeah, that that’s what it is and that’s what comes with it and stuff 
(mm), um, you could say 
Petra: But you, I mean you do see that a lot, that the way you experience the 
illness, the way you experience it in relation to yourself, is very important for 
the experience, isn’t it? (yeah) […]. There are a lot of people with schizo-
phrenia, people who have the illness schizophrenia, who, I’ve met quite a lot 
of people by now, haven’t I, um with this illness. And some people say and 
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define themselves like: “I’m schizophrenic”. And then there are others who 
say: “well, I’m Philip and I am myself and then I have this illness with me, 
which is called schizophrenia” (yeah) but, then you’re not defined by the ill-
ness, do you see what I mean? 
Philip: Yeah, because I think it’s so indefinable (yeah) also in relation to kind 
of, um (.) well, um, I think what it says in the books is so limited compared to 
what you experience, […]. And that’s it really, um, I see it a lot more spiritu-
ally (yeah) than that it’s just something that should necessarily be removed, or 
whatever. 
Petra: […] It’s also very individual. And there are actually a lot of people who 
say that when you have voices, or it could be someone who sees something, 
like has visual hallucinations, (mm) that it actually has a connection with the 
person you are and, um, the life that you’ve had - with some experiences. 
That it just doesn’t just come out of thin air. 
Philip: No, that’s it, um, really 
Petra: That there’s a meaning 
Philip: Yeah, exactly 
P/O, recorded conversation, Petra-Philip, p. 3-4 
 
Philip opens up for a re-negotiation of the fundamental concept of “illness” 
and whether it appropriately matches his experiences (“it’s not like an out-
right disease, but something that’s kind of a very natural experience”). His 
contact person Petra listens to him, without dismissing what he says, and she 
is sensitive to the general theme of his narrative: that the way a person relates 
to mental distress is important. Yet, it seems difficult for her to fully hear his 
plea to not define the voice hearing as an illness, as she cannot avoid resort-
ing to the concept schizophrenia in making sense of what he says.  
 
In an analysis of the talk of members of user organizations, Speed (2006) has 
noted how users locate themselves in the position of patient, consumer and 
survivor in different times and contexts. By subtly implying that his distress is 
not due to an illness, Philip may be said to position himself within the “survi-
vor discourse” – in resisting medical authority by drawing on a spiritual 
frame. Although Petra does not dismiss his account, she subtly reframes Phil-





frame. She may be said to offer him a compromise, by making available a po-
sition as “consumer” (Speed, 2006) – as supported by the statement “I have 
schizophrenia”, rather than “I am schizophrenic”. As Speed notes, such a 
discourse of “consumer” vacillates between acceptance and rejection of the 
medical model - it moves away from the passive “patient role”, but still com-
plies with medical hegemony. In positioning Philip in this way and discursive-
ly separating “the illness” from him, Petra allows for some equivocality that a 
strict medical discourse would have closed down. At the same time it allows 
her to maintain commitment to her medical training and psychiatric 
knowledge. In this way she makes available a subject position for Philip 
which is intended to avoid undermining his account, but still constructs him 
as having an illness. For Philip, such a position of “having schizophrenia” al-
lows for a wider scope of action and agency than “being schizophrenic”; 
however at the same time, it is a different position than he originally claimed 
for himself, and perhaps one he is not fully comfortable with it. Towards the 
end of the fragment, however, Petra seizes to talk about his distress as being 
an illness, focusing instead on hearing voices and having visual hallucinations. 
This way they seem to reach a type of compromise, agreeing that there is 
meaning in hearing voices.   
 
The fragment illustrates one of the core tensions that seemed to face the psy-
chiatric professionals when they wished to remain open to patients’ perspec-
tives on distress, when these diverged from psychiatric understandings. Petra 
on the one hand genuinely seems to strive to take the statements and posi-
tioning constructed by Philip seriously. On the other hand, it is difficult for 
her to ultimately accept other ways of constructing unusual experiences and 
voice-hearing than as pathology - and remain committed to her position as 
psychiatric professional. Her training, professional experience and member-
ship in the professional world of psychiatry have likely not made other inter-
pretational frames of the patients’ distress available - because, as Hamilton & 
Roper (2006) note, even if many patients challenge psychiatric knowledge re-
gimes, the patients often “cannot be heard if [they] disagree” (420). In trying 
to accommodate Philip’s stories, Petra therefore has to practice a difficult 
balancing act between the subjugated discourses that Philip draws on and the 




Precisely because the illness discourses threaten to render other accounts of 
the patients’ distress illegitimate, it may be argued that involving patients’ per-
spectives in this regard was more fundamentally difficult for the professionals 
than involving their perspectives within the other domains discussed. While 
the balancing act performed by professionals in positioning as “personal” and 
meeting a unique need could to some extent be managed by “making excep-
tions” or doing small adjustments without fundamentally subverting domi-
nant discourses - to accept a patient’s unconventional definition of distress as 
legitimate required a considerably more radical approach to involvement. Be-
cause psychiatric definitions of mental illness (and the assumption that the 
truth about these lies in the sphere of professional knowledge) are deeply in-
scribed in the very groundwork of psychiatry, involving patients’ alternative 
definitions appeared to verge on the inconceivable. Engaging seriously with 
spiritual and critical claims such as those of Philip would thus imply a clash 
with the very historical and institutional self-definitions of psychiatry. In this 
sense it appeared as if the sphere of definitions of mental illness often pro-
vided the boundaries for possible negotiations of user involvement and inclu-
sion of patients’ perspectives.  
 
The fundamental difficulty facing the professionals in this endeavor was re-
flected in yet another case: that of the patient Eliana and her case manager 
Joanna. Eliana had long been considered a “difficult patient” who had had 
contact with the mental health services for thirteen years with more than thir-
ty compulsory admissions. The last year and a half, however, Eliana had fully 
avoided hospitalization. Eliana partly attributed this to her relationship to Jo-
anna. She said: “If it wasn’t for Joanna, I’d be dead”. She explained that Jo-
anna was one of her first psychiatric contacts who did not “treat her as a 
mentally ill person”. In an interview, the case manager Joanna said that it 
took two years to gain Eliana’s confidence. She explained how she had made 
sense of some of Eliana’s problems: 
Joanna: Eliana has this, it’s called dissociative thinking […] She can walk 
around here in the city and have some ideas about having gone to visit her fa-
ther who is fatally ill in a hospital in another city (.) all the while as she’s been 
seen around here [by her contact persons]. And the social psychiatric team 
and [another treatment] team, they would sometimes tell her ‘but you’re ly-
ing, we saw you around here, didn’t we’ […] but it’s surely no use telling her 
that it’s a lie […] It’s a mental (.) illness which makes her think the way she 





ries (.) and it’s important to let her keep the stories […]. With time she 
doesn’t feel the need to tell me those quirky stories about what she has done. 
She’s spent really, really a lot of time telling me these stories, about who she 
was and what she knew and what she was able to do, and of course, she 
needs to tell me that she’s a person with resources who(.) is able to do a lot 
of things and so on, doesn’t she? (A:mm)(.) That her stories perhaps don’t 
have an exact basis in reality, that’s not what’s important (.) it was important 
for her to be able to tell me what she was also capable of. 
Joanna, IV, p. 10 
 
As the extract indicates, rather than assessing the level of direct truth in Eli-
ana’s stories, Joanna had focused on the speech act and metaphorical mean-
ing. She related the stories to the identity work that Eliana undertook in the 
interaction - pointing out that it was apparently important for Eliana to pre-
sent herself in certain ways. In doing this, Joanna seems to take a step to-
wards abandoning what Harper (2004) has referred to as “the constraints of 
the modernist paradigm” of psychiatric thought. According to Harper, psy-
chiatry is built on an assumption that the clinician has unmediated access to 
“reality” and should distinguish between “correct” inferences of reality and 
“faulty” ones. “Faulty” assumptions may be constructed as delusions, which 
are irrational and meaningless. Accordingly, an important task expected from 
mental health professionals is to judge the level of truth in patients’ beliefs 
and to re-adjust their faulty world views (Palmer, 2000). By concentrating on 
metaphorical aspects of Eliana’s stories – as serving a function within an in-
teraction - Joanna subtly renegotiates the expectation to judge Eliana’s ac-
counts against a rationalist criterion of absolute truth. At the same time, she 
does not fully breach the expectation to identify pathology. She makes sense 
of Eliana’s stories by putting them in a cognitivist framework - constructing 
Eliana’s stories as consequences of dissociative thinking, and as resulting 
from a mental illness. Thus, in her endeavors to make sense of the stories, 
she simultaneously draws on and takes a step towards destabilizing psychiatric 
knowledge regimes. However, as Joanna explained, a recent difficulty had 
presented itself which further complicated her balancing act: the last time Eli-
ana was hospitalized she received a diagnosis of schizophrenia. In a situated 
interview, Joanna reflected upon the new diagnosis: 
Joanna says Eliana has the diagnoses borderline and anorexia. She adds that 
Eliana actually also received a diagnosis of schizophrenia the last time she 
was hospitalized, but that she, as Eliana’s case manager, totally disagrees with 
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this diagnosis. Because, she explains, when Eliana’s lying, it’s because she re-
ally believes what she’s saying. Eliana’s very ill, Joanna says, but she’s not de-
lusional, “so we quite disagree about the diagnosis” 
P/O, p. 91 
 
Joanna is aware of the potent cultural, historical and psychiatric imperative to 
regard symptoms of schizophrenia, such as delusions, as disconnected from 
their social context. Without a diagnosis of schizophrenia, the stories can be 
attended to as “Eliana’s quirky stories”, permitting some room for explorative 
interpretation. However, if Eliana’s distress is defined as “schizophrenia”, Jo-
anna will most likely have to attend to Eliana’s stories as delusions, as standard-
ized, objectified symptoms without essential meaning. Barrett (1996) has 
demonstrated how schizophrenia in contemporary psychiatric research and 
practice is produced as “beyond the possibility of comprehension”. He relates 
this to the legacy and influence on contemporary psychiatric thought of the 
nineteenth century psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers. Jaspers asserted 
that there was a fundamental distinction between psychiatric disorders which 
could be empathically understood within their social context, and those that 
were beyond empathic understanding – and thus could only be understood in 
terms of causal cerebral processes. For Jaspers, ununderstandability – the inabil-
ity to be understood empathically and meaningfully - was the primary feature 
of schizophrenia, fundamentally separating it from “less severe” disorders. 
Barrett (1996:222) argues that Jasper’s view of schizophrenia still has signifi-
cant influence on contemporary psychiatric thought, placing schizophrenia in 
the sphere of the ununderstandable – as that which cannot be attributed 
meaning. In this light, the schizophrenia diagnosis is the ultimate threat to Jo-
anna’s interpretations of Eliana’s stories as carrying metaphorical sense. If the 
stories are approached as delusions, they will become ununderstandable. Eli-
ana will have to be “corrected” and “reality-checked” - which implies that she 
has to be told that they are not true and that she is delusional. This would 
substantially complicate Joanna’s wish to “allow Eliana to have her stories”. 
If Joanna accedes to the categorization of Eliana as schizophrenic, she there-
fore cannot credibly maintain that Eliana’s stories have a meaning and are 
metaphorically relevant. In order for her to argue that Eliana’s stories are le-
gitimate and should not be dismissed, Joanna thus has to maintain that they 
are not delusional symptoms of schizophrenia. When Joanna disagrees with 





dermine Eliana’s account – and to not situate them within the domain of un-
understandable symptoms of schizophrenia.  
 
Together, the examples illustrate the difficult balance involved when the pro-
fessionals attempted to involve patients’ perspectives on their distress under 
the risk of a continuous undermining of these by psychiatric discourses. Lis-
tening to patients’ stories about distress without dismissing them involved 
hard labor, sometimes verging on the impossible. As noticed, the challenges 
encountered in these endeavors were arguably more fundamental than when 
it came to listening to individual needs concerning treatment. Although the 
professionals strived to remain attentive to the narratives of distress ex-
pressed by patients, the dominant psychiatric discourses which also informed 
their work often rendered the narratives of patients illegitimate. Involving pa-
tients’ perspectives on distress would therefore have to imply a questioning 
stance towards the very core of psychiatric work - the concept of mental ill-
ness and psychiatric knowledge about it. In relation to definitions and negoti-
ations of mental distress, therefore, the power balance in the patient-
professionals relationship inevitably became visible. Perhaps for this reason, 
many professionals in this study who were case managers or primary contact 
persons (and hence had the most frequent contact with patients) said they of-
ten refrained from “talking about illness”, focusing instead on topics from the 
patients everyday life.  
 
Inasmuch as patients’ perspectives could be involved in terms of their every-
day life, in terms of their unique needs and in terms of the professionals be-
ing “personal” – when it came to the patients’ experiences and definitions of 
distress, it seemed to become possible for professionals to involve patients’ 
perspectives only insofar as they supported the dominant discourses of the 
institution, at least to some extent. In such a context, one may rightfully ques-
tion whether initiatives of user involvement, especially those aimed at open-
ness towards patients’ perspectives on distress, may have any impact at all on 
the institution, if they do not reflect on and question the basic assumptions 
guarding psychiatric work.  
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Concluding remarks 
I began the article by asking why user involvement seemingly does not occur 
to the extent policy makers, patients and many professionals would like it to. 
Rather than providing definitive answers, the article has opened up for some 
ways to understand the day-to-day work of professionals and the possibilities 
and constraints for their practices of user involvement. In many respects the 
data presented here reproduce the critique of theoretical accounts on the 
constraints to user involvement referred to in the introduction. However, the 
article also goes beyond those critiques by demonstrating in fine detail the 
contradictory discourses inherent in psychiatric practice that the professionals 
were faced with when they tried to involve patients. As Rhodes (1995:6) has 
noted, mental health professionals are enmeshed “in a space in which they 
[are] both watchers and watched, disciplining and disciplined”. In this way the 
professionals, just as the patients, were made subjects of discipline and had to 
navigate in a contradictory field. On the one hand the professionals’ work 
was inscribed in ethical ideals about equality and partnership; on the other 
they occupied a position of authority with the mandate to use coercion. Main-
taining commitment to the discursive norms that defined their position while 
trying to listen to patients meant the daily work of the professionals required 
a complex balancing act. When they attempted to involve patients’ perspec-
tives, it appeared as if many tensions arose: the expectations of patients who 
had learned to position them as experts, the demands of management and 
administration which required efficiency and standardization, the discourses 
of expert knowledge - and particularly the construction of mental illness as an 
unquestionable psychiatric fact. Many professionals in this study said they 
were exhausted and experienced “care fatigue”. Such an experience becomes 
understandable in light of the contradictions that they faced every day.  
 
At the same time the professionals did not succumb passively to their entan-
glement in a system of contradictory demands. They found ways to resist, 
through strategy, subversion, reflexivity and renegotiation. Their resistance to 
the knowledge of psychiatry and the disciplining space of the settings was of-
ten subtle and oblique. It did not emerge as a unified opposition against a 
specific oppressive power - but rather developed as an angle to the expected 
definitions of situations (Rhodes, 1995: 174). It was in the context of such 
resistance - when the professionals balanced, renegotiated or questioned tak-
en for granted assumptions - that steps towards involving an individual pa-





volvement could occur in some contexts, especially when the professionals 
exercised “making exceptions” or did something different. This point is sup-
ported by studies on recovery from mental distress. For example in a study 
on users’ perspectives on the components of a helping and therapeutic rela-
tionship, Denhov and Topor note that the professionals who were perceived 
by the users as helpful: “have done something more than the user has learned 
to expect from the professional role. Often it is a case of minor, everyday ac-
tions where their importance lies in their ‘extraness’.” (2012: 422). In this 
study, the “extraness” emerged as subtle “recodifications of power relations” 
(Foucault, 1980:123) which made it possible for the professionals to, at least 
for an instance, open up to patients’ perspectives. This point is interesting in 
relation to the managerialist assumption that user involvement may be se-
cured if professionals just follow standards and legislature, which have user 
involvement inscribed in them. Such a “top-down” model of user involve-
ment assumes that if professionals just follow “standard procedures”, such as 
asking patients specific questions and showing them their treatment plan, pa-
tients and their perspectives may automatically become more involved in the 
treatment. In contrast to this idea, the analysis has indicated that it is precisely 
when “standard procedures”, norms and taken for granted assumptions are 
re-negotiated, however subtly, that some degree of user involvement may oc-
cur.  
 
Finally, the article indicates that if the democratic potential of user involve-
ment is to be exploited, then user involvement ought to be understood as a 
questioning stance or even resistance to the current power-knowledge struc-
tures. It appeared that such a stance was difficult to sustain for the profes-
sionals in the long run, particularly when it came to definitional rights over 
the patients’ mental distress. Generally the professionals’ attempts to involve 
patients’ perspectives often emerged as individualized solutions which for the 
most part did not result in any great changes in institutional norms and ra-
tionales. Many professionals practiced involvement by listening to individual 
patients, by focusing on topics from their everyday life, by striving to remain 
sensitive to their needs and by attempting to not dismiss patients’ experiences 
of their distress. However, these actions were not always considered relevant 
in the dominant discourse on treatment and professionalism, which often 
stressed expert knowledge and technical expertise as important. In such a 
context, the attempts to involve patients were sometimes not recognized or 
attributed much importance.  
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In the present context, it would appear that a more conservative or consum-
erist degree of user involvement may be implemented – entailing seeing indi-
vidual patients as people with wishes important for “getting the product 
right”. However, one may question the extent to which user involvement may 
reach a genuinely democratic degree, involving liberation, de-stigmatization 
and a change of definitional rights on mental distress. For such a degree of 
user involvement to take place, it would seem that mental health profession-
als would have to be supported much more in their endeavors to involve pa-
tients’ perspectives - by a system of psychiatric knowledge which allows for 






Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This thesis is about patient identities, discourses and user involvement in con-
temporary psychiatry. The thesis has examined how these are constituted and 
ascribed meaning within the institutional context of two mental health set-
tings. I have used an ethnographic research methodology to study the en-
counters between patients and professionals, and how meaning is construct-
ed, produced and reconstructed in meetings between them. I have further 
linked these constructions to their social context, the organization, the 
knowledge and the practices of contemporary psychiatry. In this section I will 
compile the results of the articles and discuss them together, as well as their 
implications for clinical practice and research. However, before I move on to 
a discussion of the thesis’ main empirical results, I will briefly consider the 
contribution of the theoretical and methodological approach I have applied. 
From language and values to discourses, norms, 
positions and subjectivity 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine psychiatric institutions, their 
practices and assumptions, how they define what it is to be a “patient” and a 
“professional”, and how they define what it means to experience mental dis-
tress. The original description formulated in the PhD announcement stated 
that the PhD project should: “shed light on and analyze the interaction be-
tween language, values and user involvement in a psychiatric context”. It stat-
ed the study should focus on: 
 “…how patients are talked about, to and with in the mental health services” 
and “what does this mean for involvement in practice, including the possibil-
ity to meet the patient as a person with resources and the potential to recov-
er”? [my translation] (Psykiatrien Region Sjælland og Forskerskolen i Livslang 
Læring, 2010) 
 
The problems I have addressed in this thesis were formulated from within a 
Foucauldian framework, since this perspective offered insights into language 
as not only reflecting the world, but as actively creating persuasive versions of 
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it. This perspective has made it possible to situate the communication (“how 
it is talked about, to, and with patients”) within a broader institutional and 
cultural framework. It has helped us explore how the day-to-day language in 
psychiatric practice is never detached from its social contexts, but deeply in-
grained in them. The perspective has invited us to see how the interactions 
between professionals and patients always draw on broader discourses – dis-
courses about illness and health, care and empathy, normality and deviance, 
rationality and irrationality, expert knowledge and subjugated knowledges - in 
the production of subjectivity and personhood. In this way the perspective 
has allowed us to de-individualize the notion of “values” formulated in the 
original study description - and to demonstrate instead how these emerge as 
discursive norms, intimately tied to a specific institutional and cultural con-
text. 
 
Foucault’s theories are developed from a history of ideas approach which an-
alyzes historical documents, rather than dealing directly with the dynamic 
processes of everyday life and social interaction. There is a risk that an uncrit-
ical use of Foucauldian perspectives may reduce all social processes to large, 
unspecified patterns of domination (Barrett, 1996:104). I have strived to 
avoid this danger by incorporating discursive psychological theory - and thus 
by studying individuals as reflexive subjects who also resist dominant dis-
courses and allow for the emergence of alternative subject positions. With a 
focus on subtle processes of positioning between patients and professionals, 
it has been possible to move closer to them as experiencing persons, not just 
as pawns in an abstract system of domination. This “double vision” 
(Haraway, 1988:589) - encompassing both broader discourses and particular 
“local” reactions to them - has made it possible to explore how power oper-
ates unnoticeably in taken for granted assumptions; but also how the very 
same taken for granted assumptions are also questioned and reflected upon in 
practice.  
 
These points could further be specified because the study is based on an eth-
nographic methodology, which has allowed us to explore the assumptions 
and systems of thought drawn on in everyday life. With a focus on everyday 
interactions and participant observation, it has been possible to explore the 
inconspicuous aspects of psychiatric practice. Had I only conducted inter-
views we would have been able to explore how professionals and patients talk 
about their mutual actions and relationships, but not how they actually prac-





been the sole method of data production, we might have missed the im-
portant points that some of the discourses that patients may draw on in other 
contexts become silenced in interactions with professionals - and that some 
of the professionals’ efforts to involve patients cannot always be carried out 
in practice. The approach has thus allowed us to take into account that pa-
tients and professionals have experiences which are more far-reaching than 
only emergent in the observed situations.  
 
We will now turn to the empirical conclusions of the thesis. Throughout the 
next section I will relate the conclusions to the existing body of research on 
psychiatric patients, mental health professionals and user involvement, which 
was reviewed in Chapter 2. This is done in order to link the results to other 
studies and to discuss this study’s contribution to the existing research.  
Patient identities, illness discourses, and user in-
volvement 
The research question of the thesis asked: How are identities as psychiatric 
patients constituted discursively in the contemporary mental health services? 
What are the implications for patients and for involving their perspectives in 
the treatment?  
 
The thesis has approached the questions in three articles written from differ-
ent angles: by analyzing processes of researcher positioning; by analyzing dis-
courses on mental illness and their implications for patients; and, finally, by 
analyzing practices of user involvement among psychiatric professionals. Al-
together, the thesis points towards the presence of specific discursive norms 
with implications for how patients could act in order to be perceived as per-
sons with views which should be involved in the treatment. In contrast to the 
official rules of the settings which were clearly written down, the norms 
worked as implicit assumptions, which were rarely made explicit. Further-
more, they were not clear-cut and straightforward, but functioned in different 
ways in different contexts. Being recognized as legitimate thus relied on the 
patients performing a complex balancing act, as there was not one straight-
forward answer as to how to they should act or position themselves as pa-
tients. Just as the discourses provided norms that shaped how patients and 
professionals could be defined, they also provided boundaries for how the 
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researcher could be understood during the fieldwork. As we saw in the first 
article, no matter how hard I tried to negotiate different identity-claims, the 
pre-existing discourses on illness and sanity and on patients and professionals 
became a prism through which the researcher’s identity was appraised. Simi-
larly, it was difficult for the researcher to avoid reproducing some of the ob-
jectifying practices in the institution, by asking questions to the patients and 
occupying a position as someone whose role was to examine other people. 
The point that my own researcher positions became inextricably entangled in 
the discourses indicates that they were broad and connected to institutional 
processes, rather than merely manifestations of idiosyncratic situations or in-
dividual characteristics.  
 
The discursive norms seemed to be particularly complex in relation to as-
sumptions about the patients’ distress. We saw how three discourses on men-
tal distress foregrounded particular ways of being ill, rendering inauthentic or 
problematic other expressions of mental distress. The instability discourse con-
structed the patients’ distress as due to an inherent instability, and portrayed 
the patients as fragile containers for the instability. It asked of patients and 
professionals to think of patients as passive objects fundamentally controlled 
by an unstable “core” - inclined to erupt at any time. It invited patients to 
self-monitor, continuously searching for signs of mental pathology. A second 
way of constructing mental distress was identified as the discourse of “really ill”. 
It constructed patients as consisting of a “core” and a “façade” and thus it 
added a layer of volition and intentionality to the patient, opening up for the 
possibility of patients “simulating” the illness. It produced a sharp contrast 
between illness that was “real”, and illness that was “not real” or “less real”; 
requiring from patients that they learn to visualize their distress in a recog-
nizable way to be allowed to continuously receive care. The third identified 
way of thinking and talking about patients was defined as the “lack of insight” 
discourse. It constructed psychiatric knowledge about patients’ distress as an 
unquestionable truth, and invited patients into a position from which they 
should acknowledge the inadequacy of their own knowledge. The “lack of 
insight” discourse constructed narratives on mental distress which diverged 
from psychiatric as less legitimate and taught patients to silence or transform 
such narratives if they wished to have a say in their treatment.  
 
The analyses thus indicate that patients were required to develop a finely-
tuned sense for the discourses and to make strategic considerations as to how 





the studies discussed in the literature review (e.g. Johansson, 2010; Topor & 
Di Girolamo, 2010), which similarly showed that psychiatric patients develop 
conscious, even rational strategies to navigate in the maze of the mental 
health services. However, while Topor & Di Girolamo (2010) related this 
point to patients’ adjustments to individual professionals, and Johansson 
(2010) related it to patients’ own identity work in order to become “authen-
tic” subjects, this study has shown that the strategies may also be understood 
as ways for patients to learn to comply with discursive norms in order to have 
a say and be involved in their treatment. Patients who insisted on different 
expressions of distress than what was institutionally recognizable were often 
rendered problematic or perceived as un-cooperative. Furthermore, some 
studies in the review found that for many users of psychiatry, the position of 
“psychiatric patient” and the idea of “mental illness” is endowed with am-
bivalence (e.g. Tucker, 2009). This study has expanded our understanding of 
the ambivalence by pointing to the complex ways in which the concept of 
mental illness is negotiated in the mental health services – and the contradic-
tory and ambivalent patient positions they produce. For instance, for patients 
like Anna, the illness discourses became both a mode of explanation and a 
mode of self-pathologization - and for patients like Susanna and Hanna, their 
contact to the psychiatric services simultaneously provided legitimacy and a 
feeling of distrustful judgment. 
 
Regarding the position of professionals, the results of this thesis are con-
sistent with the reviewed studies that show that mental health professionals 
are subject to a large workload and time pressure, and that their work is more 
about managing flux and time pressure than stability (e.g. Michelle Cleary, 
2004; Donnison et al., 2009; Hummelvoll & Severinsson, 2001). However, 
while some of these studies emphasize that time pressures create tensions be-
tween the ideal and practice, this thesis has shown that the fundamental ten-
sions and contradictions in mental health professionals’ practices need rather 
to be understood in terms of deeply ingrained historical and institutional dis-
courses. These will likely not recede (although their acutely stressful impact 
on psychiatric professionals might) even if workload is decreased. The thesis 
has indicated that the professionals, just like the patients had to navigate in a 
constant contradictory field. The position of mental health professionals was 
defined from a range of different expectations and demands: they were ex-
pected to act like experts, who should use their professional judgments to 
spot psychopathology and to know what was best for the patient; they had to 
adapt to the demands of an extensive standardization of their practice; they 
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had to think in terms of efficiency and technical solutions; they had the man-
date to use coercion; at the same time their practice was inscribed in ethical 
ideals about equality, partnership and listening to patients.  
 
The contradictory quality of these expectations may have roots in the funda-
mental tension discussed in the chapter on the history of psychiatry (Chapter 
3), namely that psychiatry has traditionally rested on two contradictory forces: 
a moral discourse which constructs patients as experiencing subjects and a 
technical discourse which constructs patients as objects. The “patient as ob-
ject” construction asks of the professionals to be unquestionable experts, 
who should expose patients to various technical treatments (and in recent 
times to finish the treatment quickly and efficiently). The “patient as subject” 
discourse treats the patient as a person with human needs, who should be lis-
tened to and cared for. In this way, historical processes seem to shape and 
inform contemporary psychiatric practice. The daily work of professionals 
therefore required walking a tight-rope: remaining committed to a position of 
technical expertise while attempting to listen to patients.  
 
This point is interesting in relation to the tendency we saw in studies to con-
sider a great obstacle for involvement to be professionals' negative attitude 
towards patients' capabilities to being involved (e.g. Anthony & Crawford, 
2000; Petersen et al., 2012; Summers, 2003). This study has complicated this 
picture substantially. Firstly, the analyses have shown that ideas about psychi-
atric patients “lacking capability” to be meaningfully involved do not merely 
emerge as individual professionals’ reflexivity, but are tied to the historical 
and institutional context with specific preconceptions about mental illness 
and the identities of psychiatric patients. Secondly, we have seen that even 
when professionals do strive to involve patients and do believe that they can 
be involved (and most professionals indeed say they do), the very same dis-
cursive constructions often work as constraints and contradictions. In such a 
context, when it became possible for a professional to take the perspective of 
a patient seriously, most often this could only emerge as an individualized so-
lution, relying on an exercise in “making exceptions”. 
 
However, when patients positioned the sources of their distress within non-
psychiatric systems of belief, the extent to which their ideas could be listened 
to and engaged with seriously seemed to be limited. In this way, it appeared 
as if the very definitions of mental illness sometimes provided the boundaries 





psychiatric understandings of mental distress as the patient “lacking insight”, 
these understandings often had to be dismissed. On the one hand, then, the 
professionals were expected to listen and take the perspectives of the patients 
seriously, on the other they were sometimes expected to reject these as ex-
pressions of underlying pathology.  
 
Even if professionals attempted to involve the patients’ understandings of 
their distress, this was made complicated by the fact that these had often been 
molded and transformed in order to suit the expectations and definitions of 
the institution. This unsettles the notion of a static “patient perspective” 
(which much research and policy of involvement is built on), because the pa-
tients “perspectives” on their distress were often shaped and elaborated in 
accordance with the dominant discourses in mental health care.  
 
Estroff’s (1985) study on psychiatric clients in an American community (cf. 
Chapter 2) demonstrated that often what is the most detrimental to psychiat-
ric patients is not the “symptoms” or their distress per se, but the stigmatiza-
tion and the processes of self-identification with the illness that they experi-
ence. In other words, what appears to define whether a person is able to 
move towards recovery is not necessarily the gravity of his or her initial dis-
tress, but the reactions towards them and the definitions of them in society 
and in the mental health services. Therefore, the ways the mental health ser-
vices define mental distress and approach the patients’ problems is not with-
out consequences. Whereas most patients of this study needed little convinc-
ing that their distress was caused by a mental illness, and some certainly al-
ready had made such claims prior to their entry to the mental health services, 
others emphatically resisted this idea. With patients such as Frederik, Johan, 
Noel and Eliana, it seems that it would only be possible to engage seriously 
with their perspectives if a quest for defining “absolute truths” about their 
distress is abandoned - and if more diverse and pluralistic definitions of emo-
tional distress are embraced. If the right to define patients’ distress lies une-
quivocally within the domain of the professionals, the perspectives of patients 
who draw on other systems of knowledge will have to be excluded. When 
this happens, it is not only the alternative understanding that is dismissed, but 
the identity of the person who represents them. As Arthur Frank (1995) has 
noted:  
“People whose reality is denied can remain recipients of treatments and ser-
vices, but they cannot be participants in empathic relations of care” (Frank, 
1995: 109).  
 206 
 
In this way, it seemed that the idea of involving patients and their perspec-
tives is greatly restrained by the relatively rigid norms on mental distress, pa-
tienthood and truth in the institutions – norms that the patients were ex-
pected to, at least to some extent, make their own. This calls into question the 
extent to which patients could actually influence their treatment, since gaining 
such influence in the first place meant that they often had to actively adopt 
the prevailing assumptions of the institution, and sometimes to dismiss their 
own, in order to be heard at all. In such a context, perhaps a more consumer-
ist or conservative degree of user involvement may take place - relying on 
professionals’ striving to make minor adjustments to attempt to accommo-
date a patient’s individual wishes regarding treatment. However, it appears 
less likely that the democratic and radical potential of user involvement can 
be exploited - entailing patients participating and instigating lasting and fun-
damental changes at all levels of the organization.  
User involvement – moving beyond the con-
straints 
Broadly speaking, the results of the thesis question the extent to which initia-
tives aimed at user involvement will have a lasting impact on psychiatric prac-
tice, if they do not take into account the effects of psychiatric knowledge. We 
have seen how definitions of mental illness are negotiated between people in 
the discursive climate of the mental health services. Thus, the idea that mental 
health services operate with objective descriptions of patients’ distress, pre-
sumed to exist independently of contexts, power and uncritically taken for 
granted assumptions, should be revisited. Similarly, it appears essential that 
any wish to implement user involvement should take into consideration that 
mental health centers are institutions in which psychiatric knowledge devel-
ops into complex local constructions which define the types of patient identi-
ties that may become legitimate and those that may not. As the thesis has 
shown, becoming a psychiatric patient is a very complex and demanding en-
deavor. It is about developing a finely-tuned sense for the assumptions, 
norms and expectations which are present in the institution, to read these 
correctly and to position oneself in accordance with them. The analyses thus 
indicate that the managerialist ideal to think of psychiatric patients as free and 
equal consumers who can choose freely on a market of mental health care is 






However, far from being oblivious to the wishes of patients, the analyses 
show that many professionals strive to remain open to what patients say, but 
that this is made complex by the relatively strong norms in the institution. 
One may thus say that to seriously engage in user involvement, the profes-
sionals need to be supported in their endeavors to involve patients’ perspec-
tives by a psychiatric system which does not only rely on unquestionable psy-
chiatric truths. Allowing for the democratic potential in user involvement to 
unfold would mean acknowledging that the stories told by powerful institu-
tional discourses are but one possible narrative. This would imply opening up 
and engaging seriously with the multiplicity and diversity of patients’ perspec-
tives, also when these diverge from traditional psychiatric understandings.  
 
Unfortunately, rather than developing in the direction of embracing multiplic-
ity and diversity, the contemporary trend in the mental health services is to 
move towards a greater standardization and streamlining of services. Such a 
movement may further narrow the scope of possibilities for negotiation for 
both patients and professionals. For patients, the standards become tangible 
materializations of professional definitions, which risk further undermining 
alternative narratives. When the patients’ diagnosis fully determines the form, 
content and length of treatment, as is the case with the increasing develop-
ment of “treatment packages” (cf. Chapter 1), the space for accepting indi-
vidual patients’ understandings is further narrowed. For professionals, the stand-
ards and benchmarking risk undermining their relative autonomy and thus 
minimizing their window of opportunities for practicing user involvement. 
The increased standardization is in itself difficult to reconcile with the wish to 
create individual solutions based on the patients’ wishes. Additionally, the 
standards are sometimes outright contradictory, as in the examples when pa-
tients wish to stay hospitalized, and the standards demand efficiency and 
quick discharges. In such instances the professionals have to choose between 
listening to patients and complying with an external demand about the short-
est possible hospitalization (Holen, 2011). Additionally, as we have seen, 
standardization may make the professionals wary of making their own profes-
sional decisions - which they still have to do, because mental health practice 
can never actually be fully standardized (ibid.).  
 
In this way, concerns may be raised as to whether the current consumerist 
model of user involvement will just result in a “box-ticking” exercise 
(Beresford, 2002:102) with an influence limited to tokenism. If the impact of 
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initiatives aimed at promoting user involvement is to be more than tokenistic, 
it appears crucial that they involve a critical reflection on how psychiatric 
knowledge and practice are organized. It seems essential that mental health 
professionals and the management give consideration to the theories, philos-
ophies and approaches that underpin the current models they are working 
within. What could be addressed are disputable concepts such as “lack of in-
sight”, which by implication may dismiss any other explanation than the one 
put forward by professionals. Similarly, the ideal to discharge patients quickly 
and efficiently may conflict with the wish to listen to them and allow them to 
narrate lengthy stories on their experiences.  
 
Today, there are a number of new ways to think of mental health and distress, 
the work of mental health professionals and user involvement, which em-
brace more diverse and multiple definitions. A notable example is the work of 
the Hearing Voices Network, which has developed many ideas and practical 
guidelines on how to approach and understand voice-hearing in a less reduc-
tionist way (cf. chapter 1) - and also provides training for mental health pro-
fessionals. Other examples are the critical empirical and theoretical psychiatric 
research which I have drawn on in this thesis (e.g. Bracken & Thomas, 2001; 
Cromby et al., 2013; D. B. Double, 2006; Knight, 2009; Rapley et al., 2011; 
Read, Mosher, Bentall, & (Ed.), 2005). This literature points to the poor sci-
entific validity and reliability of psychiatric categories such as schizophrenia, 
and encourages psychiatry to develop new ways to approach patients’ distress 
without dismissing their views and understandings. Some accounts suggest 
abandoning the current illness categories such as diagnoses, instead making 
patients’ complaints the base of psychiatry (Bentall, 2003: 141). From this per-
spective, patients’ complaints are not seen as symptoms of an underlying ill-
ness, but instead as a center of attention in their own right. Yet other ac-
counts encourage psychiatry to move away from a direct realist epistemology 
that focuses on the veracity of patients’ alternative stories of distress - as this 
may result in an invalidation of them. Instead they encourage psychiatry to 
take a more constructionist stand, acknowledging that the stories have im-
portant metaphorical meanings (Harper, 2004; Hornstein, 2009b). From this 
perspective engaging seriously with patients’ alternative views on distress does 
not necessarily imply that the clinician accepts at face value stories that may 
seem bizarre or in the domain of the ununderstandable. Such an interpretation 
would again rely on an objectivist notion of truth, substituting one truth with 





content and context of the stories, especially their historical and biographical 
meaning (Harper, 2004).  
  
Finally, it appears essential to involve patients more in the treatment, not only 
by developing programs for peer-support (which is an aspiring practice in 
Denmark, (cf. Hansson, in prep)), but also by inviting the people who are us-
ing mental health services to actively develop models for user involvement. 
This may bring opportunities to advance new approaches and perspectives on 
user involvement that are genuinely emancipatory for the people who use 
mental health services (Stickley, 2006). If this does not happen, newer initia-
tives aimed at involving patients may run the risk of reproducing old patterns. 
It is for instance noteworthy that one of the settings studied in this thesis 
based the treatment on Open Dialogue, which in principle is built on the idea 
of polyphony, multiple definitions of distress and a democratic approach to 
involvement. As we saw in chapter five, however, it appeared that the poten-
tially more radical elements of Open Dialogue had been downplayed in the 
work of the unit, as they could not be meaningfully implemented in the con-
text. It would seem that being situated in a psychiatric system where polyph-
ony becomes narrowed and standardized makes it difficult to carry the more 
far-reaching implications of Open Dialogue into practice.  
 
The very term “user involvement” is built on an understanding of the user 
being involved into something which is already almost a ready product 
(Bengtsson, 1997). From the very beginning, then, the term appears some-
what ambiguous and seems to leave little space for changes and reforms with 
a lasting impact. Perhaps User-led Psychiatry, as the project in Region Zea-
land is named, is a more promising terminology for democratization on more 
levels of the organization – also in planning and policy-making. However, it 
has been pointed out that insofar as patients are allowed access to planning 
and development of mental health services, their role is often one of “con-
sultants” (Pilgrim & Waldron, 1998). Allowing for a widening of the possibili-
ties of user involvement would likely mean opening up for a greater influence 
of patients on policy than consultancy. This may imply what Swartz 
(2005:521) has called “unlearning clinical privilege” by allowing patients not 
only to be involved and to make choices, but to play an active part in re-
defining and re-structuring the organization of treatment. In this way, per-
haps more multiple and diverse definitions of patienthood, the work of pro-
fessionals and mental distress would become more readily available for both 
patients and professionals.  
 210 
Methodological reflections and implications for 
research 
Quality, validity and transparency 
Appraising validity and quality in qualitative research is complex. While some 
qualitative researchers take a direct realist approach, applying criteria such as 
inter-rater reliability measures in a similar way to quantitative research 
(McGrath, 2011), such measures are built on an a correspondence theory of 
an objective, universal truth which is incompatible with a postmodern re-
search perspective (Kvale, 1995).  
 
If the analysis can never create a one-to-one correspondence with “reality”, 
how then may the validity and quality of a study be appraised? Malterud 
(2001) has suggested three criteria for assessing the quality of qualitative re-
search in the field of medicine: relevance, validity and reflexivity - and a set of 
sub-criteria, such as transferability, transparency about the theoretical per-
spective and a systematic procedure. An analogous set of criteria has been 
proposed by Elliot, Fischer & Rennie (1999), who stress as guidelines for as-
sessing quality: disclosure of perspectives and details about the sample, 
grounding interpretations in examples and providing credibility checks, as 
well as coherence in presentation and interpretative framework.  
 
What these criteria share is firstly an emphasis on transparency as a general cri-
terion for quality, meaning the researcher being explicit and rigorous in de-
scribing her methods and perspectives. I have made it a priority to present 
and argue for my theoretical and methodological perspectives extensively in 
the theory and methodology sections of the thesis, as well as to situate these 
in relation to other theoretical and methodological traditions. I have also 
strived to present rich data extracts to ground my interpretations in the data – 
and I have searched for counter-examples throughout the text. An important 
part of presenting a transparent account may be argued to be reflexivity, in-
volving a discussion of the subjectivity and effects of the researcher 
(Malterud, 2001). My situated perspective, inspired by Haraway (1988) has 
encouraged me to be committed to reflexivity and to acknowledge that the 
perspective of the researcher is always partial and situated. It has been crucial 
to account for the effects of the positioned researcher throughout the thesis 






The second general criterion shared by the two sets of standards is a com-
mitment to coherence and a location of the interpretation both in the data and 
in the theoretical literature. Kvale (1995) writes of validity in postmodern re-
search as a quality of craftsmanship - conceptualizing validity as involving 
“defensible knowledge claims” (Kvale, 1995: 26) based on checking, ques-
tioning and theoretically interpreting the findings. Throughout the analysis I 
have cross-checked and questioned my assumptions and continuously 
grounded these in the theoretical and empirical literature. In this way I have 
strived to show how my interpretations have not just arisen from my own as-
sumptions, but how these have emerged and developed in constant dialogue 
with theory and studies on related topics. As we have seen, I have also ap-
proached my data from different angles (researcher, patient, professional) 
with an awareness of the partiality and situatedness of all knowledge.    
 
Finally, Kvale (1995) has made a case for pragmatic validity, suggesting that 
the validity of qualitative research should partly be judged in terms of its use-
fulness and application. In this sense, the “truthfulness” of a qualitative study 
is also about contributing fruitfully to public discussions about values, goals 
and practices. A valid study is thus a study which produces results that are 
meaningful for the people it concerns and one that may instigate social 
change. Validity becomes as much a moral and political issue as an epistemo-
logical reflection. My aim with this study has not been to claim that I present 
a total picture of language in psychiatry or that I “discover how psychiatry re-
ally is”. Instead, my aim has been to develop an account of the mental health 
services and the subjects within it from different perspectives, which hopeful-
ly opens up for reflexivity and potentially fruitful discussions. To make the 
study meaningful for the people it concerns it has been important to ap-
proach the research question from different angles and to maintain solidarity 
with the participants in the study and the difficulties they were facing. Addi-
tionally, the study has been politically charged from the onset and at risk of 
fuelling a climate of competition between different districts. To avoid any 
such connotations, I have chosen to conduct the fieldwork in two psychiatric 
settings with different structures and functions, and I have strived to analyze 
commonalities which may be found across the settings. Additionally, it has 
been crucial to constantly reflect on the possible consequences of the study 
and the implications of my political, moral and theoretical commitment. I be-
lieve that the thesis has succeeded in the endeavor to open up for a discus-
sion of the concept of user involvement and for reflections on how psychiat-
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ric knowledge is organized. I have strived to avoid individualizing user in-
volvement by showing how user involvement is constrained by discourses 
that the individual cannot just disregard. In the end, however, the pragmatic 
validity of the study and of my theoretical and political framework remains 
yet to be appraised.   
Methodological reflections and critique 
 
I have studied the settings in a specific time and place. During the fieldwork, 
each setting had either recently undergone, or was in the process of undergo-
ing administrative reorganization or renaming. Some professionals told me 
that this was an unusually hectic and unsettling time for their work. At the 
ward, for instance, many professionals felt unequipped to handle the new 
constraints associated with their transformation from an open to a closed unit 
(e.g. patients who were more acutely distressed and an increased mandate of 
authority over them). It is possible, even likely, that some of my points in the 
analyses reflect this situation. This may perhaps make it more complicated to 
judge about the transferability of this study to other psychiatric settings. Even 
so, it appears that a state of change and unsettlement may be the rule, rather 
than the exception in Danish mental health services. Other mental health 
ethnographies in Denmark, such as Johansen (2005) and Søndergaard (2009) 
have similarly noted that as they were writing up their thesis, the settings they 
were studying were undergoing administrative and structural changes. This is 
likely not coincidental; it would appear as if the authorities cannot settle for 
longer on any one model of services, and hence continually keep restructur-
ing the psychiatric system. The scene I am presenting in this thesis therefore 
inevitably captures an instant, a specific moment in a specific context within 
the mental health services.  
 
I have attempted to portray dilemmas and contradictions in psychiatric prac-
tice throughout the analyses. However, it may be discussed whether in my 
striving to explore broad patterns which were present in both institutions I 
have sometimes overlooked specific important local differences between the 
settings. This is a point which may be raised in relation to any study which 
focuses on similarities across different contexts, however in this particular 
study it is also related to questions regarding ethics and anonymity. Because 
the study’s pragmatic validity has been important, and because the study has 





between the settings. This would perhaps have involved the danger of some 
readers interpreting the thesis in terms of one of the settings “being better” at 
involving patients than the other. Such an interpretation would have been 
counterproductive for the aim of the thesis, which has rather strived to open 
up for a reflection of the effects of psychiatric knowledge and practice in 
general. Nonetheless, it is possible that a greater sensitivity to local context 
and difference between settings would have contributed with additional fruit-
ful insights.  
 
As noted in chapter one, part of the reason for why the social sciences and 
psychiatry drifted apart as disciplines was the developments towards social 
constructionism in sociology. My choice of theory, which draws on construc-
tionist approaches, can therefore be discussed. Taking such a stance inevita-
bly implies that the study becomes critical, for some readers even perhaps 
daring or radical, in that it attempts to unearth concepts and assumptions tak-
en for granted. There is a danger that the study becomes too distant and pro-
duces defensive responses among the people it concerns. This has been a 
source of continuous reflection and has perhaps complicated my own balanc-
ing act among the institutions involved in the study (cf. Chapter 1). Addition-
ally, although I have incorporated psychological theories on how discourses 
are applied and experienced, there is a limitation in the theoretical perspective 
which remains difficult to overcome. On the one hand it presents anti-
essentialist understandings which regard the person as constituted by dis-
courses, on the other I have discussed for instance the “perspectives” of pa-
tients - thereby assuming that people do have experiences, wishes and as-
sumptions that are not only emergent in the interaction. In this way, my anal-
yses are built on tensions between the distributed and personal, the private 
and public and between agency and structure, which to some extent remain 
theoretically unresolved. This is related to a more fundamental critique that 
may be raised in relation to discursive theories in general, in that they face a 
challenge when trying to account for the sources of personal agency and re-
sistance. Because my aim in this thesis has been to focus on developing an 
understanding for psychiatric practice and the positioning of patients, it has 
not been my purpose to get to the bottom of this debate.  
 
A final critical reflection may be raised regarding my choice to disseminate 
the analysis in the form of articles. Such a format inevitably demands from 
the researcher that she condenses the text and makes the discussion precise 
and to-the-point. It may therefore be discussed whether my choice to write 
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the analysis in the form of articles has resulted in some nuances and “rich-
nesses” in the data receding in favor of more compact descriptions. Indeed, 
in writing the articles, I have certainly made selections and deselections, often 
concentrating on one specific extract as illustrative among many possible. 
Thus, there are clearly many parts of the data, examples and cases that I have 
not pursued. Rather than aiming at providing a “total picture” of the “cul-
tures” of the settings, I have used the data to explore specific questions that 
have been related to my overall research interests. In this sense perhaps preci-
sion and specificity have at times been given more attention than lengthy de-
scriptions of the empirical material. At the same time, the analytical and in-
terpretative process in a qualitative study inevitably implies reducing complex-
ities and selecting specific cases while excluding others – and here the article 
format is no different than the monograph. To accommodate this, I have 
strived for a great degree of transparency by making my selections and the 
development of analytical categories explicit for the reader (cf. Chapter 5). 
Although I acknowledge that my analyses perhaps do not encompass the 
lengthy descriptions of data that a monograph sometimes can provide, I have 
also found that the format of articles has entailed strengths for the analytical 
process. In writing the articles and working with the data at different stages it 
has been possible for me to develop multiple perspectives and readings of the 
same data. This has been helpful in presenting a nuanced and differentiated 
account. Additionally, the format of articles asks from the author to remain 
focused and constantly aware of the overall argument that is being discussed 
and the relevance of each part of the text. This has helped maintain coher-
ence, preciseness and specificity.   
Implications for future research 
 
In the analyses I have focused specifically on fundamental points of tensions 
between different systems of knowledge in patient-professional meetings. A 
type of conflict which I have not addressed in any great detail is the tensions 
between different professional groups in the interdisciplinary team. The read-
er may therefore be under the impression that the co-operation between team 
members was always harmonious and smooth. This was certainly not the 
case. There were many tensions and sometimes outright conflicts between 
team members with different professional backgrounds. However, since my 
particular focus in this study has been on meetings between patients and pro-





groups has not been given priority. And yet, it is likely that the inter-
professional relationships in a team have an impact on how patients are de-
fined. A point for further inquiry could therefore be to look more closely at 
the processes of positioning among multi-disciplinary professionals and relate 
this to the study of patient identities and user involvement.  
 
The review showed that most studies on mental health approached psychiat-
ric practices from the perspective of either patients or professionals, where 
the group which was not centered tended to feature more vaguely. To devel-
op a fuller picture on psychiatric practice and the effects of psychiatric 
knowledge, in this study it has been important to approach the field from dif-
ferent angles and to center different groups. Furthermore there has been a 
tendency in research to approach the practices of mental health professionals 
either largely uncritically or, on the contrary, to see them solely as instruments 
of power. Especially in relation to mental health professionals, it seems im-
portant to understand their practice as one of managing multiple contradic-
tions that have emerged as a result of historical and institutional processes. 
The study thus invites future research to look at psychiatric practice from a 
situated, theoretical angle and to take account of all subjects in the field as re-
flective and purposeful agents.  
 
The study also has implications for qualitative research methodology more 
generally. The participatory aspect in participant observation is often dis-
cussed as a matter of how much participation the researcher engages in rather 
than how she engages in the field. Many researchers limit their discussions to 
placing themselves somewhere on the classic continuum of Spradley (1980) 
ranging from non-participation to complete participation. The methodologi-
cal approach in the thesis (esp. Article 1) encourages qualitative researchers to 
not only discuss their degrees of participation, but also to elaborate on how 
they participate in the field. Additionally, the thesis has demonstrated that 
processes of researcher positioning may not only be understood as methodo-
logical reflections, but may be analyzed as data in their own right. There may 
be a tendency in qualitative research to regard reflections on researcher posi-
tioning as an isolated topic, which solely serves the function of being trans-
parent about methods. This thesis instead invites qualitative researchers to 
attempt to transcend the division between methods and research outcomes - 
and to attend to the dilemmas during fieldwork as an index to the social 
world of participants.   
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A study of this type additionally demands further research of similar process-
es to be made. In this regard it would be especially interesting to develop 
more sensitivity to local contexts and e.g. explore the implications of architec-
ture, materiality, and the difference between outpatient clinics and inpatient 
units for the production of psychiatric knowledge and processes of position-
ing. Similarly, in this study I have focused on the institution of psychiatry and 
the people within it. I have thus not followed patients into other contexts of 
their life or to meetings with other welfare institutions. And yet it is plausible 
that these play a part in how patients may position themselves in relation to 
the mental health services. A point for further inquiry could therefore be to 
extend the research area to also explore other parts of life, the importance of 
different settings and materiality, and to analyze how these interplay with the 
possible positions that become available in the mental health services.   
 
It is also likely that many of the social processes I have studied are found in 
other modern institutions that deal with people. The interpretative work of 
professionals to work on the identity of users, to reframe their lived experi-
ences in terms of institutional expectations, as well as initiatives of resistance 
against these practices, are surely not unique to psychiatric practice. During 
this PhD-project I have co-operated closely with Ditte Dalum Christoffersen, 
a PhD-candidate who studies social processes and learning in Danish schools 
(Dalum Christoffersen, in prep). The similarities in our observations – in a 
primary school setting and in the mental health services respectively - have 
sometimes been remarkable. Similarly, Mari Holen’s study (2011) on constitu-
tions of patients in general hospitals contains many points of correspondence 
with this study, and my co-operation with her, also involving an article in this 
thesis, has been rewarding.  
 
Finally, the study has implications for psychiatric research broadly defined. 
Psychiatric research is often based on an implicit assumption that categories 
of mental illness are atheoretical, ahistorical and objective descriptions of the 
reality of these people. Along with many other studies from a critical psychia-
try perspective, the results of this study encourage psychiatric researchers to 
reflect on the ideological and historical assumptions that these categorizations 
are based on – and the effects they have. Similarly, the study has indicated 
that how mental distress is ascribed meaning is very much dependent on the 
social context and how an individual patient learns to navigate in the land-





flect on how different categories and diagnoses emerge and what their impli-
cations may be for the people they concern.  
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Abstract 
The thesis “’Listening to Patients’: A Study on Illness Discourses, Patient 
Identities, and User Involvement in Contemporary Psychiatric Practice” is an 
investigation of patient identities, psychiatric knowledge and the idea of user 
involvement in mental health institutions. User involvement, or the initiative 
to involve patients and their perspectives more actively in psychiatric care, 
has become a major political aim in recent decades. With an inspiration from 
poststructuralism, the thesis regards the practices of the mental health ser-
vices as a type of identity work with patients. The thesis thus approaches the 
question of user involvement by asking: How are identities as psychiatric pa-
tients constituted discursively in the contemporary mental health services? 
What are the implications for involving patients’ perspectives in the treat-
ment?  
 
The thesis employs an ethnographic research methodology to study the en-
counter between patients and professionals - and how meaning is construct-
ed, produced and reconstructed in the meetings. The methods involve partic-
ipant observation lasting three months in two psychiatric institutions in 
Denmark: an outpatient clinic and a closed inpatient ward, as well as individ-
ual interviews with 13 patients and 11 interdisciplinary professionals. Theo-
retically the study is informed by Foucauldian perspectives on discourses, 
norms and knowledge - as well as psychological discourse theory, particularly 
positioning theory.  
 
The thesis begins by introducing the study and some of the controversies and 
debates that surround contemporary psychiatry. Chapter 2 reviews excerpts of 
the existing, primarily qualitative, research on psychiatric patients, profession-
als’ practices and user involvement and discusses the possible contributions 
of this study. Chapter 3 briefly presents psychiatry from a historical and con-
temporary history of ideas perspective and discusses the functions and struc-
ture of the modern Danish mental health services. The next chapter, chapter 4, 
discusses the theoretical and methodological perspectives that guide the the-
sis: the viewpoint of situated knowledges, Foucauldian perspectives on lan-





In chapter 5, information about the study’s design, its methods and the con-
crete settings of the fieldwork are presented, as well as reflections on research 
ethics and the analytical procedure. The results of the study are disseminated 
in three articles, which together form the thesis’ analysis in chapter 6. The first 
article approaches the research question from a methodological framework; it 
analyzes processes of researcher positioning during the fieldwork as sources 
of data and demonstrates how these were indicative of discursive norms ac-
tive in the field. The second article analyzes discourses on mental illness in 
the institutions and looks at their implications for patients. The third article 
explores the professionals’ practices of user involvement and the possibilities 
and constraints for involving patients’ perspectives that emerged in the dis-
cursive context. Finally, in the thesis’ conclusion, the results are recapitulated 
and discussed in relation to the aim of developing a more involving approach 
in the mental health services.  
 
The analyses indicate that psychiatric patients are invited to adopt the prevail-
ing understandings of the institution if they wish to be involved in the treat-
ment. Three distinct institutionally rooted ways of thinking and talking about 
patients’ emotional distress, couched in terms of mental illness, are mapped 
out: the instability discourse, the discourse of “really ill” and the “lack of in-
sight” discourse. It is shown that for patients these bring to the foreground 
particular ways of visualizing and “doing” mental illness, rendering inauthen-
tic or problematic other expressions of distress. Patients are required to de-
velop a finely-tuned and precise sense for the discourses and to make strate-
gic considerations as to how to appear in front of professionals in order to be 
involved in the treatment. Patients who are not able to decode the discursive 
norms appropriately risk becoming unintelligible for the professionals, being 
problematized, or having their views dismissed. At the same time, the thesis 
indicates that both patients and professionals find ways to resist the discur-
sive norms. It is shown that, just as the patients, the professionals have to 
navigate in a contradictory field. On the one hand their work is inscribed in 
ethical ideals about equality and listening to patients, on the other their posi-
tions are grounded in technical discourses on expert knowledge. Involving 
patients’ perspectives therefore entails a complex and difficult balancing act 
for professionals, which often involves a subtle re-negotiation of discursive 
norms. These subtle negotiations can rarely result in more than individualized 
solutions, exercises in “making exceptions”. Additionally, when it comes to 
definitions of mental distress, the degree to which patients’ explanations and 
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understandings may be involved in the treatment is limited, when these con-
flict with mainstream psychiatric definitions. 
 
Just as the discourses provide norms that shape how patients and profession-
als can be defined, they appeared to also provide boundaries for how the re-
searcher could be understood by the participants during the fieldwork. 
Throughout the fieldwork, the categories “patient” and “professional”, and 
the binary pair “pathology” and “normality” worked as a structuring norm in 
all the researcher’s interactions with participants. These binaries left little 
space for negotiating places in between and shaped how the participants 
could interact with the researcher. It is argued that when the researcher’s pro-
cess of positioning becomes inextricably entangled in the available discursive 
norms, this indicates that the norms were broader and distinctly rooted in in-
stitutional processes, rather than just manifestations of individual participants’ 
characteristics.  
 
The results are discussed in relation to recent attempts to implement a more 
inclusive and involving approach in the mental health services. The analyses 
call into question the extent to which psychiatric patients actually can influ-
ence their treatment - since gaining such influence in the first place often 
means that they have to adopt the prevailing assumptions of the institution, 
and sometimes to dismiss their own, in order to be heard. Based on the anal-
yses it is suggested that to practice a more democratic degree of user in-
volvement, mental health professionals would need to be supported in their 
endeavors to involve patients’ perspectives by a system which embraces more 
diverse definitions of mental distress and patienthood. The discussion also 
highlights the importance of involving the people who are using the mental 
health system to a much larger extent in developing models for user involve-
ment. This could perhaps open up for serious engagement with the multiplic-
ity and diversity of patients’ experiences, also when these diverge considerably 
from traditional psychiatric understandings. The thesis thus opens up a dis-
cussion on how psychiatric knowledge is conceptualized and constituted in 
the practices of the mental health services – and the effects this has on pa-









Resumé af afhandlingen 
Afhandlingen “At lytte til patienter: en undersøgelse af sygdomsdiskurser, pa-
tientidentiteter og brugerinddragelse i moderne psykiatrisk praksis” er en un-
dersøgelse af patientidentiteter, psykiatrisk viden og ideer og brugerinddragel-
se i psykiatrien. Brugerinddragelse, eller ønsket om at involvere patienter og 
deres perspektiver mere aktivt i behandlingen, er blevet en vigtig politisk mål-
sætning de sidste årtier. I tråd med poststrukturalistiske perspektiver ser den-
ne afhandling psykiatriens praksisser og sprogbrug som et slags identitetsar-
bejde med patienterne. Afhandlingen nærmer sig derfor spørgsmålet om bru-
gerinddragelse ved at spørge: Hvordan konstitueres identiteter som 
psykiatriske patienter diskursivt? Hvilke implikationer har dette for at invol-
vere patienternes perspektiver i behandlingen?   
 
Afhandlingen benytter sig af en etnografisk metodologi for at studere mødet 
mellem patienter og professionelle samt hvordan mening konstrueres, produ-
ceres og reproduceres i dette. Metoderne består af tre måneders deltagerob-
servation i to psykiatriske institutioner i Danmark - en psykiatrisk klinik og et 
”lukket” sengeafsnit - og interview med 13 patienter og 11 tværfaglige profes-
sionelle. Teoretisk finder undersøgelsen inspiration i Foucaultske perspektiver 
på diskurser, normer og viden samt psykologisk diskursteori, herunder især 
positioneringsteori.  
 
Afhandlingen indleder med at introducere undersøgelsen og nogle af de kon-
troverser og debatter der omgiver den moderne psykiatri. Kapitel 2 diskuterer 
uddrag af den eksisterende, primært kvalitative, forskning om psykiatriske pa-
tienter, professionelles praksisser og brugerinddragelse, og diskuterer denne 
undersøgelses mulige bidrag. Kapitel 3 præsenterer kort psykiatrien ud fra et 
historisk og moderne idehistorisk perspektiv og diskuterer den nutidige dan-
ske psykiatris funktioner og struktur. Det næste kapitel, kapitel 4, diskuterer 
afhandlingens teoretiske og metodologiske perspektiver: ideen om situeret 
viden, Foucaultske perspektiver på sprog, diskurser og viden samt psykolo-
gisk positioneringsteori. I kapitel 5 præsenteres undersøgelsens design, meto-
der og de konkrete settings i hvilke feltarbejdet blev udført, såvel som reflek-
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sioner over forskningsetik og den analytiske proces. Undersøgelsens resultater 
diskuteres i tre artikler, der tilsammen udgør afhandlingens analyse i kapitel 6. 
Den første artikel nærmer sig forskningsspørgsmålet fra en metodologisk 
ramme; den analyserer processer af forskerpositionering i løbet af feltarbejdet 
som empiri - og demonstrerer hvordan disse blev til kilder til viden om de 
diskursive normer i feltet. Den anden artikel analyserer diskurser om psykisk 
sygdom i institutionerne og undersøger disses implikationer for patienterne. 
Den tredje artikel udforsker de professionelles praksisser af brugerinddragelse 
og de muligheder og begrænsninger der opstod i deres diskursive kontekst. I 
afhandlingens konklusion samles der op på resultaterne, og disse diskuteres i 
relationen til ønsket om at fremme en mere involverende tilgang i psykiatrien.  
 
Analyserne peger på at patienterne inviteres til at tilegne sig de dominerende 
forståelser i institutionen, hvis de ønsker at blive involveret i behandlingen. 
Afhandlingen kortlægger tre institutionelt forankrede måder at tænke og tale 
om patienternes problemer i form af psykisk sygdom: ustabilitetsdiskursen, 
”rigtigt syg” diskursen og manglende sygdomsindsigtsdiskursen. Disse diskur-
ser bringer specifikke måder at visualisere psykisk lidelse i forgrunden, hvilket 
medfører at andre udtryk for lidelse ofte opfattes som ikke-autentiske eller 
problematiske. Patienterne er nødt til at udvikle en finfølende og præcis sans 
for diskurserne og lave strategiske overvejelser om hvordan de fremstår over 
for de professionelle, hvis de ønsker at have medindflydelse i behandlingen. 
Patienter, for hvilke det ikke lykkes at aflæse normerne på den ”rigtige måde”, 
risikerer at blive uforståelige for de professionelle, problematiseret, eller at få 
deres forståelser afvist. Samtidig viser afhandlingen at både patienter og pro-
fessionelle finder måder, hvorpå de kan yde modstand mod de dominerende 
diskursive normer. Ligesom patienterne er de professionelle også nødt til at 
navigere i et modsætningsfuldt felt. På den ene side er deres arbejde indskre-
vet i etiske idealer om ligeværdighed og om at lytte til patienterne, på den an-
den side er deres positioner funderet i en teknisk diskurs om ekspertviden. At 
involvere patienternes perspektiver bliver derfor til en kompleks og vanskelig 
balancegang for de professionelle, der ofte indebærer, at diskursive normer 
subtilt skal genforhandles. Denne genforhandling resulterer sjældent i mere 
end individualiserede løsninger, hvor der ”laves en undtagelse”. Afhandlingen 
peger endvidere på, at i spørgsmålet om definitioner af patienternes proble-
mer kan patienternes egne forståelser og oplevelser kun inddrages i meget be-






Ligesom diskurserne skaber normer, der former hvordan patienter og profes-
sionelle kan defineres på, så skabte de også rammer for hvordan forskeren 
kunne forstås af deltagerne i løbet af feltarbejdet. Igennem feltarbejdet blev 
kategorierne ”patient”, ”professionel” og det binære par ”patologi” og ”nor-
malitet” til en strukturerende norm i forskerens interaktioner med deltagerne. 
Disse binære par efterlod meget lidt plads til at forhandle positioner imellem 
og formede hvordan deltagerne kunne interagere med forskeren. Der argu-
menteres således for, at dette peger på at de diskursive normer var brede og 
fast forankret i institutionelle processer, snarere end blot manifestationer af 
individuelle deltageres karakteristik.   
 
Resultaterne diskuteres i forhold til de nye forsøg på at implementere en mere 
inkluderende og involverende psykiatri. Analyserne stiller spørgsmålstegn ved 
i hvor høj grad psykiatriske patienter rent faktisk kan have indflydelse over 
behandlingen, når det at få indflydelse ofte forudsætter at de skal tilegne sig 
de fremherskende forståelser i institutionen, og til tider afvise deres egne, for 
at blive hørt. På baggrund af analyserne argumenteres der for, at for at kunne 
praktisere en mere demokratisk grad af brugerinddragelse, er de professionel-
le nødt til at blive støttet af et system der er mere åbent for multiple definiti-
oner af psykisk lidelse og patienthed, i deres forsøg på at involvere patienter-
nes perspektiver. Ligeledes peges der på vigtigheden af at involvere brugerne 
af det psykiatriske system i langt højere grad til at udvikle modeller for bru-
gerinddragelse. Dette kan åbne op for, at mangfoldigheden og diversiteten i 
patienternes perspektiver tages alvorligt, også når disse adskiller sig betydeligt 
fra traditionelle psykiatriske forståelser. Afhandlingen åbner således op for en 
diskussion om hvordan psykiatrisk viden konceptualiseres i psykiatriske prak-
sisser samt de implikationer dette har for patienter of professionelle.  
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Appendix 1: Information letter about the study  
Sprog og værdier i psykiatrien - et ph.d. projekt om hvad det vil 
sige at være psykiatrisk patient 
 
Agnes Ringer, cand.psych., ph.d.-stipendiat ved Region Sjælland Psykiatri og 
Institut for Psykologi og Uddannelsesforskning, Roskilde Universitet 
 
Vejleder: Annegrethe Ahrenkiel, ph.d., lektor, PAES, RUC 
Bivejleder: Erik Simonsen, ph.d., professor, forskningschef i Region Sjælland 
Psykiatri 
 
Beskrivelse af projektet  
Projektet vil undersøge hvad det indebærer at være patient i psykiatrien i dag. 
Indgangsvinklen til dette er et fokus på sprog, historier og kommunikation i 
psykiatrien. Især fokuserer undersøgelsen på mødet mellem patienter og tvær-
faglige professionelle. Hvordan opfattes det at være patient? Hvad sker der i 
samtalerne mellem patienter og professionelle? Forhandles der om hvad det 
vil sige at være patient og kan dette lede til nye opfattelser? Projektet har til 
formål at bringe ny viden om patienters positioner og hvordan disse eventuelt 
forandres i den nutidige psykiatri. 
 
Fremgangsmåde og teori 
Den empiriske del af projektet foregår på to psykiatriske afdelinger i Region 
Sjælland, en distriktspsykiatrisk afdeling og et sengeafsnit. Metoderne i pro-
jektet er deltagerobservation, interviews, lydoptagelser og analyser af skriftligt 
materiale (patientjournaler, pjecer mv.).  
 
Studiet undersøger hvordan patienter og professionelle skaber mening og in-
teragerer i deres specifikke sociale og kulturelle kontekst. Målet er således at 
se på, hvordan forskellige meninger og praksisser i forhold til at være patient 




Projektet har kontaktet Datatilsynet og Region Sjællands Videnskabsetiske 
komité om tilladelse til at gennemføre studiet. Projektet vil overholde Datatil-
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synets retningslinjer for indsamling og opbevaring af empirisk materiale. Det-
te indebærer, at alle oplysninger der indhentes, bliver behandlet fortroligt, 
opbevares utilgængeligt for andre og anonymiseres, så ingen af deltagerne vil 
kunne genkendes. Båndoptagelserne fra interviewene vil blive slettet efter ud-
skrivning. 
 
De involverede afsnit vil blive informeret om undersøgelsen, og mundtlige og 
skriftlige samtykkeerklæringer vil indhentes fra personalet og de involverede 
patienter. Afsnittene kan på et hvilket som helst tidspunkt trække sig fra un-
dersøgelsen. Tilsvarende kan de enkelte personer fra personalet og de invol-
verede patienter når som helst trække deres tilsagn til deltagelse tilbage.  
 
Hvad indebærer det at deltage i undersøgelsen?  
For de involverede afsnit indebærer undersøgelsen kun lidt ekstraarbejde. 
Udgangspunktet for studiet er, at afsnittene og personalet først og fremmest 
skal gøre som de ”plejer” under observationerne. Ud over dette vil projektet 
indebære enkelte interviews med personale fra forskellige faggrupper og in-
terviews med patienter. Disse vil i højst mulig grad blive tilrettelagt, så de ikke 
forstyrrer planlagte patientforløb. Udover dette vil en nøgleperson (fx en af-
delingsleder) til en vis grad skulle hjælpe med indsamling af skriftligt materiale 
såsom vejledninger, pjecer, patientjournaler mv.  
 
Jeg ser frem til samarbejdet med jer!  
 
Skulle I have spørgsmål til projektet er I velkommen til at kontakte:  
 
Ph.d.-stipendiat Agnes Ringer 
Mail: agmr@regionsjaelland.dk/agnesri@ruc.dk 











Hvad vil det sige at være patient i psykiatrien? 
 
Mit navn er Agnes Ringer. Jeg er i gang med at uddanne mig til forsker 
og laver et forskningsprojekt, hvor jeg prøver på at forstå hvordan det er 
at være patient i psykiatrien og hvordan personalet og patienterne taler 
med hinanden. Jeg kommer derfor til at være herude på afsnittet et par 
dage om ugen fra slutningen af maj og lidt over en måned frem. Forsk-
ningsprojektet er et led i en forskningsuddannelse på Roskilde Universitet. På bag-
grund af projektet vil jeg skrive en bog – den afsluttende ph.d.-afhandling.  
 
Må jeg hilse på dig? 
Min første dag på afsnittet kommer jeg gerne rundt på stuerne og hilser på jer der 
bor her, og bagefter vil jeg gerne være her et par dage om ugen. Jeg vil meget 
gerne lære fra jer, hvordan I oplever det at være her, og hvordan det er at være 
patient i psykiatrien. Hvis det er ok med jer, kommer jeg også gerne med til nogle 
af de samtaler I har med personalet. 
 
Alle der deltager i projektet er anonyme: 
• Jeg vil ikke dele det du fortæller mig med nogen andre, hverken personalet i psy-
kiatrien, andre patienter eller andre forskere 
• I min afhandling vil jeg ikke bruge nogen personlige oplysninger, der ville kunne 
spores tilbage til dig 
• Hvis jeg bruger noget af det du fortæller mig i afhandlingen, vil jeg gøre det i ano-
nymiseret form - på en måde så du ikke vil kunne genkendes 
 
Det er frivilligt at deltage i undersøgelsen, og du kan når som helst bede mig om at 
gå, hvis du har brug for en pause, eller hvis der er noget du ikke har lyst til at jeg er 
med til. 
 
Jeg glæder mig til at komme ud og hilse på jer! 
 
 246 
Agnes Ringer, ph.d.-studerende, Roskilde Universitet  
Mail: agnesri@ruc.dk 
 








Appendix 3: Informed consent for interview 
Informeret samtykke: forskningsprojekt om sprog i psykiatrien 
 
Jeg vil gerne spørge om du vil deltage i følgende anonyme undersøgelse: 
 
Formål 
Projektet hedder ”Sprog og værdier i psykiatrien”. Det handler om at forstå 
hvordan personalet taler med patienter og hvordan det er at være patient i 
psykiatrien. I projektet vil jeg gerne interviewe patienter og nogle behand-
lere, samt være med til jeres samtaler. Jeg er derfor interesseret i din op-
levelse af psykiatrien og hvad du tænker om det at være patient i psyki-
atrien.  
 
Hvem er jeg?  
Mit navn er Agnes Ringer. Jeg er i gang med at uddanne mig til forsker på 
Roskilde Universitet. Undersøgelsen er et led i forskeruddannelsen og skal 
bruges til at skrive en bog – den afsluttende ph.d. afhandling. 
 
Anonymitet og tavshedspligt 
Din deltagelse i undersøgelsen er anonym. Dette indebærer at der er visse 
regler som jeg vil overholde: 
• Jeg har tavshedspligt og vil ikke dele det du fortæller mig med nogen an-
dre, hverken personalet i psykiatrien, andre patienter eller andre forskere  
• Jeg vil ikke bruge dit navn, cpr-nummer eller andre oplysninger som kan 
føres tilbage til dig. Alle de oplysninger jeg får, bliver behandlet fortroligt og 
anonymiseres, så du ikke vil kunne genkendes i afhandlingen 
• Båndoptagelserne fra interviewene og samtalerne vil blive slettet efter 
udskrivning. Dette gør jeg for at sikre dig anonymitet 
 
Interview  
Samtalen varer ca. 1 time og før vores samtale vil jeg bede dig om at un-
derskrive samtykkeerklæringen nederst. Interviewet vil blive optaget på 
bånd, udskrevet til tekst, og dele af dem vil i anonymiseret form kunne ind-
gå i afhandlingen. 
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Jeg vil også bede dig om samtykke til, at jeg får adgang til dele af din pati-
entjournal. Jeg vil ikke bruge journalen til at få personlige oplysninger om 
dig, men til at se på hvordan personalet skriver om deres patienter. 
 
Det er frivilligt at deltage i undersøgelsen, og selvom du har givet tilsagn 
om at deltage, kan du når som helst trække dit tilsagn tilbage. 
 
Har du spørgsmål til undersøgelsen, er du meget velkommen til at kontak-
te mig: 
 
Agnes Ringer, ph.d.-studerende, Roskilde Universitet  
Mail: agnesri@ruc.dk 
 





INFORMERET SAMTYKKE  
 
Tilsagn vedrørende deltagelse i undersøgelsen ”Sprog og værdier i psyki-
atrien”  
 
Navn: ____________________________________________  
 
Fødselsdato: ______________________________________  
 
□ (Sæt kryds) Jeg giver samtykke til at deltage i undersøgelsens inter-
view 
 
□ (Sæt kryds) Jeg giver samtykke til, at undersøgeren får adgang til min 
patientjournal  
  
Jeg er bekendt med, at det er frivilligt at deltage i undersøgelsen, og at jeg 
når som helst kan trække mit tilsagn tilbage. Jeg har fået en kopi af denne 
samtykkeerklæring til eget brug. 
 
 





Dato   Underskrift  
 




Dato  Underskrift 
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Appendix 4: Interview guide for patients 
I. Hvilke narrativer har informanterne om livet før, og grunden til at de er i psykiatri-
en? 
- Prøv på at fortæl lidt om dit liv før du kom i kontakt til psykiatrien? 
- Prøv på at fortælle mig lidt om hvad der ledte til at du kom i kontakt til psykiatrien første 
gang? 
- Hvad skete der så? 
- Hvad tænkte du om det? 
- Kan du fortælle lidt mere om det? 
- Har du nogen eksempler på det? 
 
II. Hvordan oplever informanterne livet i psykiatrien og psykiatriens sprog? 
- Hvis du prøver på at huske tilbage til din kontakt med psykiatrien, kan du fortælle mig om 
nogen episoder som især har været betydningsfulde for dig?  
- Fx første kontakt? 
- Hvordan oplever du nu det at have kontakt til psykiatrien? 
- Hvad synes du især har været betydningsfuldt for dig i din kontakt med psykiatrien? 
- Har du været uenig i noget som blev sagt om dig? Hvad skete der så? 
- Har dine forståelser for dig selv ændret sig siden du fik kontakt til psykiatrien? 
Forskningsspørgsmål: Hvordan oplever informanterne deres deltagelsesmuligheder i psyki-
atrien? 
 
III. Hvordan oplever informanterne deres deltagelsesmuligheder i psykiatrien? 
- Oplever du at de lytter til dig i psykiatrien? 
- Kan du give nogen eksempler? Er der eksempler på det modsatte? 
- Oplever du at du er med i de beslutninger som træffes om dig? 
- Hvordan/hvordan ikke? Kan du give et eksempel? 
- Hvordan tror du at andre patienter oplever det at være i psykiatrien? 
 







Appendix 5: Interview guide for professionals 
I. Baggrundsspørgsmål 
- Hvor gammel er du? Hvor længe har du arbejdet i psykiatrien? Hvad er din uddannelses-
mæssige baggrund? Hvor længe har du været her i teamet? 
- Hvor mange patienter har du? 
- Hvordan ser en typisk arbejdsdag ud for dig? 
II. Hvordan tilskriver informanterne mening til deres arbejde i psykiatrien og deres 
patientforløb? 
- Hvad var det der gjorde at du valgte at arbejde i psykiatrien? 
- Hvad ser du som din rolle i psykiatrien? 
- Hvad ser du som psykiatriens formål? 
- Hvis du kigger tilbage på dine samtaler med patienter, kan du fortælle mig om nogen samta-
ler som især har været betydningsfulde for dig? 
- Har du nogen eksempler på en kontakt med en patient som var rigtig god? 
- Har du nogen eksempler på en kontakt med en patient som var rigtigt dårlig? 
- Så vil jeg gerne spørge dig konkret om nogle af de patienter du har nu… 
III. Hvordan oplever informanterne deres arbejdssituation og hvilke betingelser på-
virker deres kontakt til patienterne? 
- Har du oplevet at din arbejdssituation har ændret sig siden du startede? Hvis ja - hvordan? 
Kan du give nogle eksempler? 
- Hvad tror du det kan have har betydet for din kontakt med patienterne? 
- Hvad oplever du som det bedste ved at arbejde her? 
- Hvad oplever du som det sværeste ved at arbejde her? 
- Har du nogensinde været uenig i den måde ting blev gjort på i psykiatrien? 
IV. Hvad tænker informanterne om brugerstyring? 
- I psykiatrien tales der meget om brugerstyring – er det noget du har tænkt over? Kan du 
nævne nogen eksempler på det? 
- Hvornår ville du sige, at noget var brugerstyret? 
- Hvornår ville du sige, at noget ikke var brugerstyret? 
- Er der noget vigtigt vi ikke har talt om?  
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Appendix 6: Convention of interview transcripts 
The choice of transcription conventions should be closely related to the type 
of analysis one wishes to conduct. My concern in the interviews and the re-
cordings of meetings was primarily with the content of the talk and the 
broader patterns of what was being said. I was less interested in the fine lin-
guistic details and the small moment-by-moment mechanism in the inter-
views. For this reason I adopted the simplified version of the classic Jefferso-
nian transcript convention developed by Wetherell & Potter (1992:226). The 
main conventions are shown beneath: 
 
// - starts of overlap in talk 
(.) – A pause, only timed if it lasts exceptionally long 
... – omitted material (in the particular extract used in the example) 
 (yeah, aha) – Comments from the interviewer, tokens of acknowledgement 
are placed in round brackets within the text of the interviewee 
[inaudible] – Clarification or explanatory material is placed in square brackets 
I felt so bad – words said with particular emphasis are underlined 
She said "I like you" - when the interviewee refers to someone else saying 
something, this is marked with citation signs 
Sounds that are not actual words such as ”Uhm”, ”er” are included, and 
commas, full stops and question marks are placed to improve the readability 







Appendix 7: Diagnostic criteria for schizophre-
nia and borderline personality disorder 
 
ICD-10 (WHO, 1993) diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia 
 
F20 - F29 SCHIZOPHRENIA, SCHIZOTYPAL AND DELUSIONAL 
DISORDERS 
F20-F29  
Schizophrenia, schizotypal and delusional disorders 
F20 Schizophrenia 
F21 Schizotypal disorder  
F22 Persistent delusional disorders 
F23 Acute and transient psychotic disorders 
F24 Induced delusional disorder  
F25 Schizoaffective disorders 
F28 Other nonorganic psychotic disorders  
F29 Unspecified nonorganic psychosis 
 
F20.0 - F20.3 
 General criteria for Paranoid, Hebephrenic, Catatonic and Undifferentiated 
type of Schizophrenia:  
 
G1. Either at least one of the syndromes, symptoms and signs listed below 
under (1), or at least two of the symptoms and signs listed under (2), should 
be present for most of the time during an episode of psychotic illness lasting 
for at least one month (or at some time during most of the days).  
 
 (1) At least one of the following:  
a) Thought echo, thought insertion or withdrawal, or thought broadcasting.  
b) Delusions of control, influence or passivity, clearly referred to body or 
limb movements or specific thoughts,  
actions, or sensations; delusional perception.  
c) Hallucinatory voices giving a running commentary on the patient's behav-
iour, or discussing him between themselves, or other types of hallucinatory 
voices coming from some part of the body.  
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d) Persistent delusions of other kinds that are culturally inappropriate and 
completely impossible (e.g. being able to control the weather, or being in 
communication with aliens from another world).  
 
(2) or at least two of the following:  
e) Persistent hallucinations in any modality, when occurring every day for at 
least one month, when accompanied by delusions (which may be fleeting or 
half-formed) without clear affective content, or when accompanied by persis-
tent over-valued ideas.  
f) Neologisms, breaks or interpolations in the train of thought, resulting in 
incoherence or irrelevant speech.  
g) Catatonic behaviour, such as excitement, posturing or waxy flexibility, neg-
ativism, mutism and stupor.  
h) "Negative" symptoms such as marked apathy, paucity of speech, and 
blunting or incongruity of emotional responses (it must be clear that these are 
not due to depression or to neuroleptic medication). 
 
G2. Most commonly used exclusion criteria: If the patient also meets criteria 
for manic episode (F30) or depressive episode (F32), the criteria listed under 
G1.1 and G1.2 above must have been met before the disturbance of mood 
developed.  
 
G3. The disorder is not attributable to organic brain disease (in the sense of 
F0), or to alcohol- or drug-related intoxication, dependence or withdrawal 
 
ICD-10 (WHO, 1993) Diagnostic criteria for emotionally unstable per-
sonality disorder, borderline type 
 
F60 SPECIFIC PERSONALITY DISORDERS 
 F60.0 Paranoid personality disorder  
 F60.1 Schizoid personality disorder  
 F60.2 Dissocial personality disorder  
 F60.3 Emotionally unstable personality disorder  
 .30 Impulsive type  
 .31 Borderline type  
 F60.4 Histrionic personality disorder  
 F60.5 Anankastic personality disorder  
 F60.6 Anxious [avoidant] personality disorder  





 F60.9 Personality disorder, unspecified 
 
F60 SPECIFIC PERSONALITY DISORDERS 
G1. Evidence that the individual's characteristic and enduring patterns of in-
ner experience and behaviour deviate markedly as a whole from the culturally 
expected and accepted range (or 'norm'). Such deviation must be manifest in 
more than one of the following areas:  
(1) cognition (i.e. ways of perceiving and interpreting things, people and 
events; forming attitudes and images of self and others);  
(2) affectivity (range, intensity and appropriateness of emotional arousal and 
response);  
(3) control over impulses and need gratification;  
(4) relating to others and manner of handling interpersonal situations.  
 
G2. The deviation must manifest itself pervasively as behaviour that is inflex-
ible, maladaptive, or otherwise dysfunctional across a broad range of personal 
and social situations (i.e. not being limited to one specific 'triggering' stimulus 
or situation).  
 
G3. There is personal distress, or adverse impact on the social environment, 
or both, clearly attributable to the behaviour referred to under G2.  
 
G4. There must be evidence that the deviation is stable and of long duration, 
having its onset in late childhood or adolescence.  
 
G5. The deviation cannot be explained as a manifestation or consequence of 
other adult mental disorders, although episodic or chronic conditions from 
sections F0 to F7 of this classification may co-exist, or be superimposed on it.  
 
G6. Organic brain disease, injury, or dysfunction must be excluded as possi-
ble cause of the deviation (if such organic causation is demonstrable, use cat-
egory F07).  
 
Comments: The assessment of G1 to G6 above should be based on as many 
sources of information as possible. Although sometimes it is possible to ob-
tain sufficient evidence from a single interview with the subject, as a general  
rule it is recommended to have more than one interview with the person and 
to collect history data from informants or past records. It is suggested that 
sub-criteria should be developed to operationalize behaviour patterns specific 
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to different cultural settings concerning social norms, rules and obligations 
where needed (such as examples of unresponsibility and disregard of social 
norms in dissocial personality disorder). The diagnosis of personality disorder 
for research purposes requires the identification of a subtype (more than one 
subtype can be coded if there is compelling evidence that the subject meets 
multiple sets of criteria). 
 
F60.3 Emotionally unstable personality disorder 
F60.30 Impulsive type 
A. The general criteria of personality disorder (F60) must be met.  
B. At least three of the following must be present, one of which is (2):  
(1) A marked tendency to act unexpectedly and without consideration of the 
consequences.  
(2) A marked tendency to quarrelsome behaviour and to conflicts with others, 
especially when impulsive acts are thwarted or criticized.  
(3) Liability to outbursts of anger or violence, with inability to control the re-
sulting behavioural explosions.  
(4) Difficulty in maintaining any course of action that offers no immediate 
reward.  
(5) Unstable and capricious mood. 
 
F60.31 Borderline type 
A. The general criteria of personality disorder (F60) must be met.  
B. At least three of the symptoms mentioned above in criterion B (F60.30) 
must be present, and in addition at least two of the following:  
(6) Disturbances in and uncertainty about self-image, aims and internal pref-
erences (including sexual).  
(7) Liability to become involved in intense and unstable relationships, often 
leading to emotional crises. 
 
